Coin Press - Cuba Strangled by US Pressure

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Cuba Strangled by US Pressure




The island nation of Cuba is facing its most severe economic crisis in decades. Recent months have seen a perfect storm of external pressure and internal fragility. The United States has tightened long‑standing sanctions and, through a combination of executive orders and diplomatic threats, has targeted the two pillars that have kept the Caribbean country afloat: imported oil and tourism. As fuel shortages deepen, blackouts become routine and visitors stay away, many Cubans are comparing the present hardship to the “Special Period” of the 1990s. This article examines how the latest U.S. measures are choking the Cuban government, the social and economic repercussions on the population, and the responses from Havana and the broader international community.

Washington’s New Offensive
In late January 2026, the U.S. president declared a national emergency regarding Cuba and signed a sweeping executive order that uses tariffs as a weapon against any country that supplies the island with oil. The order empowers the State and Commerce Departments to designate countries that provide fuel to Cuba and allows the White House to raise duties on unrelated imports from those nations. The U.S. administration claims the move is necessary because Havana allegedly supports hostile governments and armed groups, hosts foreign intelligence facilities and engages in human rights abuses. While the order has not yet been fully implemented, it has already sown uncertainty among Cuba’s remaining fuel suppliers, most notably Mexico and Russia.

This tariff threat comes on the heels of a dramatic U.S. military operation. On 3 January 2026 elite U.S. forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife and flew them to a U.S. naval vessel. Venezuela had been Cuba’s closest ally and its main oil supplier for two decades. The operation severed that lifeline overnight. Mexico, which filled the void by shipping nearly 20,000 barrels of oil per day in 2025, paused deliveries in late January as it weighed the risk of U.S. retaliation. With Venezuela offline and Mexico hesitant, Cuba now depends on small shipments from Russia and Algeria, leaving it with only a few weeks of fuel reserves.

Energy Shortages and Tourism Collapse
Fuel scarcity has transformed daily life across Cuba. Rolling blackouts lasting several hours have become common even in the capital, Havana. Public transportation is grinding to a halt as buses and shared taxis run out of diesel, forcing people to walk long distances or hitch rides. Businesses and hospitals struggle to operate without reliable electricity and fuel. The government produces only about 40 % of its energy domestically, making imported oil essential to power the grid, irrigate crops and keep factories running.

The fuel crisis has compounded an already steep decline in tourism, once a $3 billion annual industry for Cuba. Visitor numbers plunged from 4.8 million in 2018 to roughly 2.3 million between January and November 2025. Sanctions enacted over the past five years—including bans on cruise ships and restrictions on flights—had already deterred many travelers. The collapse of Venezuela’s oil shipments and the global pandemic worsened the situation, but the current blockade threatens to bring the sector to a standstill. Drivers of classic cars in Havana report that they now receive only one or two customers a day and have cut their prices by more than half to attract business. Sightseeing buses that once shuttled crowds around the capital now leave nearly empty.

People who make a living from tourism are among those suffering most. Street vendors of snacks such as chivirico—deep‑fried flour sprinkled with sugar—have seen sales plummet as visitor numbers drop and locals have less disposable income. Small businesses, including guesthouses and restaurants that mushroomed during Cuba’s brief tourism boom, are closing their doors. The exodus of tourists also means fewer euros and dollars in circulation, exacerbating the island’s currency shortages.

Humanitarian Alarm
International observers warn that the energy squeeze could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe. The secretary‑general of the United Nations urged all parties to seek dialogue and respect international law, warning that Cuba’s situation will “worsen if not collapse” if its fuel needs are not met. The UN noted that the General Assembly has repeatedly called for an end to the U.S. trade embargo and reminded Washington of its obligations under international law.

The U.S. government dismisses these warnings and says the humanitarian crisis is the result of Havana’s mismanagement rather than sanctions. Washington has announced an additional $6 million in aid to be delivered through the Catholic Church, bringing the total U.S. assistance since last year’s Hurricane Melissa to $9 million. Cuban officials deride the aid as hypocrisy, saying it is impossible to provide “soup & cans for a few” while denying the country access to fuel.

Cuba’s Response
Faced with dwindling oil supplies, Cuba has unveiled a sweeping rationing plan designed to protect essential services. Government ministers say fuel will be guaranteed for sectors such as agriculture, healthcare, water supply, education and defence. Tourism and export industries, including the famous cigar sector, will also receive priority to generate foreign currency. Domestic and international flights are expected to continue for now, though drivers will see restrictions at petrol stations until supplies normalise.

Officials have also announced plans to plant 200,000 hectares of rice and expand renewable energy and animal traction to offset the lack of fuel for irrigation and ploughing. Schools have been told to adopt a hybrid system combining in‑person and remote learning to save energy. The government’s message is resolute: “We are not going to collapse,” said Commerce Minister Oscar Perez‑Oliva.

President Miguel Díaz‑Canel has called for solidarity and resilience. In public remarks he compared the current crisis to the 1990s and urged Cubans to prepare for “further sacrifices”. He criticised Washington’s measures as “fascist, criminal and genocidal” and declared that the United States had hijacked its own citizens’ interests for personal gain. Cuba’s foreign minister described the U.S. actions as an “unusual and extraordinary threat” and announced that Havana was declaring an international emergency.

Public Mood
On the streets of Havana, the mood swings between anger and resignation. Some residents liken the situation to war and say the only thing missing is bombing. Many recall the Special Period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, when oxen replaced tractors and power cuts were the norm. Elderly Cubans who lived through that era say today’s shortages of fuel, food and medicine feel worse. Younger adults, who have never known anything but economic crisis, are nonetheless shocked by how quickly buses have disappeared and fuel lines have lengthened.

Workers in essential services worry about the impact on vulnerable populations. Parents wonder how to keep schools open without electricity; farmers ask how to till soil without fuel; hospital administrators scramble to secure diesel for generators. Some are already walking long distances to work or using bicycle taxis. A growing number of people say they feel trapped: they cannot afford to leave the country, yet staying means enduring increasingly harsh conditions.

Regional and Global Implications
The U.S. offensive against Cuba’s oil suppliers has unsettled relations across Latin America. Mexico, currently negotiating a trade agreement with Washington, is caught between its solidarity with Havana and the risk of damaging its own economy. Mexican officials say they are using all diplomatic channels to find a way to continue supplying oil without triggering U.S. tariffs. Russia has hinted that it will continue sending oil despite the sanctions, viewing the standoff as another front in its broader confrontation with the West. Analysts caution that the U.S. tariff framework could extend far beyond energy producers, disrupting supply chains for a wide range of goods.

For the Cuban government, the stakes are existential. Oil and tourism provide the foreign currency that allows the state to import food, medicine and spare parts. Without them, the economy could collapse and social unrest could intensify. U.S. officials hope that financial pain will force Havana to negotiate or trigger internal change, while Cuban leaders argue that the measures are a form of collective punishment designed to topple their system without regard for human suffering. The coming months will reveal whether Washington’s strategy succeeds in forcing concessions or whether it pushes Cuba to deepen ties with other powers.

Conclusion and Future
By targeting fuel supplies and tourism, the United States has opened a new chapter in its decades‑long confrontation with Cuba. The measures have already plunged the island into deeper crisis, leaving millions to grapple with blackouts, empty streets and an uncertain future. Whether the strategy will weaken the government in Havana or merely inflict greater hardship on ordinary Cubans remains to be seen. What is clear is that, in the absence of oil and visitors, the Cuban economy cannot function as it has for the past thirty years. As the world watches, Cuba must once again summon resilience and ingenuity to survive another period of scarcity.



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Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

Latin America’s age trap

Latin America has spent generations thinking of demography as a problem of abundance. Governments built schools for swelling classes, cities spread to absorb millions of new residents, and economists worried about whether jobs, housing and food production could keep pace with a rapidly expanding population. That assumption now belongs to the past. The region is entering an era in which there will be fewer children, a slower-growing workforce and many more older people, and the transition is unfolding far faster than most political systems are prepared to admit.The shift is already measurable. Fertility in Latin America has fallen to about 1.8 children per woman and has remained below the replacement level of 2.1 since 2015. The Caribbean is lower still, at roughly 1.5. In 2024, Latin America and the Caribbean had about 663 million inhabitants, nearly 26 million fewer than projections made at the beginning of the century had anticipated. The population is now expected to peak at about 730 million in 2053 before beginning a long decline.A peak in the middle of the century does not sound like an immediate emergency. That is precisely why the risk is easy to underestimate. Demographic crises rarely arrive as a single shock. They emerge through thousands of local changes: maternity wards with fewer patients, primary schools with empty desks, small towns losing young adults, companies unable to recruit skilled staff, pension systems collecting too little and families trying to care for elderly relatives with fewer hands available.Latin America does not yet have the lowest fertility in the world, and it is not yet the oldest region. Parts of East Asia have much lower birth rates, while Europe already has a substantially larger elderly population. The reason Latin America’s predicament could prove harsher is the sequence in which the change is occurring. The region is ageing before it has become broadly prosperous, before much of its workforce has entered formal employment and before durable welfare states have been built. Europe grew old after decades of industrialisation, capital accumulation and the expansion of tax-funded social protection. Several East Asian economies face extreme demographic contraction, but many entered it with high savings, advanced infrastructure, strong education systems and highly productive firms. Latin America is approaching the same pressure with weak productivity growth, deeply unequal access to public services, fragile fiscal positions and labour markets in which informality remains normal rather than exceptional.The speed of the transformation leaves little room for complacency. In 1950, about 41 per cent of the region’s population was under the age of 15. By 2024, that share had fallen to 22.5 per cent. In the same year, roughly 65 million people were aged 65 or older, representing 9.9 per cent of the population. By 2050, that group is projected to reach about 138 million and almost 19 per cent of the total. The median age, just 18 in 1950, reached 31 in 2024 and is expected to approach 40 by mid-century.This is not simply a story about people refusing to have children. Much of the fertility decline reflects social progress. Infant mortality has fallen, contraception has become more accessible, women have gained education and economic independence, and adolescent pregnancy has declined sharply. Families no longer need many births to ensure that several children survive to adulthood. Women are also more able to decide whether and when motherhood fits their lives.The trouble is that institutions have not adapted to the freedom and expectations of modern adulthood. In many cities, secure housing is expensive, formal jobs are scarce, commuting is exhausting and childcare is limited. Parenthood can carry a severe career penalty, especially for women, while domestic and caring responsibilities remain distributed unequally. Young adults often spend years moving between temporary work, informal employment and dependence on relatives before they feel able to form a household.Low fertility therefore reflects both choice and constraint. Some people do not want children. Others want fewer than previous generations. Many would like to become parents but postpone the decision because the economic and practical conditions never appear sufficiently stable. The postponement of first births explains part of the fall, but not all of it. Completed family size is also declining, meaning that later births are not fully compensating for those deferred in early adulthood.Chile offers one of the clearest warnings. Its fertility rate fell to about 1.03 children per woman in 2024, below Japan’s level and dramatically lower than it had been only a decade earlier. Uruguay now records far fewer births than deaths. Cuba is losing population through the combined effects of low fertility, ageing and large-scale emigration. Brazil and Mexico still have enormous populations, but their national size conceals shrinking school cohorts and ageing communities across many states and municipalities. Central America remains younger on average, yet fertility there is falling rapidly as well.The economic consequences will not be determined by headcounts alone. A smaller workforce can support a larger retired population if each worker becomes more productive, if more women enter well-paid employment, if healthy older people remain active and if technology raises output. Demographic decline is not an automatic sentence to recession. It becomes dangerous when productivity stagnates and institutions fail to mobilise the people who are already present.Latin America enters this test with a serious structural weakness. Nearly 47 per cent of employed people were working informally in the first half of 2025. Among young workers, the share was about 56 per cent. Informal work often means low and unstable earnings, limited training, weak legal protection and irregular or nonexistent pension contributions. It also narrows the tax base from which governments must finance health care, pensions and long-term support. For decades, a relatively large working-age population offered the region a demographic dividend. There were more potential workers in relation to children and older dependants, creating an opportunity for faster growth and higher savings. Yet a dividend is only an opportunity, not a guarantee. Much of it was consumed during years of modest investment, unequal education and poor productivity. The favourable age structure is now beginning to close before the region has completed the economic transformation it was supposed to finance.The labour force will continue to grow for some time at regional level, but more slowly and with an older profile. Young cohorts entering employment will become smaller. Employers will face recruitment problems in areas that require technical skills, health professionals, teachers and care workers. Rural districts and smaller cities may lose working-age residents even while major metropolitan areas remain crowded. National averages will therefore hide acute local decline.Ageing will also expose the weaknesses of pension systems designed around continuous formal employment. The basic arithmetic is unforgiving. More people will draw benefits for longer periods, while growth in the number of contributors will slow. Yet raising contribution rates, reducing benefits or delaying retirement is politically difficult in societies where many people already receive inadequate support and where physically demanding work makes longer careers unrealistic.Pension coverage has expanded, including through non-contributory schemes, but adequacy remains a major problem. Around 43 per cent of older people receive pension income that is insufficient to meet minimum consumption needs. Roughly a quarter of people aged 65 and over were still participating in the labour market in 2024. For some, work in later life is a welcome source of purpose and income. For many others, it is not active ageing but economic necessity.Health systems face a related challenge. Longer lives are a major achievement, but longevity does not automatically mean more years in good health. Diabetes, cardiovascular disease, cancer, dementia and disability will demand sustained treatment, rehabilitation and assistance with daily life. Systems that remain divided between public programmes, employment-based insurance and private provision often deliver fragmented care precisely when older patients need continuity.The most immediate strain may appear not in hospitals or treasury accounts but inside homes. Long-term care remains limited or absent in much of the region, so families provide most assistance to elderly and disabled relatives. Women perform a disproportionate share of this work, often reducing paid hours or leaving employment altogether. That response becomes less viable as families become smaller, adult children migrate and more women participate in the labour market.The region’s need for professional long-term care workers could nearly triple by 2050. Without planning, the result will be a severe shortage of trained staff, a larger burden on unpaid carers and widening inequality between households that can purchase private support and those that cannot. A demographic model built on the assumption that daughters and daughters-in-law will provide unlimited free care is already breaking down.Migration complicates the picture. Latin America is simultaneously a region of emigration, immigration and large movements within its own borders. The departure of young adults can accelerate ageing in countries and communities of origin, leaving older relatives behind and draining scarce professional skills. Remittances may protect household incomes, but money sent from abroad cannot provide daily physical care.For receiving countries, migration can slow workforce decline and bring younger taxpayers into the system. It is not, however, a demographic switch that governments can simply turn on. Migrants need legal status, housing, language support where relevant, recognition of qualifications and access to formal employment. Poor integration can reproduce the same informality that already weakens public finances. Migration can redistribute population across the region, but it cannot reverse low fertility everywhere at once.Political incentives may make preparation harder. Older voters will form a growing share of electorates and will understandably defend pensions, health services and financial security. Younger households will demand affordable housing, education, childcare and better employment. Governments with limited revenue may present these needs as a competition between generations. That would be a costly mistake. Families span generations, and underinvestment in children today produces less productive workers and weaker pension finances tomorrow. The decline in the number of children also creates an opportunity. Smaller cohorts make it possible to spend more effectively on each child, improve early development, repair weak schools and expand technical education. A country with fewer young people cannot afford to waste their potential through poor teaching, malnutrition, violence or exclusion from employment. Human capital must replace population growth as the main engine of expansion.Policy should begin by abandoning the illusion that a cash payment for each birth can restore the family patterns of the twentieth century. One-off bonuses may change the timing of some births, but they do not resolve insecure work, expensive housing, inadequate childcare or the unequal division of care. Coercive or moralising pronatalism is even more dangerous. It treats women’s autonomy as the problem while ignoring the economic conditions that make desired parenthood difficult.A more credible family policy would make having children compatible with a modern life. That means reliable childcare, paid leave for both mothers and fathers, protection against workplace discrimination, predictable hours, affordable housing and reproductive health services. It also means reducing the burden of care that falls on women. Supporting families is not the same as demanding larger families. The objective should be to close the gap between the number of children people want and the number they believe they can responsibly raise.The second priority is productivity and formalisation. Governments need tax and social insurance systems that make formal employment easier for small firms and portable for workers who change jobs. Better technical education, digital infrastructure, access to finance and competition can help productive businesses expand. Higher female employment would soften workforce decline, but only if jobs provide sufficient pay and if childcare and eldercare are available.Pension reform must combine financial sustainability with social legitimacy. A universal floor can protect older people from poverty, while contributory benefits should reward formal work without excluding those whose careers were interrupted by unemployment, care or informality. Retirement ages may need gradual adjustment as healthy life expectancy rises, but rules should recognise differences in health, occupation and lifetime income. A construction worker and an office professional cannot be treated as though ageing affects them in the same way.Health policy must move towards prevention, primary care and the management of chronic disease long before old age. Long-term care should be treated as essential social infrastructure rather than a private family matter. Training carers, setting quality standards, supporting home and community services and giving respite to family members would create employment while allowing more women to remain in paid work.Older workers will also need a different labour market. Lifelong learning, flexible hours, anti-discrimination rules and adapted workplaces can help people remain productive voluntarily. The purpose is not to compel everyone to work indefinitely. It is to remove barriers that force capable people out while protecting those whose health or occupations make continued employment unreasonable.Latin America still has time, but not much. The region remains younger than Europe, and its total labour force has not yet begun a broad decline. That creates a final window in which reforms can be introduced before fiscal pressure intensifies. Waiting until the 2040s would mean attempting to build care systems, repair pensions and raise productivity after the ratio of workers to older dependants has already deteriorated sharply. The demographic crisis could become the worst of all not because Latin America will necessarily have the fewest babies or the oldest citizens, but because it risks combining rapid ageing with unfinished development. The decisive variable is no longer fertility alone. It is institutional readiness.A smaller and older population need not be poorer, lonelier or less dynamic. It can be healthier, more productive and better educated. Reaching that outcome requires governments to treat demography as a central economic issue rather than a distant social trend. Latin America does not need to force people to have children. It needs to make ordinary adulthood viable, parenthood compatible with aspiration and old age secure. Demography is not destiny, but prolonged political delay can make it feel like one.