Coin Press - Greenland Deal – and now?

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Greenland Deal – and now?




Since the beginning of 2026, a diplomatic thriller has been unfolding around the Arctic island of Greenland. US President Donald Trump, who already wanted to buy the island in 2019, has made his claim state doctrine in his second term in office. He justifies this with geopolitical and security policy arguments and threatens European allies with punitive tariffs. Although the US and NATO have drawn up a preliminary framework agreement in Davos, the situation remains tense – and the inhabitants of Greenland continue to reject the takeover.

A conflict with a history
Trump had already started a trade war with the EU in the spring and summer of 2025. At that time, the Union relented in order to protect its ailing economy. With the mediation of Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Brussels accepted an asymmetrical agreement that abolished all tariffs on US goods, while Washington imposed a basic tariff of 15 per cent on imports from Europe and even higher tariffs on certain products. This ‘tariff turnaround’ served as a model for how the US president uses economic pressure to achieve political goals. When Trump renewed his threat in January 2026, he once again took a heavy toll on the trade front: from 1 February, tariffs of 10 per cent were to be imposed on goods from Germany, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands, rising to 25 per cent from 1 June – unless Denmark sold Greenland. For Germany's export-oriented industry, whose shipments to the US had already slumped by almost ten per cent in 2025, further tariffs would be a severe blow. Industry association representatives warned that the loss of confidence caused by Trump's unpredictability was jeopardising investment.

Threats and military signals
Trump justifies his demand for the takeover of Greenland by pointing out that Russia and China could gain a military foothold there. On 9 January, he declared that the US would not allow other powers to occupy the island; if Denmark did not sell, Washington would have to act ‘in a pleasant or more difficult manner’. In his short message service, he emphasised that the US had subsidised Europe for decades and that it was ‘time to give something back’. Words like these provoke memories of the Alaska and Louisiana purchases of the 19th century.

Europe responded to the threat not only with outrage, but also with action. Because talks between Denmark and the US had remained fruitless, several NATO countries sent a reconnaissance contingent to Greenland in mid-January; 15 German soldiers also took part. The mission was intended to assess the conditions for joint manoeuvres and to draw a ‘red line’ in the ice. The EU also issued a joint statement: it stood by the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity, customs threats endangered transatlantic relations, and it would respond in a united and coordinated manner. Vice-Chancellor Lars Klingbeil warned that Europe must not allow itself to be blackmailed. At the political level, individual states reacted differently: French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer openly condemned the threats, while German Chancellor Merz initially remained silent. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni called the tariffs ‘a mistake’ and called for de-escalation.

Trump's actions were also controversial in the US. Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer announced his intention to stop the additional tariffs, with both Democrats and Republicans warning that higher tariffs would increase prices for families and businesses. Several governors – including Andy Beshear of Kentucky and Gretchen Whitmer of Michigan – described Trump's claim to Greenland as ‘stupid’ and emphasised that Americans did not want a takeover. Even Republican Governor Kevin Stitt admitted that the US could already establish military bases on the island and did not need to own it.

The supposed breakthrough in Davos
On the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Donald Trump met with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 21 January 2026. He then made a surprise announcement that a ‘great solution’ was in sight: a framework agreement had been reached, so the tariffs planned for 1 February would not be imposed for the time being.

Rutte confirmed that there was a rough plan and that further talks would follow. According to information from participants, the draft consists of four points: First, Washington will refrain from imposing the planned punitive tariffs for the time being; second, the 1951 stationing agreement is to be revised, taking into account the ‘Golden Dome’ missile defence project for a greater US presence in the Arctic; Thirdly, the US will have a say in investments in Greenland in order to prevent influence from China and Russia. Fourthly, European NATO countries will commit to greater involvement in the Arctic.

However, many questions remain unanswered. Neither Trump nor Rutte mentioned the sensitive issue of sovereignty, which Rutte said was ‘not an issue’. Observers therefore warn that this is merely a rough draft. European governments are urging caution and view the turnaround more as a respite. The EU special summit on the customs crisis is to take place despite the supposed deal in order to discuss a joint strategy.

Why Greenland is so coveted
Greenland is the world's largest island, rich in rare earths, gold, diamonds, uranium, zinc, lead and potential oil and gas reserves. Strategically located on the shortest route between North America and Europe, it already hosts a US air force base with an early warning system for ballistic missiles. Climate change is opening up new shipping routes, making the Arctic more economically attractive. For Washington, it is crucial that no other major power gains a foothold on the island. The Biden administration has already agreed on extensive access to the base in stationing agreements with Denmark; expansion would be possible even without a change of ownership.

Greenlanders say no – the people are fighting back
While politicians haggle over geopolitical treaties, the people of Greenland are speaking out. A survey conducted by the opinion research institute Verian on behalf of the Greenlandic newspaper Sermitsiaq and the Danish daily Berlingske found that 85 per cent of residents reject integration into the US; only six per cent would agree to annexation, while nine per cent are undecided. Deutschlandfunk also reported on a survey according to which 85 percent of Greenlanders reject the US plans.

Former head of government Múte B. Egede already stated in early 2025: "We don't want to be Danes. We don't want to be Americans either. We want to be Greenlanders." This statement sums up the mood of many citizens who have been campaigning for greater independence from Denmark for years but do not want to accept a new colonial ruler. Greenland's current head of government, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, is also pursuing a cautious path to independence. On 17 January 2026, under his leadership, thousands of demonstrators marched to the US consulate in Nuuk to protest against Trump's claims.

Europe between dependence and self-assertion
The Greenland dispute highlights how dependent European security is on the US. Several guests on the ZDF talk show ‘Maybrit Illner’ pointed out that Europe would not be viable today without NATO; the US provides the nuclear umbrella and many important capabilities. Experts therefore warned against an escalation that could lead to a breakdown of the alliance. On the programme, CDU foreign policy expert Norbert Röttgen remarked: ‘What is he supposed to do if the Greenlanders say no? Should he send 10,000 soldiers into the ice?’ Former Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, now President of the UN General Assembly, referred to the United Nations Charter: states have no right to invade the territory of other states, and the law of the strongest must not apply.

Nevertheless, there is a growing desire in Europe to become more independent. During Trump's first term in office, the EU laid the foundation for a European defence union with the ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’ (PESCO). But true military sovereignty is still a long way off; many states fear they would be vulnerable without US support. At the same time, observers point out that Trump's pressure could also be directed against European regulations such as digital taxes or data protection guidelines.

Analysis and short-term outlook
The announcement of a framework agreement in Davos has defused the conflict over Greenland, at least for the time being. However, the alleged deal is based on vague wording. The central issue of sovereignty has been left out, and even US negotiators admit that the details still need to be worked out. The four agreed pillars – suspension of tariffs, reassessment of the stationing agreement, US say in investments and stronger European engagement – could be delayed indefinitely in practice. As long as Washington is not granted the right to annexation, Trump will continue to exert pressure.

For the EU, it remains a balancing act: on the one hand, it does not want to jeopardise its most important economic relations with the US; on the other hand, it must show that it defends the sovereignty of its members and partners. The conflict has reignited the debate on European autonomy. At the same time, cracks in the transatlantic partnership will not heal by themselves.

Meanwhile, the people of Greenland have made it clear that they are not prepared to sell their island. As long as this attitude persists, Trump will not be able to impose his will without resorting to massive force. And as Norbert Röttgen mockingly asked on a talk show, this would probably require sending 10,000 soldiers into the snow – a scenario that is not very popular even in Washington. In this respect, it seems likely that the dispute over Greenland will continue to strain transatlantic relations until a solution is found that respects both the security interests of the US and the sovereignty of the island's inhabitants.



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Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

Beijing's new Taiwan playbook

Beijing's military machinery and political ambitions have moved it closer to a point where it could attempt to seize Taiwan by force.  Decades of double‑digit defence spending have yielded advanced amphibious assault vessels, fleets of hypersonic and ballistic missiles and an air force that can saturate airspace around the island.  Naval analysts note that the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s new Type 054B guided‑missile frigates incorporate artificial‑intelligence‑enabled sensors to improve anti‑submarine warfare and fleet air defence and can undertake long‑range escort missions.  Dozens of civilian‑flagged research vessels, operating under the cover of scientific exploration, have spent years mapping the seabed across the western Pacific and as far afield as Guam and Hawaii to improve Chinese submarine navigation and to erode the United States’ traditional advantage in undersea warfare.  Expanded missile launch infrastructure in Xinjiang, featuring scores of launch pads, is intended to increase the survivability of China’s land‑based nuclear forces.Yet despite these capabilities, Beijing has shown little appetite for a near‑term invasion.  A recent threat assessment by the United States’ intelligence community concluded that Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion by 2027 and lack a fixed timetable for unification.  Taiwan’s defence ministry concurs that China’s build‑up is relentless but emphasises that deterrence, rather than assumptions about invasion windows, will shape Beijing’s calculations.  Analysts argue that a war would trigger unprecedented economic costs.  Taiwan’s semiconductor industry underpins global technology supply chains and about a fifth of world trade transits the Taiwan Strait.  Any conflict that closed this artery would reverberate through financial markets, manufacturing and energy supplies.  Even without U.S. intervention, Chinese leadership would risk social stability at home if a miscalculated assault stalled or provoked severe sanctions.Against this backdrop, Beijing has refined what some analysts describe as a grey‑zone strategy — a web of coercive measures designed to wear down Taiwan’s morale and manoeuvre it towards “reunification” without firing a shot.  People’s Liberation Army aircraft entered Taiwan’s air defence identification zone more than three hundred times a month after William Lai’s 2024 election, only for the number of incursions to fall sharply in 2026 as planners redistributed sorties to training and maintenance.  China’s coast guard now conducts routine multi‑ship patrols in the restricted waters around Kinmen and Pratas, two Taiwanese‑administered archipelagos close to the mainland, to normalise jurisdictional claims and erode Taiwan’s threat awareness.  As part of the large‑scale “Strait Thunder 2025A” and “Justice Mission 2025” exercises, the People’s Liberation Army practised cutting power and blockading Taiwan’s liquefied natural gas terminals — a rehearsal for imposing energy strangulation during a future crisis.Energy insecurity is a key prong of Beijing’s hybrid approach.  Taiwan imports around 97 percent of its energy, with liquefied natural gas accounting for roughly half of electricity generation.  When war in Iran temporarily choked off shipments through the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year, Chinese‑language social media channels flooded TikTok and Xiaohongshu with ominous videos claiming Taiwan’s gas reserves would expire within a fortnight and extolling “peaceful unification” as the only remedy.  Officials from the Taiwan Affairs Office even offered to supply electricity and gas from the mainland as soon as Taiwan surrendered its sovereignty.  Taiwan’s government countered by publicising the diversification of its imports, increasing strategic reserves and conducting joint navy‑coast‑guard drills to escort fuel tankers through potential blockades.  Such moves aim to reassure citizens and blunt the psychological impact of Beijing’s energy narratives.Political infiltration forms another component of the grey‑zone campaign.  Beijing has long supported parties in Taiwan that advocate a looser relationship with the mainland, but recent cases show a willingness to back actors whose public stance on unification is ambiguous.  Taiwanese courts convicted a former spokesperson for the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) after she accepted funds from Chinese handlers and provided contact lists of government agencies.  Investigators say the case is not isolated: election interference and covert recruitment have targeted both the centrist TPP and elements of the governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).  At the international level, Chinese diplomats persuade or pressure host governments to label Taiwan as a province of China; 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