Coin Press - China’s lithography leap

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China’s lithography leap




China has crossed a threshold in the semiconductor contest that many Western policymakers had hoped would remain out of reach for considerably longer. A state-backed manufacturer in Shanghai has begun producing domestically developed immersion deep-ultraviolet lithography systems, with the first machines intended for some of the country’s most important chipmakers.

The development does not mean that China has suddenly reproduced ASML’s most advanced technology. It has not broken the Dutch company’s monopoly on commercially proven extreme-ultraviolet lithography, nor has it demonstrated that its new machines can yet deliver the productivity, precision and reliability demanded by a modern high-volume fabrication plant.

What has changed is nevertheless important. China’s domestic lithography campaign is no longer confined to research projects, politically convenient announcements or laboratory prototypes. It has entered an initial industrial phase, supported by a manufacturer, state capital, specialist engineering teams and customers prepared to test the equipment under real production conditions.

A breakthrough that must be described precisely
Shanghai Aishengna Electronic Technology Group is leading the effort to manufacture China’s first home-grown immersion DUV systems. The current production plan envisages approximately five machines during 2026 and roughly twenty more in 2027. Initial deliveries are expected to go to Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, Hua Hong Semiconductor and memory producer ChangXin Memory Technologies.

Those numbers immediately reveal both the significance and the limitations of the development. ASML shipped 131 immersion DUV systems in 2025 and has prepared annual production capacity of approximately 130 systems for 2026. China is therefore not about to displace the Dutch group by volume. The Chinese systems also require extensive qualification. They are not believed to match ASML’s current machines in performance, availability or long-term reliability. No independently verifiable data have yet been published for the most important commercial measurements, including wafer throughput, overlay precision, defect rates and sustained operating time.

The expression mass production must consequently be treated with caution. In this instance, it describes the transition from a single prototype towards a small repeatable manufacturing series. It does not yet demonstrate that the machines are ready to operate continuously in an advanced fabrication plant while producing commercially acceptable yields.
Even so, the transition matters. A technology programme that can produce five imperfect machines is fundamentally different from one that can produce none.

Why DUV remains strategically decisive
Immersion DUV lithography is sometimes described as yesterday’s technology because ASML’s most advanced customers are now expanding their use of EUV and High-NA EUV systems. That description is misleading. DUV machines remain essential throughout the semiconductor industry. They use light with a wavelength of 193 nanometres and place a thin layer of water between the projection optics and the silicon wafer. The water increases the effective numerical aperture of the optical system, allowing finer circuit patterns to be printed than would be possible with a conventional dry scanner.

Not every layer of an advanced processor requires EUV. DUV machines continue to produce numerous layers in leading-edge chips and are indispensable for mature logic, memory, analogue, automotive, communications and power semiconductors. These categories represent an enormous industrial market, even when they receive less attention than the smallest processors used in artificial intelligence systems. DUV can also be pushed beyond the resolution achieved in a single exposure. Through multiple patterning, a chipmaker divides one complex pattern into several simpler patterns and exposes the wafer repeatedly. This technique can extend DUV production towards considerably smaller process nodes.

The price is complexity. Each additional exposure introduces another opportunity for alignment errors, contamination and yield loss. More masks, more processing steps and more time are required. Production becomes slower and more expensive, while precise overlay between successive patterns becomes increasingly difficult.

A Chinese immersion DUV machine would therefore not automatically place the country at the technological frontier. It could, however, secure equipment for a large proportion of China’s semiconductor output and preserve a domestic route towards more advanced chips when foreign machines are unavailable.

China is building an industrial coalition
Aishengna was established in 2023 with registered capital of seven billion yuan and the backing of state-controlled investors. The company has incorporated engineering teams associated with Shanghai Yuliangsheng Technology and Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment, bringing together expertise that had previously been dispersed across several Chinese lithography initiatives.

Yuliangsheng has close links to the wider equipment network surrounding SiCarrier, which itself has been closely associated with Huawei’s campaign to create a domestic semiconductor supply chain. The structure illustrates how China is approaching the problem. Instead of relying on one company to develop every technology independently, it is combining state finance, municipal support, engineering talent, fabrication plants and equipment manufacturers.
The expected customers are equally important. SMIC, Hua Hong and CXMT are not merely buyers waiting for a finished commercial product. They can provide the production environment in which the machines are tested, calibrated and improved.

A lithography system placed inside a major fabrication plant begins generating the data needed for industrial learning. Engineers can identify stability problems, improve alignment, modify software, strengthen components and adjust process recipes. Each wafer becomes part of the development programme.

This relationship gives the Chinese initiative an advantage that a conventional start-up would not possess. Its first customers have strategic reasons to tolerate delays, lower throughput and higher initial costs. They are likely to participate in the development process because the alternative is continued dependence on equipment whose delivery or servicing may be restricted at any time.

ASML’s real advantage is larger than the machine
ASML’s dominance cannot be explained by the wavelength of its light source alone. A modern scanner is an exceptionally complicated production platform in which optics, lasers, wafer stages, vibration control, thermal management, metrology, computational lithography and software must operate as one system.
The machine must position a wafer with extraordinary precision, expose successive layers, compensate for microscopic distortions and repeat the process hundreds of times without losing calibration. It must perform these tasks at industrial speed and remain available for continuous production.

A scanner that produces one successful pattern in a controlled test is therefore not necessarily commercially useful. A fabrication plant needs repeatability across millions of exposures. A small overlay deviation may render an entire layer defective. An unreliable component may interrupt a production line whose unfinished wafers are worth millions. ASML has spent decades refining these capabilities with leading chipmakers and a specialised international supplier network. It also possesses an enormous installed base, extensive field-service operations and process knowledge accumulated across successive generations of machines.

That is the central reason why the Chinese systems do not present an immediate commercial threat. China may have succeeded in assembling a domestic immersion platform, but it has yet to demonstrate the operating discipline that transformed ASML’s machines into the industry standard.

The catch is industrial reliability
The most difficult stage begins after the first machine leaves the factory. China must prove that its domestic scanners can maintain overlay accuracy over long production runs, achieve acceptable throughput, survive constant operation and deliver similar results from one machine to another. It must also establish a reliable supply of spare parts, trained service engineers, qualified materials and compatible processing equipment.

Some critical components are still believed to depend on foreign suppliers. Even where most of the machine is domestically produced, one imported laser component, precision sensor or optical element may create a new vulnerability. China may have reduced its dependence without eliminating it. Lower productivity can initially be absorbed through state support. A Chinese fabrication plant may accept a higher cost per wafer because the strategic value of domestic equipment exceeds the immediate commercial loss. Additional machines can compensate for poor throughput, while subsidies can offset lower yields.

That approach has limits. Advanced processors contain large dies and costly materials. Poor yield rapidly becomes prohibitive. A machine that is politically valuable but industrially unstable cannot support China’s long-term demand for artificial intelligence accelerators, advanced memory and premium smartphone processors.
The first systems will consequently be judged less by the smallest line they can print than by their behaviour after thousands of wafers.

The EUV wall has not fallen
China’s progress with immersion DUV must also be separated from its far more difficult effort to develop EUV lithography. A prototype constructed in a secure facility in Shenzhen has reportedly succeeded in generating extreme-ultraviolet light. That is a meaningful technical achievement, but the system has not yet produced working chips. Generating EUV light is only one element of a complete scanner.

EUV operates at a wavelength of 13.5 nanometres. The light is absorbed by almost every material, meaning that the exposure process must take place in a vacuum and use highly specialised reflective optics rather than conventional lenses. The system must control contamination, maintain mirror quality, position the wafer, manage heat and compensate for minute optical distortions. Masks, photoresists, metrology equipment and computational corrections must also function as part of the same process. A weakness in any one of these areas can prevent the machine from producing usable wafers.

ASML, meanwhile, is not standing still. It is expanding production of its established EUV systems while introducing High-NA technology for future logic processes below two nanometres and advanced memory production. The company is preparing to increase its low-NA EUV capacity significantly during 2027 and is already examining another expansion for 2028.
China may therefore narrow the gap in one generation of equipment while the technological frontier moves forward again. The catch is not merely whether China can build an EUV prototype. It must convert that prototype into a compact, stable, serviceable and economically viable production system. That remains a vastly more demanding task.

Export controls have changed the economics
Restrictions imposed by the United States and the Netherlands have prevented Chinese customers from acquiring ASML’s EUV systems and have progressively limited access to the most advanced immersion DUV models. These measures have slowed China’s technological progress, increased production costs and forced chipmakers to rely on older machines and more complicated manufacturing techniques.

They have also produced an unintended consequence. Domestic lithography now has a guaranteed strategic market. A Chinese machine does not need to outperform ASML in every category to become attractive. It needs to be sufficiently capable at a moment when the foreign alternative cannot be purchased, upgraded or trusted to remain serviceable. For a Chinese fabrication plant, technological sovereignty has acquired an economic value of its own. A less productive domestic machine may still be preferable to a superior foreign system that could become unusable following a regulatory decision abroad.

This creates a fundamental policy paradox. Export controls can buy time and deny access to the newest technology, but the same controls strengthen the commercial case for developing substitutes. The more uncertain foreign supply becomes, the more money, talent and political attention China is prepared to direct towards local equipment.
Restrictions can delay technological convergence. They cannot guarantee permanent dependence.

ASML is not facing an immediate crisis
The alarm surrounding China’s announcement should not obscure ASML’s present strength. The company generated second-quarter sales of €9.3 billion in 2026 and net income of €2.9 billion. It subsequently raised its full-year sales forecast to between €43 billion and €45 billion, with an expected gross margin of between 54 and 56 per cent.
Demand for advanced logic and memory equipment continues to be driven by investment in artificial intelligence infrastructure. ASML is expanding its production capacity, has strong customer commitments and retains the only commercially proven EUV platform used in high-volume manufacturing.

A handful of Chinese immersion machines cannot materially alter that position in the near term. ASML’s installed base, service revenue, software, customer relationships and technological lead remain formidable. The strategic risk lies further ahead. China has been an important market for ASML’s DUV business. If domestic machines improve, Chinese customers may gradually replace foreign equipment in mature and intermediate processes, even where the local alternative remains less efficient.

ASML could therefore lose part of its Chinese market without being technologically defeated. Procurement rules, servicing concerns and national industrial policy may prove as influential as technical performance. A monopoly begins to weaken not only when a competitor reaches parity, but when customers decide that dependence itself has become unacceptable.

A turning point, not a takeover
China has achieved something once regarded as improbable: it has created a credible path towards domestically manufactured immersion DUV lithography systems and begun building them for major customers. That achievement must not be confused with equality. The initial output is small. The machines are not yet proven in high-volume manufacturing. Their performance remains below ASML’s standards, and the much more difficult EUV challenge is unresolved.

Nevertheless, the programme now possesses a manufacturer, state finance, engineering teams, customers and a production timetable. It is no longer theoretical. That is the real source of concern for ASML. The nightmare is not that China has already reproduced everything the Dutch company can build. It is that a process of industrial learning has begun in a market large enough, wealthy enough and politically determined enough to sustain years of costly experimentation.

ASML remains far ahead. But the assumption that China must remain permanently dependent on imported lithography technology is no longer secure.



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Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

India's island choke point

The language of revenge makes for an arresting headline, but it obscures the more consequential story unfolding on Great Nicobar. India is not constructing a mechanism that can simply be activated to halt Chinese trade. It is attempting to convert a remote and sparsely developed island into a forward maritime hub from which it can observe strategic shipping routes, support naval and air operations and, in a serious crisis, make Chinese access to the Indian Ocean more difficult and expensive.Great Nicobar is the southernmost large island in India’s Andaman and Nicobar archipelago. It lies closer to Indonesia than to the Indian mainland and sits near the approaches to the Strait of Malacca, one of the most important maritime passages in the world. The island is also approximately forty nautical miles from a heavily used east-west shipping corridor. That geography gives Great Nicobar a significance far greater than its size or population might suggest. Vessels travelling between the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and the South China Sea must pass through a limited number of navigable channels. The Strait of Malacca remains the principal commercial route because alternatives through the Sunda and Lombok straits generally require longer voyages, more fuel and additional time.For China, whose economic strength depends heavily on seaborne exports, raw materials and imported energy, this is a persistent strategic vulnerability. For India, the same geography offers an opportunity to transform an isolated territory into an advanced observation, logistics and deterrence platform.A nine-billion-dollar transformationThe Great Nicobar development programme is commonly described as an investment worth roughly nine billion dollars, although its estimated cost has changed as the plans have been revised. The wider programme is currently valued at approximately 81,000 crore rupees and covers around 166 square kilometres.It combines four interconnected projects. The first is a deep-water international container transhipment port at Galathea Bay. The second is a new airport intended for both civilian and military use. The third is a gas and solar power complex with a planned capacity of 450 megavolt-amperes. The fourth is a new township with roads, water systems, communications, public services and industrial infrastructure.The initial two phases of the proposed port were appraised in 2026 at a combined cost of 48,862 crore rupees. They are designed to provide twelve container berths and an annual handling capacity of 11.8 million twenty-foot equivalent units. Longer-term plans could expand the port still further. Natural water depths of between twenty and thirty metres are among Galathea Bay’s most important commercial advantages. They could allow the terminal to receive the largest modern container ships without the severe draught restrictions encountered at many existing Indian ports.The new airport is equally significant. With an estimated investment of around 13,000 crore rupees, it is intended to accommodate civilian aircraft as well as military transports, maritime patrol aircraft and combat aircraft. Operational control is expected to rest with the Indian Navy, giving New Delhi a much larger aviation platform in the south-eastern Indian Ocean than is available at the existing airfield on the island.The port, airport and power facilities therefore cannot be understood as separate construction schemes. Together, they are intended to create the permanent logistical foundation required for sustained economic and military activity.India wants its cargo backThe commercial argument behind the project is substantial. India has historically routed a large share of its container transhipment traffic through foreign ports, particularly Colombo, Singapore and Port Klang. Containers arriving on large intercontinental vessels are frequently transferred at those hubs to smaller feeder ships serving Indian destinations.That arrangement costs India revenue, creates dependence on infrastructure outside its jurisdiction and reduces its influence over regional shipping networks. A competitive deep-water terminal at Great Nicobar could intercept cargo moving between the Indian Ocean and East Asia while serving ports on India’s eastern coast, Bangladesh, Myanmar and other parts of Southeast Asia. The location is attractive, but geography alone does not create a successful port. Shipping companies choose terminals according to price, reliability, vessel turnaround times, customs efficiency, digital systems, frequency of feeder connections and the availability of repair, storage and bunkering services. Galathea Bay will have to compete not only with Singapore, Colombo and Port Klang but also with emerging Indian facilities such as Vizhinjam.The financial structure reveals how difficult that competition may be. The first two port phases have been designed as a public-private partnership, with Indian-controlled ownership and a proposed concession period of fifty years. Project planners sought viability-gap assistance of 12,230 crore rupees to reduce the risk for private investors. Financial appraisers concluded that the requested support did not fit the standard viability-gap funding framework. The ports ministry may therefore have to provide capital assistance from its own budget or seek a separate political decision. This is a crucial detail. It suggests that Great Nicobar’s strategic value may justify public expenditure that would be difficult to defend on commercial returns alone.In other words, the port is not merely a business venture. It is strategic infrastructure with a commercial component.What the island changes for ChinaThe most immediate military benefit would be improved maritime domain awareness. Radar installations, long-range aircraft, drones, naval vessels and intelligence systems based closer to the Malacca approaches would give India a clearer picture of movements between the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Chinese naval deployments in the Indian Ocean have become more regular over the past two decades. Warships assigned to anti-piracy patrols, survey vessels, submarines and support ships have all demonstrated Beijing’s growing ability to operate far from the Chinese coastline. Access to ports developed or operated by Chinese companies has also increased Beijing’s logistical options across the region.A fully equipped Great Nicobar hub would allow India to monitor those movements from a much more advantageous position. It could support patrol aircraft for longer periods, shorten response times and provide fuel, maintenance and communications closer to the principal maritime routes. This does not mean that India could effortlessly close the Strait of Malacca. The expression “choking Beijing” is strategically evocative but operationally misleading. The strait is bordered by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. India does not control it, and any attempt to block commercial shipping would constitute an extraordinary act with global economic and military consequences. Maintaining an effective blockade against a major power would require persistent naval and air superiority, extensive intelligence, secure logistics and cooperation from other states.Great Nicobar is therefore not a switch with which India can turn off Chinese trade. Its importance lies in deterrence and strategic uncertainty. It could increase the number of assets China would need to protect its sea lanes, make covert naval movement more difficult and force Beijing to devote greater attention to the eastern Indian Ocean.Alternative Chinese routes do exist. Ships can use the Sunda or Lombok straits, while pipelines through Myanmar and overland corridors through Pakistan provide limited diversification. None of them can easily replace the scale, efficiency and established commercial networks associated with the Malacca route. India does not need the ability to stop every Chinese vessel to gain leverage. It needs the credible capacity to observe movements, complicate operations and impose additional costs during a confrontation.A forward base must also surviveBuilding runways, quays and radar stations is only the beginning. A remote installation becomes strategically valuable only when it can continue operating under pressure.Great Nicobar will require secure fuel storage, ammunition facilities, maintenance depots, air-defence systems, hardened aircraft shelters, redundant communications and dependable supply links. It must also be protected against submarine activity, missile attacks, cyber disruption and sabotage. The island’s distance from India’s main industrial and military centres creates a logistical challenge. Personnel, spare parts, construction materials and emergency supplies must travel long distances by sea or air. Severe weather can interrupt those connections, while the narrow local infrastructure base leaves little room for failure.A highly visible airport and port without adequate protection could become targets rather than instruments of leverage. The strategic value of Great Nicobar will consequently depend less on ceremonial inaugurations than on the unglamorous systems that keep aircraft flying, ships supplied and sensors functioning during a crisis.The project could also assist India in humanitarian relief and disaster response. A major airport, deep-water port and permanent logistics network would provide a forward base for operations after cyclones, earthquakes or tsunamis across Southeast Asia. Such capabilities would strengthen India’s claim to be a dependable regional security partner rather than merely a country seeking military advantage over China.The ecological price cannot be hiddenGreat Nicobar is not an empty piece of territory. It contains tropical rainforest, mangroves, coral habitats and numerous endemic species. Galathea Bay is associated with the nesting grounds of giant leatherback turtles, while the island is also home to the Nicobar megapode, saltwater crocodiles and other vulnerable wildlife. The project involves the diversion of approximately 130.75 square kilometres of forest land. Estimates indicate that close to one million trees could eventually be affected, although the government maintains that significant green areas will remain within the wider development zone.Authorities have imposed dozens of environmental conditions and planned compensatory afforestation covering more than ninety-seven square kilometres. The government also argues that the large majority of Great Nicobar will remain within forests, national parks, protected areas, a biosphere reserve and tribal conservation zones. The National Green Tribunal declined to stop the development in February 2026, concluding that there was no sufficient basis for overturning the existing environmental and coastal clearances. It nevertheless required strict compliance with the protective conditions.The ruling did not eliminate the underlying concerns. An island rainforest is a complex and isolated ecosystem that cannot simply be recreated through tree planting elsewhere. Forest loss can alter freshwater systems, coastal stability and wildlife migration even when a large percentage of the island formally remains protected.There is also a profound human dimension. Great Nicobar is home to the Nicobarese and the Shompen, one of the world’s most isolated indigenous communities. The government says the project will not physically displace them and has promised dedicated safeguards. The greater danger may arise from indirect contact. A large influx of construction workers, officials, traders and future residents could expose isolated communities to disease, cultural disruption and pressure on traditional territory. Preventing direct displacement will not be sufficient if the surrounding social and ecological conditions are transformed beyond recognition.A landscape shaped by disasterThe island lies in a seismically active region. The Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 devastated Great Nicobar, destroyed settlements and caused severe land subsidence at its southern end. Any new airport, port, power plant and township must therefore be designed for conditions far more demanding than those facing ordinary mainland infrastructure. Breakwaters, evacuation routes, emergency power systems, elevated storage, earthquake-resistant construction and redundant communications will all be essential. The financial cost of such resilience is high, but ignoring it would expose the entire programme to catastrophic failure.Environmental protection and disaster planning are not secondary obstacles to the strategic project. They are part of its strategic credibility. A port delayed by legal challenges, damaged by a natural disaster or surrounded by social conflict would weaken rather than strengthen India’s position.The project is not yet a finished weaponThe most important distinction is between ambition and operational reality. Great Nicobar is not currently capable of controlling the Malacca approaches on the scale suggested by dramatic descriptions of the project. In March 2026, the relevant public-private partnership committee recommended the first two port phases for further administrative consideration, subject to financial, contractual and ownership conditions. The airport had entered initial tendering, while the power plant and township remained at different stages of appraisal and approval.The latest public timetable indicates that physical work on the Galathea Bay port is expected to begin in 2028. That schedule is later than earlier expectations that an initial port phase might already be operating by that year. Even after construction begins, completing the full island transformation will require many years and potentially several decades. Financing, private-sector participation, environmental monitoring, supply-chain constraints and construction in a remote seismic location could all affect the schedule. Cost escalation is also likely to remain a concern as designs become more detailed.China will not stand still during that period. Beijing can strengthen alternative routes, expand naval deployments, increase cooperation with regional ports and develop capabilities intended to threaten Indian installations. Great Nicobar is therefore part of a continuing strategic competition rather than a final answer to it.India’s real revenge is strategic patienceDescribing the Great Nicobar project as India’s revenge on China captures the emotional appeal of a country turning geography against its principal Asian rival. Yet revenge is not the most accurate description. The project is better understood as an attempt to correct a long-standing imbalance. India possesses an island chain overlooking some of the world’s busiest sea routes, but for decades much of that geographical advantage remained underdeveloped. Great Nicobar represents an effort to convert position into capability.Success will not be measured by whether India can literally stop Chinese shipping. It will be measured by whether the island gives New Delhi reliable surveillance, faster military response, commercially viable port operations and a resilient logistics network without inflicting irreversible damage on the people and ecosystems already there.If those conditions are met, Great Nicobar could become one of India’s most consequential strategic investments. It would not choke Beijing in peacetime, but it could make China’s leaders think more carefully about the risks of confrontation in the Indian Ocean. That additional calculation is the true source of India’s leverage.