Coin Press - Greenland Deal – and now?

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Greenland Deal – and now?




Since the beginning of 2026, a diplomatic thriller has been unfolding around the Arctic island of Greenland. US President Donald Trump, who already wanted to buy the island in 2019, has made his claim state doctrine in his second term in office. He justifies this with geopolitical and security policy arguments and threatens European allies with punitive tariffs. Although the US and NATO have drawn up a preliminary framework agreement in Davos, the situation remains tense – and the inhabitants of Greenland continue to reject the takeover.

A conflict with a history
Trump had already started a trade war with the EU in the spring and summer of 2025. At that time, the Union relented in order to protect its ailing economy. With the mediation of Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Brussels accepted an asymmetrical agreement that abolished all tariffs on US goods, while Washington imposed a basic tariff of 15 per cent on imports from Europe and even higher tariffs on certain products. This ‘tariff turnaround’ served as a model for how the US president uses economic pressure to achieve political goals. When Trump renewed his threat in January 2026, he once again took a heavy toll on the trade front: from 1 February, tariffs of 10 per cent were to be imposed on goods from Germany, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands, rising to 25 per cent from 1 June – unless Denmark sold Greenland. For Germany's export-oriented industry, whose shipments to the US had already slumped by almost ten per cent in 2025, further tariffs would be a severe blow. Industry association representatives warned that the loss of confidence caused by Trump's unpredictability was jeopardising investment.

Threats and military signals
Trump justifies his demand for the takeover of Greenland by pointing out that Russia and China could gain a military foothold there. On 9 January, he declared that the US would not allow other powers to occupy the island; if Denmark did not sell, Washington would have to act ‘in a pleasant or more difficult manner’. In his short message service, he emphasised that the US had subsidised Europe for decades and that it was ‘time to give something back’. Words like these provoke memories of the Alaska and Louisiana purchases of the 19th century.

Europe responded to the threat not only with outrage, but also with action. Because talks between Denmark and the US had remained fruitless, several NATO countries sent a reconnaissance contingent to Greenland in mid-January; 15 German soldiers also took part. The mission was intended to assess the conditions for joint manoeuvres and to draw a ‘red line’ in the ice. The EU also issued a joint statement: it stood by the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity, customs threats endangered transatlantic relations, and it would respond in a united and coordinated manner. Vice-Chancellor Lars Klingbeil warned that Europe must not allow itself to be blackmailed. At the political level, individual states reacted differently: French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer openly condemned the threats, while German Chancellor Merz initially remained silent. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni called the tariffs ‘a mistake’ and called for de-escalation.

Trump's actions were also controversial in the US. Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer announced his intention to stop the additional tariffs, with both Democrats and Republicans warning that higher tariffs would increase prices for families and businesses. Several governors – including Andy Beshear of Kentucky and Gretchen Whitmer of Michigan – described Trump's claim to Greenland as ‘stupid’ and emphasised that Americans did not want a takeover. Even Republican Governor Kevin Stitt admitted that the US could already establish military bases on the island and did not need to own it.

The supposed breakthrough in Davos
On the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Donald Trump met with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 21 January 2026. He then made a surprise announcement that a ‘great solution’ was in sight: a framework agreement had been reached, so the tariffs planned for 1 February would not be imposed for the time being.

Rutte confirmed that there was a rough plan and that further talks would follow. According to information from participants, the draft consists of four points: First, Washington will refrain from imposing the planned punitive tariffs for the time being; second, the 1951 stationing agreement is to be revised, taking into account the ‘Golden Dome’ missile defence project for a greater US presence in the Arctic; Thirdly, the US will have a say in investments in Greenland in order to prevent influence from China and Russia. Fourthly, European NATO countries will commit to greater involvement in the Arctic.

However, many questions remain unanswered. Neither Trump nor Rutte mentioned the sensitive issue of sovereignty, which Rutte said was ‘not an issue’. Observers therefore warn that this is merely a rough draft. European governments are urging caution and view the turnaround more as a respite. The EU special summit on the customs crisis is to take place despite the supposed deal in order to discuss a joint strategy.

Why Greenland is so coveted
Greenland is the world's largest island, rich in rare earths, gold, diamonds, uranium, zinc, lead and potential oil and gas reserves. Strategically located on the shortest route between North America and Europe, it already hosts a US air force base with an early warning system for ballistic missiles. Climate change is opening up new shipping routes, making the Arctic more economically attractive. For Washington, it is crucial that no other major power gains a foothold on the island. The Biden administration has already agreed on extensive access to the base in stationing agreements with Denmark; expansion would be possible even without a change of ownership.

Greenlanders say no – the people are fighting back
While politicians haggle over geopolitical treaties, the people of Greenland are speaking out. A survey conducted by the opinion research institute Verian on behalf of the Greenlandic newspaper Sermitsiaq and the Danish daily Berlingske found that 85 per cent of residents reject integration into the US; only six per cent would agree to annexation, while nine per cent are undecided. Deutschlandfunk also reported on a survey according to which 85 percent of Greenlanders reject the US plans.

Former head of government Múte B. Egede already stated in early 2025: "We don't want to be Danes. We don't want to be Americans either. We want to be Greenlanders." This statement sums up the mood of many citizens who have been campaigning for greater independence from Denmark for years but do not want to accept a new colonial ruler. Greenland's current head of government, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, is also pursuing a cautious path to independence. On 17 January 2026, under his leadership, thousands of demonstrators marched to the US consulate in Nuuk to protest against Trump's claims.

Europe between dependence and self-assertion
The Greenland dispute highlights how dependent European security is on the US. Several guests on the ZDF talk show ‘Maybrit Illner’ pointed out that Europe would not be viable today without NATO; the US provides the nuclear umbrella and many important capabilities. Experts therefore warned against an escalation that could lead to a breakdown of the alliance. On the programme, CDU foreign policy expert Norbert Röttgen remarked: ‘What is he supposed to do if the Greenlanders say no? Should he send 10,000 soldiers into the ice?’ Former Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, now President of the UN General Assembly, referred to the United Nations Charter: states have no right to invade the territory of other states, and the law of the strongest must not apply.

Nevertheless, there is a growing desire in Europe to become more independent. During Trump's first term in office, the EU laid the foundation for a European defence union with the ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’ (PESCO). But true military sovereignty is still a long way off; many states fear they would be vulnerable without US support. At the same time, observers point out that Trump's pressure could also be directed against European regulations such as digital taxes or data protection guidelines.

Analysis and short-term outlook
The announcement of a framework agreement in Davos has defused the conflict over Greenland, at least for the time being. However, the alleged deal is based on vague wording. The central issue of sovereignty has been left out, and even US negotiators admit that the details still need to be worked out. The four agreed pillars – suspension of tariffs, reassessment of the stationing agreement, US say in investments and stronger European engagement – could be delayed indefinitely in practice. As long as Washington is not granted the right to annexation, Trump will continue to exert pressure.

For the EU, it remains a balancing act: on the one hand, it does not want to jeopardise its most important economic relations with the US; on the other hand, it must show that it defends the sovereignty of its members and partners. The conflict has reignited the debate on European autonomy. At the same time, cracks in the transatlantic partnership will not heal by themselves.

Meanwhile, the people of Greenland have made it clear that they are not prepared to sell their island. As long as this attitude persists, Trump will not be able to impose his will without resorting to massive force. And as Norbert Röttgen mockingly asked on a talk show, this would probably require sending 10,000 soldiers into the snow – a scenario that is not very popular even in Washington. In this respect, it seems likely that the dispute over Greenland will continue to strain transatlantic relations until a solution is found that respects both the security interests of the US and the sovereignty of the island's inhabitants.



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Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Да здравствует Украина

Es lebe die Ukraine - Да здравствует Украина - Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Nech žije Ukrajina - Länge leve Ukraina - תחי אוקראינה - Lang leve Oekraïne - Да живее Украйна - Elagu Ukraina - Kauan eläköön Ukraina - Vive l'Ukraine - Ζήτω η Ουκρανία - 乌克兰万岁 - Viva Ucrania - Ať žije Ukrajina - Çok yaşa Ukrayna - Viva a Ucrânia - Trăiască Ucraina - ウクライナ万歳 - Tegyvuoja Ukraina - Lai dzīvo Ukraina - Viva l'Ucraina - Hidup Ukraina - تحيا أوكرانيا - Vivat Ucraina - ขอให้ยูเครนจงเจริญ - Ucraina muôn năm - ژوندی دی وی اوکراین - Yashasin Ukraina - Озак яшә Украина - Živjela Ukrajina - 우크라이나 만세 - Mabuhay ang Ukraine - Lenge leve Ukraina - Nyob ntev Ukraine - Да живее Украина - გაუმარჯოს უკრაინას - Hidup Ukraine - Vivu Ukrainio - Længe leve Ukraine - Živjela Ukrajina - Жыве Украіна - Yaşasın Ukrayna - Lengi lifi Úkraína - Lank lewe die Oekraïne

Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

Europe’s arms money maze

Europe’s rearmament has acquired an uncomfortable companion: uncertainty about what the money actually buys. In Germany, an argument over defence-related borrowing has raised questions about whether exceptional debt is producing genuinely additional expenditure. In Estonia, unreliable inventory records and disputed ammunition contracts have brought ministerial accountability into the foreground. These are different problems, but they meet at the same point: a larger budget is not a reliable measure of a stronger defence.The contention that nobody knows what is happening to Europe’s weapons money goes too far. Budgets are published, procurement bodies operate and auditors are identifying failures. Nor do these cases establish that funds have disappeared into Russian hands or that the Kremlin engineered the difficulties. The more defensible conclusion is also more useful: Europe cannot judge rearmament by the volume of money announced. It must establish what has been purchased, accepted and made ready for use.That distinction matters strategically. An adversary need not steal the money to benefit from delays, unusable equipment or a loss of confidence in the governments spending it.What the €800 billion actually meansThe scale of the spending is substantial. Combined defence expenditure across the European Union reached €418 billion in 2025, with €454 billion estimated for 2026. Those annual totals should not be confused with the much larger, multi-year headline attached to the EU’s rearmament financing plan. The widely cited €800 billion is potential financing capacity, not a single fund already transferred to arms manufacturers. Its main components are approximately €650 billion in possible additional national expenditure enabled by fiscal flexibility over four years, and €150 billion in loans through the Security Action for Europe instrument, known as SAFE. The loans must be repaid; the additional national spending depends on governments choosing to use the available room.These distinctions are indispensable to any honest assessment. Permission to borrow is not an order placed with a factory. An order is not a completed delivery. Equipment delivered to a warehouse is not necessarily equipment that troops can operate, maintain and replenish. Treating all these stages as interchangeable allows governments to claim progress before the military benefit exists.It also creates a temptation to add together figures that describe different periods or overlapping flows of money. A credible account of rearmament should distinguish financing arrangements from annual expenditure, and both from verified outputs. Otherwise, the public is left comparing impressive totals whose practical meaning is unclear.Germany’s argument over additional spendingOn 10 September, the Ifo Institute challenged the use of Germany’s defence-related borrowing exemption. It calculated an €11 billion gap between additional borrowing and the year-on-year increase in the relevant expenditure. Ifo’s argument was that 38.5 per cent of the additional debt had not produced additional defence and security spending, instead freeing room for other purposes in the ordinary budget. The Finance Ministry rejected the comparison as legally and methodologically flawed. The exemption concerns qualifying expenditure above one per cent of gross domestic product, rather than an increase over the previous year. Ifo, for its part, said its analysis concerned additional spending, not constitutionality.This is not evidence that €11 billion was stolen. It is a dispute over the relationship between an exceptional borrowing mechanism and the political expectation attached to it. The difference is important: an arrangement can comply with its legal design while delivering less additional expenditure than citizens understand the announcement to promise.The practical question is whether new borrowing expands defence capacity or changes the way existing commitments are financed. Those outcomes can coexist within the same budget. Refinancing an established obligation may be lawful and fiscally useful, but it should not be presented as though an equivalent amount of new military capability has been purchased. Germany’s dispute therefore points to a straightforward transparency test. Governments should identify the expenditure that would have occurred anyway, the genuinely additional commitments and the delivery milestones attached to them. Without that comparison, the argument risks becoming a contest between accounting definitions while the central question—what the armed forces actually gain—remains unanswered.Estonia’s warning from the accountsIn Estonia, the problems are more immediate. Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur announced on 2 September that he would step down, accepting political responsibility for failures exposed in defence administration and procurement. His announcement did not amount to an admission of personal corruption.The National Audit Office issued a qualified opinion concerning defence inventories valued at approximately €1.2 billion because their quantities, composition and valuation could not be established reliably. It also questioned an unexplained retrospective adjustment of €99.7 million to the previous year’s inventory figures. That does not mean €1.2 billion of weapons has vanished. An unreliable balance is not the same thing as a proven loss. It means the records are insufficiently dependable to establish what the balance represents—a serious weakness in any organisation, and particularly consequential in one responsible for military readiness.Inadequate records can obstruct decisions long before a final financial loss is demonstrated. Commanders and purchasing authorities need to distinguish usable stock from equipment awaiting inspection, repair or replacement. If those categories are unclear, another procurement decision may rest on a mistaken understanding of what is already available.Auditing is therefore more than an exercise in retrospective blame. A trustworthy inventory helps determine what must be bought next, how urgently it is needed and whether previous purchases fulfilled their purpose. Poor accounting can undermine operational planning even where no theft is established.Paid for is not the same as usableEstonia’s ammunition procurement for Ukraine illustrates a second difficulty. The audit identified disputed advance payments and warned of a potential exposure to the state budget of around €70 million. That figure describes a risk, not a final, adjudicated loss.The controversy includes contracts involving the Italian company Datasel. Pevkur described ammunition delivered under the disputed arrangements as incomplete and of insufficient quality, rather than simply non-existent. Datasel disputes the criticism and has said that goods delivered and invoiced were worth approximately €58 million against about €59 million in advances. The company’s account is a contested position, not a judicial finding.The disagreement exposes a distinction that matters beyond this particular supplier. A payment record, an invoice, the physical presence of goods and acceptance of those goods for their intended use answer different questions. A supplier may point to shipments while a purchasing authority disputes whether the contractual requirement has been met. The existence of equipment does not, by itself, resolve an argument over quality or completeness.For Ukraine, the decisive consideration is usable military support. For the public authorities financing it, the additional questions are whether payment conditions were appropriate, inspections were timely and contractual protections can recover money when performance is disputed. Those questions should be settled through evidence and the relevant proceedings, not through premature declarations of guilt.The procurement lesson is nonetheless clear. Emergency purchasing needs traceable contracts, independently verified acceptance and a dependable record linking each payment to performance. Urgency may justify faster decisions. It cannot make the distinction between an invoice and a functioning delivery disappear.An oversight system split across institutionsEurope’s defence financing does not sit within a single system of scrutiny. National budgets, EU programmes, loans and off-budget arrangements have different institutional responsibilities. The European Court of Auditors’ September review described complex governance and uneven oversight arrangements, rather than a continent-wide absence of auditing.SAFE falls within the European Court of Auditors’ remit. The European Peace Facility, outside the ordinary EU budget, has its own College of Auditors. National defence expenditure is scrutinised through national institutions. The distinction is between different mandates, not between money that is automatically checked and money that is automatically unaccountable. The difficulty arises at the joins. A public explanation may follow the announcement of a financing package, while a procurement body follows the contract and an operational authority follows the equipment. Unless those accounts can be reconciled, citizens and legislators may struggle to establish the complete journey from political promise to accepted delivery.Secrecy complicates that task, but it need not prevent it. Publishing ammunition locations or technical vulnerabilities would be irresponsible. Giving properly authorised auditors access to contracts, inspections and payment records is a different matter. The need to protect operational information should not become a general excuse for withholding financial evidence.Nor should procurement integrity be treated as a rival to speed. Clearly assigned responsibility, verifiable milestones and early checks can prevent disputes from developing into expensive attempts to recover money after the event. The relevant choice is between controls that work during procurement and explanations demanded after something has gone wrong.Where Putin could benefitThese failures do not establish that Vladimir Putin has obtained everything he wanted. A Europe that turns rising expenditure into effective forces would represent a very different outcome. There is also no demonstrated Russian role in the particular German budget dispute or the Estonian accounting and contractual problems described here.The potential advantage for Moscow is indirect. Delayed or disputed deliveries can leave the intended recipient weaker than the expenditure suggests. Confusing financial claims can make it harder to defend further commitments. A succession of procurement controversies could erode confidence not only in individual contracts, but in the wider case for supporting Ukraine and strengthening European defence.That is a strategic risk, not proof of an accomplished Russian victory. The public identification of problems is itself evidence that scrutiny exists. A minister accepting political responsibility, auditors challenging unreliable balances and a government being pressed to explain its borrowing are mechanisms through which democratic systems can correct failure. Their value depends on what happens afterwards.The answer is neither to abandon rearmament nor to shield it from criticism. Governments should report progress in terms that connect money to results: contracts awarded, payments made, equipment accepted and capabilities available, with sensitive details reserved for secure oversight. Disputed transactions should remain visible until resolved rather than disappearing beneath the next spending announcement.Europe does not need to prove its determination by producing another larger number. It needs to demonstrate that the money already committed is becoming usable strength. Until it does, the distance between those two things remains an opportunity for the adversary it is trying to deter.