Coin Press - New York’s lost Luster

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New York’s lost Luster




New York City long prided itself on drawing the world’s brightest minds and deepest pockets. Yet the past decade has brought a slow ebb in the pool of people who power its economy. Population figures show the city’s ascent faltering: after years of growth, the number of residents began to decline in 2017 and then plunged by nearly half a million between April 2020 and July 2022. A modest rebound of about 120 000 people since 2022, largely through international migration, has not fully offset the losses. Domestic migration patterns reveal that most leavers initially head to suburbs around New York, but the states that gain the most are low‑tax, fast‑growing destinations such as Florida and Texas. High costs and quality‑of‑life concerns are recurring themes among those who leave.

Recent estimates released in 2025 show that New York’s pandemic‑era population decline is reversing. The city added about 87 000 residents between July 2023 and July 2024, lifting its total population to roughly 8.478 million. The state as a whole gained around 130 000 residents over the same period, recouping one‑third of the half‑million people lost between April 2020 and July 2022. These two consecutive years of growth reflect improved counts of international migration and shelter populations. Nevertheless, net domestic outmigration remains substantial—around 121 000 people in 2024—though that figure marks the lowest level since 2013 and is largely driven by low‑ and middle‑income households.

Millionaires and high‑earners: shrinking share of the nation’s wealth
New York’s public services depend heavily on a small number of wealthy residents. In 2022 millionaires represented less than 1 % of tax filers yet provided 44 % of state and 40 % of city personal‑income tax revenue. That reliance is threatened by a marked decline in the city’s share of national wealth. From 2010 to 2022 New York’s share of the United States’ millionaire households fell from 12.7 % to 8.7 %, dropping the state from second to fourth place behind California, Florida and Texas. While the number of millionaires in New York almost doubled during that period, comparable households more than tripled in California and Texas and quadrupled in Florida. Had New York retained its 2010 share of millionaires, the state and city would have collected about US$13 billion more in personal‑income tax in 2022.

The erosion is visible in migration data. Between 2019 and 2020, tax filings show that the number of city residents earning between US$150 000 and US$750 000 fell by nearly six percent, while those making more than US$750 000 dropped by almost ten percent. A study of address‑change data compiled by the state’s tax department found that in 2020 and 2021 more than six percent of millionaire households updated their addresses to locations outside New York; by 2023 that rate had fallen to below three percent, but it remains higher than before the pandemic. Meanwhile, high earners pay a combined state and city marginal tax rate that can exceed 13.5 %, a national high. Moving to nearby Connecticut can save a household earning US$1 million more than US$70 000 a year in state and local income taxes, and a US$5 million property can attract roughly US$23 000–48 000 less in annual property taxes. Such disparities give affluent households incentives to move without losing access to New York’s cultural attractions.

The pull of the Sun Belt and other competitors
The magnetism of Florida and Texas rests not only on their sunny climates. Neither state levies an income tax, and both boast lower living costs. Census data released in January 2025 show that Florida gained around 64 000 residents from other states between July 2023 and July 2024, while Texas added more than 85 000. During the same period New York recorded a net domestic migration loss of roughly 121 000 people. A report tracking wealth flows found that between 2013 and 2022 New York lost about US$517.5 billion in cumulative resident income as households moved away, while New Jersey lost US$170.1 billion; Florida on the other hand gained over US$1 trillion. Average incomes of people relocating from New York to Florida’s Miami‑Dade and Palm Beach counties exceeded US$266 000 and US$189 000 respectively.

Low taxes are not the only attraction. A detailed look at job trends reveals that New York is slowly losing ground in industries it once dominated. Since 1990 the share of city workers employed in finance and insurance has slipped from 11.5 % to 7.7 %. Of the 233 000 finance jobs created nationwide over the past five years, the state captured only 19 000. Major firms have been shifting managers and back‑office staff to lower‑cost markets such as Dallas, Salt Lake City, Alpharetta (Georgia) and Charlotte. New York’s combined state and local corporate tax rate can exceed 18 %, according to business associations; regulatory mandates on hiring practices and the high cost of compliance further add to operating expenses. These pressures encourage both start‑ups and established institutions to look elsewhere.

Lifestyle factors compound the economic calculus. Median monthly rent in the city now exceeds US$3 600, more than twice the US$1 700 average across the 50 largest U.S. cities. Annual nursery‑care fees average about US$26 000 and basic car insurance costs roughly US$1 729—both among the highest in the country. The federal cap on state‑and‑local tax deductions introduced in 2017 has increased effective tax rates for wealthy residents. High costs of living and limited deductions are cited by some of the city’s billionaire investors, including Paul Singer and Carl Icahn, who moved to Florida in recent years.

Business relocations and the corporate drip
Concerns over the city’s direction intensified after proposals for higher income and corporate taxes gained traction in the 2025 mayoral election. In the weeks following the vote, state records in Florida show that at least 27 firms registered by New York owners applied to expand operations there, while nine filed to relocate entirely. The mayor of Boca Raton reported that four corporate headquarters are already planning moves to his city, and he has received “too many to count” inquiries since the election. Local economic‑development officials in South Florida confirm that investment bankers and hedge‑fund managers are increasingly scouting office space. Civic leaders have responded by offering targeted incentives and promising to address growing pains such as housing and transport.

At home the city’s business landscape is changing. A moving‑industry report based on 24 million recorded moves found that from May 2024 to October 2025 New York lost 8 400 jobs in finance and more than 1 200 chain retail stores closed. While the data do not capture every corporate decision, they suggest that the losses are concentrated in high‑paying sectors that underpin the city’s tax base. Job growth since the pandemic has been skewed toward lower‑paid fields such as home healthcare and social assistance. Inflation‑adjusted private‑sector wages in New York fell 9 % between January 2020 and August 2025, whereas national wages rose 3 %.

Not just the wealthy: the middle‑class exodus
The narrative of billionaires fleeing masks a broader challenge. Data from the same moving‑industry report reveal that households earning between US$51 000 and US$200 000 account for the largest number of departures from New York City. People making US$51 000–100 000 recorded 66 158 outflows, followed closely by the US$101 000–200 000 group with 62 209. In contrast, departures among high‑income residents fell after the 2025 primary election. The report also notes that 88 % of newcomers earn under US$200 000, signalling a shift toward a lower‑income demographic. Working‑class and middle‑income households cite rising housing costs and the cost of raising children as primary reasons for leaving.

Research by an independent fiscal institute offers further nuance. After analysing eight years of migration records, the institute found that high earners typically move out of New York State at about one‑quarter the rate of other residents. The surge in wealthy departures during 2020 and 2021 was largely a temporary response to pandemic‑induced remote work. Migration rates for high earners returned to pre‑pandemic levels by 2022, and the state gained 17 500 millionaire households from 2020 through 2022 despite losing about 2 400. Statistical analysis showed no significant evidence that recent tax increases prompted high‑income migration; when affluent New Yorkers do move, they often choose other high‑tax states. Independent fact‑checkers note that working‑class New Yorkers, particularly Black and Hispanic residents and families with young children, leave at much higher rates than wealthy households.

Policy debates and social costs
Despite an improving population count, structural pressures remain. New York spends US$9 761 per resident on welfare and education—72 % more than Texas and 130 % more than Florida. Low‑income renters now devote 54 % of their income to rent, up from under 40 % in 1991; even a well‑paid professional must earn at least US$151 600 annually to ensure that rent on a studio consumes only 30 % of income. Without a rebound in finance or a dramatic housing boom, business leaders warn that New York could devolve into an “economically ordinary” US city, burdened by high rents and expanding welfare obligations.

Political debates have sharpened these tensions. The 2025 mayoral frontrunner, Zohran Mamdani, proposes adding a two‑percentage‑point surcharge on incomes above US$1 million and raising the corporate income‑tax rate to 11.5 % to fund universal childcare and free buses. Experts point out that tax‑induced mobility among high earners is small: studies by Northwestern University, the EU Tax Observatory and the Fiscal Policy Institute indicate that wealthy households rarely move solely because of tax differentials. Nevertheless, policy analysts caution that imposing the nation’s highest marginal rates could gradually erode the tax base.

Statistics from the Citizens Budget Commission show that more than 125 000 New Yorkers relocated to Florida between 2018 and 2022, carrying nearly US$14 billion in adjusted gross income. Such figures fuel both sides of the debate: proponents of higher taxes argue that migration flows are limited, while opponents warn that revenue losses could accelerate. The city’s 2025 “City of Yes” zoning reforms spurred construction of about 34 000 apartments in a single year, but housing supply remains tight. The interplay between taxes, housing costs and public services will determine whether New York regains its footing or continues to lose ground to lower‑cost competitors.

A city at a crossroads
New York’s appeal has always rested on its ability to offer unmatched cultural life, economic opportunity and diversity. The recent outflows of wealth, talent and businesses threaten this model. With millionaires comprising less than one percent of residents yet contributing nearly half of personal‑income tax revenue, the departure of even a few thousand people can blow a hole in public finances. The value proposition for middle‑income families is equally in jeopardy as housing and childcare costs soar. Meanwhile, the definancialisation of the local economy and the relocation of corporate headquarters erode the city’s job base. Taken together, these trends give credence to the image of a city that is “sinking” under the weight of its own costs.

Yet the picture is not one of unrelenting decline. International migration, natural population growth and inbound investment continue to sustain New York. Surveys show that residents still value the city’s parks, cultural institutions and transit network despite concerns about safety and affordability. The challenge for policymakers is to balance progressive social aims with economic competitiveness: to improve public services and housing affordability while keeping tax rates and business costs from driving away the very people and companies who fund them.



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Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

Iran and the holy War risk

For now, Iran does not appear to be launching a formal holy war. But the question is no longer rhetorical. After the bombings that turned a long shadow conflict into an open regional war, religious language has moved from symbolic background noise toward the center of state messaging. The more important issue is not whether Tehran will suddenly summon the Muslim world into a single, borderless struggle. It is whether the Islamic Republic will fuse military retaliation, political succession, proxy activation and sacred rhetoric into a broader campaign that functions like a holy war without ever formally declaring one.The current crisis is already historic. Since the joint U.S.-Israeli attack of February 28, which killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and struck Iranian state and military targets, the conflict has spread across Israel, Lebanon, the Gulf and the energy corridors that underpin the global economy. Public death tolls inside Iran alone have climbed into the four figures. Even though international nuclear inspectors said early in the campaign that they had no indication several key nuclear installations had been hit or that radiation had spread beyond normal levels, later stages of the war clearly broadened toward oil storage, airports, command sites and urban infrastructure. This is no longer a contained deterrence exchange. It is a live contest over regime survival, regional order and strategic endurance.That is precisely why the phrase “holy war” must be handled with care. In January, influential voices inside Iran had already warned that any attack on the Supreme Leader would amount to a declaration of war against the wider Islamic world and could require a jihad decree. That language mattered then, and it matters even more now because the red line was crossed. Tehran can plausibly argue to its own hard-line base that the highest religious and political authority in the Islamic Republic was not merely challenged but assassinated. In ideological terms, that transforms retaliation from a policy choice into a sacred obligation. In political terms, it gives hard-liners a ready-made framework for widening the war.Yet rhetoric is not the same as doctrine, and doctrine is not the same as operational behavior. Iran’s response so far looks less like an uncontrolled call to universal religious uprising than a grim, state-directed campaign of calibrated punishment. Tehran has struck back with missiles, drones, maritime pressure and pressure on regional hosts of U.S. military power. It has also tried to impose costs on the world economy by turning the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz into instruments of leverage. This is not the behavior of a leadership abandoning strategy for blind zeal. It is the behavior of a regime trying to survive by making the war too costly, too wide and too economically dangerous for its enemies to sustain indefinitely.That distinction matters. A genuine, formal holy war would imply a sweeping call for open-ended religious mobilization across borders, one that subordinates ordinary state interests to an all-consuming theological struggle. Iran has not done that in any clear, universal sense. It has instead behaved as a revolutionary state that uses sacred language to reinforce legitimacy, discipline supporters and justify retaliation. That model predates the current crisis. The Islamic Republic has always blended theology, nationalism, martyrdom culture, anti-Western resistance and hard security logic. The bombings have intensified that blend, but they have not erased the regime’s instinct for calculation.The strongest evidence against an immediate full holy-war scenario is inside Iran itself. The system’s first imperative has not been global mobilization; it has been continuity. Even after decapitation strikes, the state moved to preserve command structures, delegate powers downward and push the Assembly of Experts toward selecting a successor. By March 8, that succession process had reportedly advanced to the point where a decision had been reached, even if the name had not yet been publicly revealed. That is a survival reflex. Regimes preparing for limitless religious war do not usually prioritize constitutional succession, elite cohesion and internal control. Regimes fighting for their lives do.Iran’s regional behavior also shows tension between ideological fury and strategic restraint. President Masoud Pezeshkian’s apology to Gulf neighbors was extraordinary, not because it ended the war, but because it exposed the conflict inside Tehran’s own response. On one side sits the logic of escalation: punish every state that hosts U.S. forces, widen the crisis, raise oil prices, frighten shipping markets and prove that the bombardment of Iran cannot remain geographically contained. On the other side sits the logic of isolation avoidance: do not drive every Arab state irreversibly into the opposing camp, do not convert every neighbor into an active launchpad for anti-Iran operations, and do not make regime survival impossible by fighting the entire region at once.This internal contradiction is one reason the phrase “holy war” can mislead. What is unfolding is more dangerous in practical terms and more limited in formal terms. Iran may never issue a clean, universal call for a civilizational war against all enemies of Islam, yet it can still encourage clerical sanction, mobilize militias, inspire cross-border attacks, bless cyber retaliation, empower covert cells and unleash proxy violence under a sacred frame. That would be a hybrid escalation: not a single global summons, but a diffuse religious legitimization of a long, dirty regional war. For civilians, ports, airports, desalination plants, shipping lanes and energy markets, the difference may feel almost academic.The role of Iran’s allied armed networks reinforces that point. Hezbollah has entered the conflict, but not from a position of unchallenged strength. Its intervention has deepened political strain in Lebanon and highlighted how even Iran’s most loyal partners are balancing solidarity against self-preservation. Other aligned groups face similar pressures. The so-called axis can still hurt Israel, U.S. assets and regional infrastructure, but it is not a frictionless machine awaiting one theological command to move in perfect unity. The more Tehran leans on proxies, the more it reveals that its preferred method remains layered coercion, not a single dramatic declaration of holy war.There is also a sectarian and geopolitical reality that limits the holy-war model. The Muslim world is not a single mobilizable bloc waiting for instructions from Tehran. Iran is a Shiite theocratic state with revolutionary ambitions, but its appeal across Sunni-majority states is uneven at best and sharply contested at worst. Gulf monarchies, already targeted by Iranian missiles and drones, are not natural participants in an Iranian-led sacred struggle. Many of them fear Tehran at least as much as they oppose the bombing campaign against it. That means Iran’s religious messaging may galvanize sympathizers, militants and ideological fellow travelers, but it is unlikely to unify the wider Islamic world behind one war banner.Still, dismissing the danger would be a grave mistake. The holy-war language matters because words can widen the menu of violence. Once a conflict is framed as sacred defense rather than national retaliation alone, thresholds can drop. Assassinations, sabotage, maritime attacks, strikes on civilian-linked infrastructure and violence by semi-deniable actors all become easier to justify. A state under bombardment, mourning its supreme leader and fighting for institutional survival may decide that conventional retaliation is not enough. If Tehran concludes that it cannot win symmetrically, it may authorize a looser, more ideological pattern of warfare stretching from the Gulf to the Mediterranean and beyond.The economic front is equally important. Iran understands that energy fear can be weaponized. Even limited disruption in the Strait of Hormuz sends shockwaves through insurance, shipping, aviation and inflation expectations worldwide. That leverage is politically valuable because it turns a military confrontation into a global pressure campaign. A formal holy war would demand maximal ideological mobilization. A survival war, by contrast, rewards selective disruption, ambiguity and controlled chaos. Tehran’s actions so far fit the second model more closely than the first.This is why the most serious answer to the headline question is not a simple yes or no. Iran is unlikely to launch a classic holy war in the simplistic sense of a formal, total religious call to arms that instantly unites the Muslim world under its banner. But it is already moving toward something more contemporary and, in some ways, more destabilizing: a war of survival wrapped in sacred legitimacy, regional coercion and asymmetric retaliation. The bombings have not merely invited revenge. They have strengthened the argument of those in Tehran who believe compromise invites death and that only resistance sanctified by faith can preserve the system.So the real risk is not that Iran suddenly abandons strategy for theology. The real risk is that strategy and theology fuse more tightly than before. If that fusion hardens, the war will not remain a sequence of missile exchanges and air raids. It will become a broader contest over succession, legitimacy, energy, maritime freedom, proxy warfare and the right to define resistance as a religious duty. In that environment, the phrase “holy war” may remain officially ambiguous, but its practical effects could become visible across the entire region.