Coin Press - Gaza on the cusp of civil war

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Gaza on the cusp of civil war




In the days following a fragile ceasefire in early October 2025, the Gaza Strip – already devastated by two years of war – has been shaken by a wave of internecine violence. The militant group that has ruled the enclave for nearly two decades has responded to the power vacuum left by Israel’s withdrawal by turning its guns on rival militias and local clans. What began as an attempt to re‑establish order in lawless streets has degenerated into summary executions, sieges and pitched battles that many residents say risk pushing Gaza to the brink of civil war.

From ceasefire to crackdown
A United States‑brokered truce between Israel and the rulers of Gaza took effect in early October, ending a bloody two‑year conflict and leading to a prisoner‑hostage exchange. The agreement envisaged the group’s disarmament and the handover of civilian administration to a Palestinian technocratic committee under international supervision. Yet just days after the ceasefire, militants re‑emerged from their tunnels, freed the last living Israeli hostages and deployed thousands of fighters in uniform across Gaza’s ruined streets. Security officials say they killed thirty‑two members of a clan‑affiliated gang in Gaza City that they accuse of looting aid and collaborating with Israel, while losing six of their own men. A widely circulated video showed masked gunmen ordering seven blindfolded men to kneel before shooting them; bystanders shouted religious slogans and denounced the victims as traitors. The group later confirmed that the executions were real and justified them as punishment for treason.

Officials sympathetic to the crackdown argue that the militants simply stepped into the vacuum created when Israeli forces targeted and dismantled the local police during the war. As the regular security apparatus collapsed, powerful families and armed factions – some reportedly receiving arms or cash from Israel – seized control of neighbourhoods, hijacked aid convoys and terrorised residents. According to Gaza’s truckers’ union, gangs “looted aid and killed people under the protection of the occupation”. Israeli sources acknowledge providing support to anti‑militant clans such as the Popular Forces led by Yasser Abu Shabab, though they deny involvement in theft. The result has been a patchwork of competing militias vying for influence in a landscape strewn with debris.

Sieges and summary executions
The militant rulers have sought to present their campaign as a restoration of law and order. Their newly formed Sahem (Arrow) unit comprises intelligence and enforcement personnel tasked with dismantling armed gangs and seizing weapons. In several neighbourhoods their fighters have directed traffic, appointed temporary administrators and offered an amnesty: anyone accused of collaboration who had not shed blood could surrender their arms and have their record expunged. Officials say more than seventy gang members have taken advantage of the offer and that over fifty “gang hubs” have been dismantled. Videos released by the group’s internal media arm depict uniformed officers patrolling markets and reassuring residents that a “merciful hand” awaits those who repent.

Behind this veneer of due process lies a brutal reality. On the first day of the ceasefire, fighters surrounded the Doghmush family compound in Gaza City and laid siege for three days. Members of the Doghmush clan, one of Gaza’s most powerful families, were accused of murdering a journalist and a militant commander and of looting humanitarian aid. When seven men on Hamas’ wanted list refused to surrender, security forces stormed the neighbourhood and killed more than fifteen people. Witnesses described troops going door to door, verifying identities and torturing detainees; some victims had fingernails ripped out. Rights groups such as Al Mezan and the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights have condemned these extrajudicial killings.

Similar scenes unfolded in Khan Younis, where fighters targeted the Majadla clan after accusing them of murdering two resistance fighters. Local reports say the Israeli army intervened during the shoot‑out, killing seven militants. The militia later claimed to have killed Ahmad Tarabin, the right‑hand man of Yasser Abu Shabab, and to have attacked gangs led by Rami Hillis in Gaza City. In separate operations the Sahem unit publicly executed three men it accused of collaborating with Israel. Palestinian analyst Reham Owda says these actions are designed not only to punish collaborators but to demonstrate that the group’s security officers should be part of any future governing body.

Clans, militias and the spectre of civil war
The violence has exposed deep fissures within Gaza’s social fabric. The Doghmush, Hilles and Majadla families have longstanding feuds with Hamas dating back to the movement’s takeover of the Strip in 2007. Many of these clans maintain their own armed wings and have at times aligned with Fatah or the Palestinian Authority. During the recent war they took advantage of the chaos to settle scores and, according to multiple reports, to cooperate with Israeli forces. Saleh Aljafarawi, a 28‑year‑old journalist who gained prominence for his war coverage, was shot dead while reporting on fighting between Hamas and the Doghmush clan; his body, still wearing a press jacket, was later recovered from a truck. Residents who fled the gunfire told reporters they were “running from their own people” rather than Israeli bombardment.

The risk of wider civil strife grew when a new militia calling itself “The People’s Army – Forces of Northern Gaza” released a video declaring that it had taken control of parts of northern Gaza. Nine masked men, armed with rifles and seated around a table, pledged to rebuild the area and provide security but warned Hamas to stay away. The group’s statement promised “decisive force” against any attempt by Hamas to enter its territory and proclaimed that “the era of your tyranny has ended”. The emergence of this militia, coupled with ongoing clashes with established clans, has prompted fears that the Palestinian territory could descend into outright civil war.

In addition to the People’s Army, militias led by Hussam al‑Astal in Khan Younis and Yasser Abu Shabab in Rafah continue to defy Hamas. These groups reportedly receive weapons from Israel and have recruited hundreds of fighters, paying attractive salaries. According to a security official quoted in local reports, Hamas had killed Abu Shabab’s lieutenant and was working to eliminate him. Abu Shabab has denied collaboration and vowed to resist. Sheikh Husni al‑Mughni, head of Gaza’s Higher Committee for Tribal Affairs, insists that the clans support the crackdown and that justice has been served, but many families now demand weapons to defend themselves. Human rights advocates warn that such dynamics could ignite a cycle of revenge killings.

Political implications
The internal conflict has reverberated across Palestinian politics. The Palestinian Authority, which administers parts of the West Bank, condemned what it described as “horrible crimes” and “vile terrorism” in Gaza. Officials in Ramallah argue that the violence undermines efforts to unify Palestinian institutions under a single law and weapon. They accuse Hamas of bombarding clan houses with rockets and rocket‑propelled grenades in an attempt to “break the backbone of clans”. At least nineteen Doghmush members and eight Hamas fighters were killed in one confrontation, according to internal ministry sources.

The United States, which brokered the ceasefire and proposed a 20‑point peace plan for Gaza, has offered mixed signals. On his way to the Middle East, President Donald Trump told reporters that Hamas had been granted a temporary green light to police Gaza. “They do want to stop the problems, and they’ve been open about it, and we gave them approval for a period of time,” he said. He later compared the crackdown to his own fight against violent gangs and said that killing gang members did not bother him. Nonetheless, he reiterated that Hamas must disarm and warned that if it refuses, it will be disarmed “quickly and perhaps violently”.

Israeli leaders, meanwhile, insist that the war is not over until Hamas is dismantled. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has acknowledged arming clans opposed to Hamas, and Israeli forces remain in control of parts of northern Gaza and Rafah. Observers say the internal violence may provide Israel and its allies with leverage to force a demilitarisation deal. However, the sight of militants executing alleged collaborators in public squares has also drawn international criticism and could complicate the formation of a new governing authority.

A fragile truce in jeopardy
The ceasefire that began with the release of Israeli hostages may yet collapse under the weight of Gaza’s internal wars. In addition to the Doghmush confrontation, reports have surfaced of clashes with the Majadla and Hilles clans, as well as targeted assassinations of suspected collaborators. In one weekend alone, at least twenty‑seven people, including a journalist and a son of a senior Hamas official, were killed in battles between Hamas and the Dughmush clan. Another report put the clan’s casualties at fifty‑two, with twelve militants killed, including the son of senior official Bassem Naim; witnesses said fighters used ambulances to storm the neighbourhood.

Despite the bloodshed, some residents welcome the return of uniformed officers to the streets. A medic from Jabaliya refugee camp told reporters that seeing police again provided a sense of normalcy after months of anarchy. Others fear the crackdown has unleashed forces beyond anyone’s control. In social media posts, some Gaza residents argue that the gangs targeted by Hamas were “more dangerous than the occupation” itself and that swift justice was necessary. Critics counter that the extrajudicial killings violate international law and risk fuelling cycles of revenge.

The outcome may hinge on whether the rival clans and newly formed militias decide to accept the amnesty or continue to fight. The interior ministry has set a deadline for suspects to surrender, warning that anyone who fails to do so will face arrest and prosecution. Hossam al‑Astal, a militia leader with ties to Israel, has already rejected the ultimatum, calling the fighters “rats” and urging them to repent before it is too late. As the deadline approaches, many Gazans brace for further bloodletting.

Conclusion
Gaza is teetering on the edge. What was intended as a pause in the war with Israel has exposed the territory’s underlying fractures: feuding clans, armed gangs, foreign proxies and a ruling movement determined to hold onto its weapons. The current campaign may succeed in dismantling some militias and restoring a measure of order, but at the cost of deepening social rifts and undermining prospects for a peaceful transition. Unless a credible, inclusive security arrangement emerges – one that curbs the power of rival gangs and ensures accountability for all – the threat of civil war will continue to loom over the battered enclave.



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Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

Iran and the holy War risk

For now, Iran does not appear to be launching a formal holy war. But the question is no longer rhetorical. After the bombings that turned a long shadow conflict into an open regional war, religious language has moved from symbolic background noise toward the center of state messaging. The more important issue is not whether Tehran will suddenly summon the Muslim world into a single, borderless struggle. It is whether the Islamic Republic will fuse military retaliation, political succession, proxy activation and sacred rhetoric into a broader campaign that functions like a holy war without ever formally declaring one.The current crisis is already historic. Since the joint U.S.-Israeli attack of February 28, which killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and struck Iranian state and military targets, the conflict has spread across Israel, Lebanon, the Gulf and the energy corridors that underpin the global economy. Public death tolls inside Iran alone have climbed into the four figures. Even though international nuclear inspectors said early in the campaign that they had no indication several key nuclear installations had been hit or that radiation had spread beyond normal levels, later stages of the war clearly broadened toward oil storage, airports, command sites and urban infrastructure. This is no longer a contained deterrence exchange. It is a live contest over regime survival, regional order and strategic endurance.That is precisely why the phrase “holy war” must be handled with care. In January, influential voices inside Iran had already warned that any attack on the Supreme Leader would amount to a declaration of war against the wider Islamic world and could require a jihad decree. That language mattered then, and it matters even more now because the red line was crossed. Tehran can plausibly argue to its own hard-line base that the highest religious and political authority in the Islamic Republic was not merely challenged but assassinated. In ideological terms, that transforms retaliation from a policy choice into a sacred obligation. In political terms, it gives hard-liners a ready-made framework for widening the war.Yet rhetoric is not the same as doctrine, and doctrine is not the same as operational behavior. Iran’s response so far looks less like an uncontrolled call to universal religious uprising than a grim, state-directed campaign of calibrated punishment. Tehran has struck back with missiles, drones, maritime pressure and pressure on regional hosts of U.S. military power. It has also tried to impose costs on the world economy by turning the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz into instruments of leverage. This is not the behavior of a leadership abandoning strategy for blind zeal. It is the behavior of a regime trying to survive by making the war too costly, too wide and too economically dangerous for its enemies to sustain indefinitely.That distinction matters. A genuine, formal holy war would imply a sweeping call for open-ended religious mobilization across borders, one that subordinates ordinary state interests to an all-consuming theological struggle. Iran has not done that in any clear, universal sense. It has instead behaved as a revolutionary state that uses sacred language to reinforce legitimacy, discipline supporters and justify retaliation. That model predates the current crisis. The Islamic Republic has always blended theology, nationalism, martyrdom culture, anti-Western resistance and hard security logic. The bombings have intensified that blend, but they have not erased the regime’s instinct for calculation.The strongest evidence against an immediate full holy-war scenario is inside Iran itself. The system’s first imperative has not been global mobilization; it has been continuity. Even after decapitation strikes, the state moved to preserve command structures, delegate powers downward and push the Assembly of Experts toward selecting a successor. By March 8, that succession process had reportedly advanced to the point where a decision had been reached, even if the name had not yet been publicly revealed. That is a survival reflex. Regimes preparing for limitless religious war do not usually prioritize constitutional succession, elite cohesion and internal control. Regimes fighting for their lives do.Iran’s regional behavior also shows tension between ideological fury and strategic restraint. President Masoud Pezeshkian’s apology to Gulf neighbors was extraordinary, not because it ended the war, but because it exposed the conflict inside Tehran’s own response. On one side sits the logic of escalation: punish every state that hosts U.S. forces, widen the crisis, raise oil prices, frighten shipping markets and prove that the bombardment of Iran cannot remain geographically contained. On the other side sits the logic of isolation avoidance: do not drive every Arab state irreversibly into the opposing camp, do not convert every neighbor into an active launchpad for anti-Iran operations, and do not make regime survival impossible by fighting the entire region at once.This internal contradiction is one reason the phrase “holy war” can mislead. What is unfolding is more dangerous in practical terms and more limited in formal terms. Iran may never issue a clean, universal call for a civilizational war against all enemies of Islam, yet it can still encourage clerical sanction, mobilize militias, inspire cross-border attacks, bless cyber retaliation, empower covert cells and unleash proxy violence under a sacred frame. That would be a hybrid escalation: not a single global summons, but a diffuse religious legitimization of a long, dirty regional war. For civilians, ports, airports, desalination plants, shipping lanes and energy markets, the difference may feel almost academic.The role of Iran’s allied armed networks reinforces that point. Hezbollah has entered the conflict, but not from a position of unchallenged strength. Its intervention has deepened political strain in Lebanon and highlighted how even Iran’s most loyal partners are balancing solidarity against self-preservation. Other aligned groups face similar pressures. The so-called axis can still hurt Israel, U.S. assets and regional infrastructure, but it is not a frictionless machine awaiting one theological command to move in perfect unity. The more Tehran leans on proxies, the more it reveals that its preferred method remains layered coercion, not a single dramatic declaration of holy war.There is also a sectarian and geopolitical reality that limits the holy-war model. The Muslim world is not a single mobilizable bloc waiting for instructions from Tehran. Iran is a Shiite theocratic state with revolutionary ambitions, but its appeal across Sunni-majority states is uneven at best and sharply contested at worst. Gulf monarchies, already targeted by Iranian missiles and drones, are not natural participants in an Iranian-led sacred struggle. Many of them fear Tehran at least as much as they oppose the bombing campaign against it. That means Iran’s religious messaging may galvanize sympathizers, militants and ideological fellow travelers, but it is unlikely to unify the wider Islamic world behind one war banner.Still, dismissing the danger would be a grave mistake. The holy-war language matters because words can widen the menu of violence. Once a conflict is framed as sacred defense rather than national retaliation alone, thresholds can drop. Assassinations, sabotage, maritime attacks, strikes on civilian-linked infrastructure and violence by semi-deniable actors all become easier to justify. A state under bombardment, mourning its supreme leader and fighting for institutional survival may decide that conventional retaliation is not enough. If Tehran concludes that it cannot win symmetrically, it may authorize a looser, more ideological pattern of warfare stretching from the Gulf to the Mediterranean and beyond.The economic front is equally important. Iran understands that energy fear can be weaponized. Even limited disruption in the Strait of Hormuz sends shockwaves through insurance, shipping, aviation and inflation expectations worldwide. That leverage is politically valuable because it turns a military confrontation into a global pressure campaign. A formal holy war would demand maximal ideological mobilization. A survival war, by contrast, rewards selective disruption, ambiguity and controlled chaos. Tehran’s actions so far fit the second model more closely than the first.This is why the most serious answer to the headline question is not a simple yes or no. Iran is unlikely to launch a classic holy war in the simplistic sense of a formal, total religious call to arms that instantly unites the Muslim world under its banner. But it is already moving toward something more contemporary and, in some ways, more destabilizing: a war of survival wrapped in sacred legitimacy, regional coercion and asymmetric retaliation. The bombings have not merely invited revenge. They have strengthened the argument of those in Tehran who believe compromise invites death and that only resistance sanctified by faith can preserve the system.So the real risk is not that Iran suddenly abandons strategy for theology. The real risk is that strategy and theology fuse more tightly than before. If that fusion hardens, the war will not remain a sequence of missile exchanges and air raids. It will become a broader contest over succession, legitimacy, energy, maritime freedom, proxy warfare and the right to define resistance as a religious duty. In that environment, the phrase “holy war” may remain officially ambiguous, but its practical effects could become visible across the entire region.