Coin Press - EU India deal gains unveiled

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EU India deal gains unveiled




On 26 January 2026 negotiators from Brussels and New Delhi announced that they had finally concluded a free‑trade agreement (FTA) after nearly two decades of on‑off negotiations. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described it as the “mother of all deals”. The pact – which still requires legal revision and ratification in both the European Parliament and the Indian parliament – is broad in scope. It will eventually eliminate or reduce tariffs on over 90 % of EU exports to India, save European companies around €4 billion per year in duties and double EU exports to India by 2032. In return, the EU will cut tariffs to zero on about 90 % of Indian goods at launch and extend duty‑free access to 93 % within seven years. The agreement complements a newly signed Security and Defence Partnership that extends cooperation into areas such as maritime security, cyber‑defence and counterterrorism, signalling that the relationship now goes well beyond commerce.

Europe’s economic gains
Market access to a massive growth engine
India’s economy – valued at roughly $4.2 trillion and forecast to grow faster than any other major economy – is the EU’s tenth‑largest export market. EU goods face a weighted‑average tariff of about 9.3 % when entering India. Under the FTA, India will eliminate or reduce tariffs on 96.6 % of EU exports by value. Tariffs on roughly 30 % of goods will fall to zero immediately, while remaining duties will be phased out over five, seven or ten years. High barriers on automobiles and industrial goods are set to tumble: duties on cars will fall from 110 % to 10 % over five years under a quota for 250 000 vehicles; tariffs of up to 44 % on machinery, 22 % on chemicals and 11 % on pharmaceuticals will be scrapped. For European vintners and distillers, India’s prohibitive 150 % wine tariff will drop to 20–30 % and duties on spirits will fall to 40 %.

The EU’s exporters stand to benefit disproportionately in sectors where India currently imposes the steepest barriers. According to an Allianz Research estimate, an ambitious FTA could boost EU exports by USD 19.2 billion per year (about +0.3 % of total EU exports) and raise EU GDP by +0.1 percentage points annually. Germany, France and Italy – with strong industrial and machinery exports – would gain the most. The EU also expects improved access in financial and maritime services, stronger intellectual‑property protection and simplified customs procedures, making it easier for European firms to invest in and operate within the Indian market.

Securing supply chains and reducing dependency on China
Beyond the immediate tariff windfall, the FTA is part of a broader strategy to diversify supply chains and reduce reliance on China. A Reuters analysis notes that for Europe the deal provides a route to “support supply‑chain diversification and reduce reliance on China” while tapping India’s fast‑growing market. EU trade with the United States and China dwarfs its trade with India – €873 billion and €736 billion in goods respectively in 2024 – but both relationships have become more uncertain. The return of U.S. tariff threats and growing geopolitical friction with Beijing have pushed Brussels to accelerate deals with Mercosur, Mexico, Indonesia and now India.

India’s demographic scale offers long‑term opportunities. The agreement opens a market of 1.4 billion consumers to European companies with lower tariffs and better regulatory cooperation. Crucially, it provides a foothold in sectors where China currently dominates global supply chains. The pact’s digital‑trade provisions set rules on data flows, privacy and standards, allowing European technology firms to collaborate with India’s vast digital workforce. It also contains labour, environment and women’s empowerment commitments, aligning trade flows with the EU’s sustainability agenda.

Strategic and defence dividends
The simultaneous Security and Defence Partnership gives the trade accord a geopolitical dimension. Signed on 27 January 2026, the pact builds a comprehensive framework for cooperation in maritime security, counterterrorism, cyber‑defence and emerging technologies. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said the partnership marks a new phase in relations and reflects how “the EU and India see the world changing in similar ways”. By aligning security interests, Europe hopes to embed India in a rules‑based order and create an Indo‑Pacific partner that can balance China’s influence, thus increasing the geopolitical payoff from deeper economic integration. The partnership also includes cooperation on space security, resilience of critical infrastructure and counter‑terrorism training, underlining that the EU’s gains are not merely commercial but strategic.

The truth behind the deal: limits and conditions
Ratification risks and delayed benefits
While political leaders celebrated, the FTA’s benefits will not be immediate. The legal text still needs to be reviewed, translated and approved by all 27 EU governments, the European Parliament and India’s parliament, a process that could take a year or more. Analysts caution that the ratification could face setbacks similar to the EU–Mercosur agreement, which has been challenged in the EU’s top court. Even after entry into force, many tariff cuts are phased in over up to ten years and low‑price cars as well as sensitive farm products are excluded entirely. Therefore, the claimed doubling of EU exports by 2032 will depend on smooth implementation and sustained political will on both sides.

Modest gains relative to global trade
Although labelled the “mother of all deals”, some analysts argue that the economic impact for Europe may be modest. EU–India goods trade was about €120 billion in 2024, a fraction of the EU’s trade with the United States or China. Even if EU exports to India double, they would remain small relative to the bloc’s global trade. Allianz estimates that Europe’s auto industry would gain less than USD 50 million in additional car exports because current car exports to India are only USD 300–400 million. The EU’s major export interests lie in machinery, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, while automotive gains attract headlines but deliver little material uplift.

Stringent conditions and mutual compromises
The FTA is less ambitious than some other EU deals. It leaves out government procurement, energy and raw materials and investment protection agreements, which are still being negotiated separately. Agriculture and dairy are largely excluded; India will maintain protections for rice, sugar, dairy and poultry. EU demands for far‑reaching environmental, labour and intellectual‑property standards have been controversial. India succeeded in limiting tariff elimination to around 97 % of EU exports and secured quotas for sensitive goods such as cars, steel and shrimps. Delhi also obtained a commitment that any flexibilities the EU grants other countries under its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism will also apply to India, mitigating some of the impact of Europe’s new carbon levy.

Non‑tariff barriers and the carbon border tax
The greatest obstacles to EU gains may lie outside the tariff schedules. Indian exporters complain of stringent EU technical standards, certification costs and regulatory delays, while the EU is concerned about data security and market access in services. India’s trade community fears that Europe’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism could erode tariff gains by imposing duties on carbon‑intensive exports. A technical group and a €500 million EU fund have been created to help Indian firms verify carbon footprints and reduce emissions. For the EU, success will depend on the enforcement of environmental and labour provisions and on ensuring that India implements reforms to ease doing business.

Conclusion: beyond trade
The EU‑India trade pact represents the most comprehensive trade agreement either party has ever signed. For Europe it offers access to a vast and rapidly growing economy, savings in duties, diversification away from China and the United States, and a new strategic partner in the Indo‑Pacific. Tariffs on machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and premium wines will fall sharply, and European firms will gain improved access to Indian services sectors. The accompanying security partnership underscores the geopolitical stakes: Europe aims to anchor India in a rules‑based order and counterbalance competitors in Asia. However, the deal is conditional, phased and subject to political hurdles. The economic gains are significant but remain limited relative to Europe’s overall trade. To realise its full potential, both sides must navigate ratification, implement reforms, and balance economic ambition with domestic sensitivities. Only then will the truth behind the deal – whether it truly delivers for Europe – become clear.



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Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

India's island choke point

The language of revenge makes for an arresting headline, but it obscures the more consequential story unfolding on Great Nicobar. India is not constructing a mechanism that can simply be activated to halt Chinese trade. It is attempting to convert a remote and sparsely developed island into a forward maritime hub from which it can observe strategic shipping routes, support naval and air operations and, in a serious crisis, make Chinese access to the Indian Ocean more difficult and expensive.Great Nicobar is the southernmost large island in India’s Andaman and Nicobar archipelago. It lies closer to Indonesia than to the Indian mainland and sits near the approaches to the Strait of Malacca, one of the most important maritime passages in the world. The island is also approximately forty nautical miles from a heavily used east-west shipping corridor. That geography gives Great Nicobar a significance far greater than its size or population might suggest. Vessels travelling between the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and the South China Sea must pass through a limited number of navigable channels. The Strait of Malacca remains the principal commercial route because alternatives through the Sunda and Lombok straits generally require longer voyages, more fuel and additional time.For China, whose economic strength depends heavily on seaborne exports, raw materials and imported energy, this is a persistent strategic vulnerability. For India, the same geography offers an opportunity to transform an isolated territory into an advanced observation, logistics and deterrence platform.A nine-billion-dollar transformationThe Great Nicobar development programme is commonly described as an investment worth roughly nine billion dollars, although its estimated cost has changed as the plans have been revised. The wider programme is currently valued at approximately 81,000 crore rupees and covers around 166 square kilometres.It combines four interconnected projects. The first is a deep-water international container transhipment port at Galathea Bay. The second is a new airport intended for both civilian and military use. The third is a gas and solar power complex with a planned capacity of 450 megavolt-amperes. The fourth is a new township with roads, water systems, communications, public services and industrial infrastructure.The initial two phases of the proposed port were appraised in 2026 at a combined cost of 48,862 crore rupees. They are designed to provide twelve container berths and an annual handling capacity of 11.8 million twenty-foot equivalent units. Longer-term plans could expand the port still further. Natural water depths of between twenty and thirty metres are among Galathea Bay’s most important commercial advantages. They could allow the terminal to receive the largest modern container ships without the severe draught restrictions encountered at many existing Indian ports.The new airport is equally significant. With an estimated investment of around 13,000 crore rupees, it is intended to accommodate civilian aircraft as well as military transports, maritime patrol aircraft and combat aircraft. Operational control is expected to rest with the Indian Navy, giving New Delhi a much larger aviation platform in the south-eastern Indian Ocean than is available at the existing airfield on the island.The port, airport and power facilities therefore cannot be understood as separate construction schemes. Together, they are intended to create the permanent logistical foundation required for sustained economic and military activity.India wants its cargo backThe commercial argument behind the project is substantial. India has historically routed a large share of its container transhipment traffic through foreign ports, particularly Colombo, Singapore and Port Klang. Containers arriving on large intercontinental vessels are frequently transferred at those hubs to smaller feeder ships serving Indian destinations.That arrangement costs India revenue, creates dependence on infrastructure outside its jurisdiction and reduces its influence over regional shipping networks. A competitive deep-water terminal at Great Nicobar could intercept cargo moving between the Indian Ocean and East Asia while serving ports on India’s eastern coast, Bangladesh, Myanmar and other parts of Southeast Asia. The location is attractive, but geography alone does not create a successful port. Shipping companies choose terminals according to price, reliability, vessel turnaround times, customs efficiency, digital systems, frequency of feeder connections and the availability of repair, storage and bunkering services. Galathea Bay will have to compete not only with Singapore, Colombo and Port Klang but also with emerging Indian facilities such as Vizhinjam.The financial structure reveals how difficult that competition may be. The first two port phases have been designed as a public-private partnership, with Indian-controlled ownership and a proposed concession period of fifty years. Project planners sought viability-gap assistance of 12,230 crore rupees to reduce the risk for private investors. Financial appraisers concluded that the requested support did not fit the standard viability-gap funding framework. The ports ministry may therefore have to provide capital assistance from its own budget or seek a separate political decision. This is a crucial detail. It suggests that Great Nicobar’s strategic value may justify public expenditure that would be difficult to defend on commercial returns alone.In other words, the port is not merely a business venture. It is strategic infrastructure with a commercial component.What the island changes for ChinaThe most immediate military benefit would be improved maritime domain awareness. Radar installations, long-range aircraft, drones, naval vessels and intelligence systems based closer to the Malacca approaches would give India a clearer picture of movements between the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Chinese naval deployments in the Indian Ocean have become more regular over the past two decades. Warships assigned to anti-piracy patrols, survey vessels, submarines and support ships have all demonstrated Beijing’s growing ability to operate far from the Chinese coastline. Access to ports developed or operated by Chinese companies has also increased Beijing’s logistical options across the region.A fully equipped Great Nicobar hub would allow India to monitor those movements from a much more advantageous position. It could support patrol aircraft for longer periods, shorten response times and provide fuel, maintenance and communications closer to the principal maritime routes. This does not mean that India could effortlessly close the Strait of Malacca. The expression “choking Beijing” is strategically evocative but operationally misleading. The strait is bordered by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. India does not control it, and any attempt to block commercial shipping would constitute an extraordinary act with global economic and military consequences. Maintaining an effective blockade against a major power would require persistent naval and air superiority, extensive intelligence, secure logistics and cooperation from other states.Great Nicobar is therefore not a switch with which India can turn off Chinese trade. Its importance lies in deterrence and strategic uncertainty. It could increase the number of assets China would need to protect its sea lanes, make covert naval movement more difficult and force Beijing to devote greater attention to the eastern Indian Ocean.Alternative Chinese routes do exist. Ships can use the Sunda or Lombok straits, while pipelines through Myanmar and overland corridors through Pakistan provide limited diversification. None of them can easily replace the scale, efficiency and established commercial networks associated with the Malacca route. India does not need the ability to stop every Chinese vessel to gain leverage. It needs the credible capacity to observe movements, complicate operations and impose additional costs during a confrontation.A forward base must also surviveBuilding runways, quays and radar stations is only the beginning. A remote installation becomes strategically valuable only when it can continue operating under pressure.Great Nicobar will require secure fuel storage, ammunition facilities, maintenance depots, air-defence systems, hardened aircraft shelters, redundant communications and dependable supply links. It must also be protected against submarine activity, missile attacks, cyber disruption and sabotage. The island’s distance from India’s main industrial and military centres creates a logistical challenge. Personnel, spare parts, construction materials and emergency supplies must travel long distances by sea or air. Severe weather can interrupt those connections, while the narrow local infrastructure base leaves little room for failure.A highly visible airport and port without adequate protection could become targets rather than instruments of leverage. The strategic value of Great Nicobar will consequently depend less on ceremonial inaugurations than on the unglamorous systems that keep aircraft flying, ships supplied and sensors functioning during a crisis.The project could also assist India in humanitarian relief and disaster response. A major airport, deep-water port and permanent logistics network would provide a forward base for operations after cyclones, earthquakes or tsunamis across Southeast Asia. Such capabilities would strengthen India’s claim to be a dependable regional security partner rather than merely a country seeking military advantage over China.The ecological price cannot be hiddenGreat Nicobar is not an empty piece of territory. It contains tropical rainforest, mangroves, coral habitats and numerous endemic species. Galathea Bay is associated with the nesting grounds of giant leatherback turtles, while the island is also home to the Nicobar megapode, saltwater crocodiles and other vulnerable wildlife. The project involves the diversion of approximately 130.75 square kilometres of forest land. Estimates indicate that close to one million trees could eventually be affected, although the government maintains that significant green areas will remain within the wider development zone.Authorities have imposed dozens of environmental conditions and planned compensatory afforestation covering more than ninety-seven square kilometres. The government also argues that the large majority of Great Nicobar will remain within forests, national parks, protected areas, a biosphere reserve and tribal conservation zones. The National Green Tribunal declined to stop the development in February 2026, concluding that there was no sufficient basis for overturning the existing environmental and coastal clearances. It nevertheless required strict compliance with the protective conditions.The ruling did not eliminate the underlying concerns. An island rainforest is a complex and isolated ecosystem that cannot simply be recreated through tree planting elsewhere. Forest loss can alter freshwater systems, coastal stability and wildlife migration even when a large percentage of the island formally remains protected.There is also a profound human dimension. Great Nicobar is home to the Nicobarese and the Shompen, one of the world’s most isolated indigenous communities. The government says the project will not physically displace them and has promised dedicated safeguards. The greater danger may arise from indirect contact. A large influx of construction workers, officials, traders and future residents could expose isolated communities to disease, cultural disruption and pressure on traditional territory. Preventing direct displacement will not be sufficient if the surrounding social and ecological conditions are transformed beyond recognition.A landscape shaped by disasterThe island lies in a seismically active region. The Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 devastated Great Nicobar, destroyed settlements and caused severe land subsidence at its southern end. Any new airport, port, power plant and township must therefore be designed for conditions far more demanding than those facing ordinary mainland infrastructure. Breakwaters, evacuation routes, emergency power systems, elevated storage, earthquake-resistant construction and redundant communications will all be essential. The financial cost of such resilience is high, but ignoring it would expose the entire programme to catastrophic failure.Environmental protection and disaster planning are not secondary obstacles to the strategic project. They are part of its strategic credibility. A port delayed by legal challenges, damaged by a natural disaster or surrounded by social conflict would weaken rather than strengthen India’s position.The project is not yet a finished weaponThe most important distinction is between ambition and operational reality. Great Nicobar is not currently capable of controlling the Malacca approaches on the scale suggested by dramatic descriptions of the project. In March 2026, the relevant public-private partnership committee recommended the first two port phases for further administrative consideration, subject to financial, contractual and ownership conditions. The airport had entered initial tendering, while the power plant and township remained at different stages of appraisal and approval.The latest public timetable indicates that physical work on the Galathea Bay port is expected to begin in 2028. That schedule is later than earlier expectations that an initial port phase might already be operating by that year. Even after construction begins, completing the full island transformation will require many years and potentially several decades. Financing, private-sector participation, environmental monitoring, supply-chain constraints and construction in a remote seismic location could all affect the schedule. Cost escalation is also likely to remain a concern as designs become more detailed.China will not stand still during that period. Beijing can strengthen alternative routes, expand naval deployments, increase cooperation with regional ports and develop capabilities intended to threaten Indian installations. Great Nicobar is therefore part of a continuing strategic competition rather than a final answer to it.India’s real revenge is strategic patienceDescribing the Great Nicobar project as India’s revenge on China captures the emotional appeal of a country turning geography against its principal Asian rival. Yet revenge is not the most accurate description. The project is better understood as an attempt to correct a long-standing imbalance. India possesses an island chain overlooking some of the world’s busiest sea routes, but for decades much of that geographical advantage remained underdeveloped. Great Nicobar represents an effort to convert position into capability.Success will not be measured by whether India can literally stop Chinese shipping. It will be measured by whether the island gives New Delhi reliable surveillance, faster military response, commercially viable port operations and a resilient logistics network without inflicting irreversible damage on the people and ecosystems already there.If those conditions are met, Great Nicobar could become one of India’s most consequential strategic investments. It would not choke Beijing in peacetime, but it could make China’s leaders think more carefully about the risks of confrontation in the Indian Ocean. That additional calculation is the true source of India’s leverage.