Coin Press - Red sea gambit with Eritrea

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Red sea gambit with Eritrea




The United States is once again redefining its alliances in the Horn of Africa. Faced with an escalating war against Iran, a volatile Red Sea and the threat of maritime disruption, the Trump administration has quietly courted one of the world's most repressive governments: Eritrea. The overtures — meetings in Cairo and Asmara, hints of sanctions relief and talk of a strategic reset — have provoked both intrigue and alarm. They also reveal the hard calculus driving America’s diplomacy in an era when access to sea lanes may be as vital as any ideological commitment.

When Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in U.S. and Israeli air strikes on Tehran in March 2026, the Middle East descended into a war that quickly spilled across the region. Iran’s proxies in Yemen, the Houthis, threatened to cut the Bab el‑Mandeb strait at the mouth of the Red Sea and boasted that they could shut down commercial shipping. Within weeks, Houthi drones and missiles were harassing vessels. In May 2025 the United States had concluded a tenuous ceasefire with the Houthis after a two‑month bombing campaign, but the lull did little to reassure shipping companies, and a carrier strike group later sailed around the Cape of Good Hope rather than risk the shorter route through the Red Sea. For Washington the geopolitical stakes were clear: if the Strait of Hormuz on the east side of the Arabian Peninsula could be closed by Iran, the Red Sea corridor on the west could not be allowed to fail.

Enter Eritrea. Stretching more than 1 000 kilometres along the Red Sea opposite Yemen, the small African state possesses some of the most coveted coastal real estate on the planet. Its ports, archipelagos and arid coastline could offer docking, resupply and surveillance points for any power seeking to patrol the waterway. For years, however, Asmara was treated as a pariah. Sanctions imposed in 2021 for its brutal incursions into Ethiopia’s Tigray region isolated the regime. Western governments criticised its indefinite military conscription, the absence of elections since independence in 1993 and systematic repression of dissent. Human Rights Watch and the United Nations listed arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances and crimes against humanity. Many compared the one‑party state to North Korea. Eritrea was, in the words of one U.S. congressional report, a “militarised authoritarian state” in which conscripts were forced to work for years under threat of punishment.

A secretive diplomatic charm offensive
Against this backdrop, the Trump administration began exploring a reset. Massad Boulos, the president’s senior envoy for Africa, held private meetings with Eritrea’s veteran leader, Isaias Afwerki, in Cairo and New York. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al‑Sisi acted as go‑between. Officials familiar with the talks say Washington offered to ease some sanctions in exchange for access to Eritrean ports and cooperation on maritime security. A second meeting was planned for Asmara. The State Department did not publicly acknowledge the initiative, but a spokesperson confirmed that the administration wished to “strengthen U.S. ties with the people and government of Eritrea”.

On the surface, the logic seems hard‑headed. If the United States is fighting a war with Iran and trying to keep the Red Sea open, it needs partners on the African shore. With Sudan in turmoil, Ethiopia distracted by internal strife and Djibouti hosting multiple foreign bases, Eritrea’s underutilised coastline is appealing. “The Red Sea region is too strategically important for the U.S. not to try to reopen ties with Eritrea,” a senior American official said privately. Some believe that bringing Asmara into Washington’s orbit would deprive Iran of another foothold and prevent Beijing or Moscow from consolidating influence on the western flank of the Middle East.

Yet the manner in which the talks have been conducted — behind closed doors, without congressional oversight or public debate — has fuelled speculation about a “secret alliance”. There is no signed treaty or formal announcement, only a series of leaks and carefully worded denials. For a president known for his transactional approach to foreign policy and his penchant for surprises, the opacity is not unusual. Nevertheless, the prospect of striking a bargain with Eritrea without demanding reforms has alarmed human‑rights advocates.

Eritrea’s record: repression at home, adventurism abroad
Eritrea’s president, Isaias Afwerki, has ruled his country since it won independence from Ethiopia in 1993. He has never held national elections and has shelved the constitution ratified in 1997. There is only one legal political party. The legislature has not convened in more than a decade. Independent media were shut down in 2001, and journalists and dissidents have vanished into secret prisons. Freedom House ranks Eritrea alongside North Korea as one of the least free places on earth. The national service programme, introduced during the border war with Ethiopia in the late 1990s, obliges men up to the age of sixty and women up to twenty‑seven to serve in the military or civil service indefinitely; conscripts often work for decades, earning paltry wages and facing arbitrary punishments. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry has said that these policies amount to enslavement.

The regime has also been accused of fomenting instability beyond its borders. From 2020 until late 2022 Eritrean troops fought alongside Ethiopian federal forces and Amhara militias against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, contributing to a humanitarian catastrophe that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. Despite a peace agreement, Eritrean units remain in parts of Tigray and have been implicated in looting and human‑rights abuses. Eritrean soldiers have been accused of smuggling goods and trafficking refugees. The government’s military adventures have strained relations with neighbouring Ethiopia and Sudan, even as Asmara cultivates ties with Russia and the United Arab Emirates to extract mining revenue and arms deals.

Isaias himself is a study in contradictions. In a speech marking the 35th anniversary of Eritrean independence, he devoted pages to denouncing what he called America’s “unipolar hegemony” and belittling the economic and military capabilities of the United States. He warned that Washington’s interventions in Iran and Venezuela were unlawful and lectured about the need for a new world order based on fairness and justice. He claimed the United States had accumulated unsustainable debt and undermined global stability through offshoring and intimidation. Yet he offered no mention of his country’s own systemic abuses or the diplomatic overtures reportedly underway. His government rejected a United Nations visit by human‑rights experts and continues to detain thousands of political prisoners.

Analysts say this rhetorical barrage serves a purpose. By casting himself as a champion of sovereignty and a critic of Western dominance, Isaias distracts from Eritrea’s collapsing infrastructure, intermittent electricity supply and widespread poverty. Only about half of Eritreans have access to electricity, and less than a fifth use the internet. Meanwhile, young people flee in droves to escape indefinite conscription and economic stagnation. The regime blames sanctions and conspiracies for these problems, but decades of central planning and militarisation are largely responsible. Even as he condemns American interventionism, Isaias relies on foreign mining investments and remittances from the diaspora to prop up his economy.

Strategic calculations and ethical dilemmas
Why, then, would Washington seek to rehabilitate such a regime? The answer lies in the strategic map. Iran’s influence in the Horn of Africa has waxed and waned over the decades. In the early 2000s Tehran cultivated close ties with Sudan and Eritrea, establishing naval access points and using soft‑power tools such as development aid and religious networks. But after the Gulf states increased their engagement in the region, and following renewed sanctions on Iran, Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea severed or scaled back relations with Tehran. Eritrea aligned itself with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, which offered financial assistance and military cooperation linked to the war in Yemen. By courting Eritrea now, Washington hopes to consolidate that shift and ensure that any residual Iranian presence on the Red Sea is neutered.

From a geopolitical perspective, the plan has logic. Eritrea controls the Dahlak Archipelago, a chain of islands that could serve as a naval outpost. Its ports at Massawa and Assab are deep enough for modern warships. The country lies directly opposite Yemen’s Hodeidah and the Houthi‑controlled coast, making it an ideal staging ground for monitoring missile launches and intercepting drones. With shipping insurance costs rising and energy markets jittery, the prospect of a reliable American‑Eritrean partnership is attractive to investors and defence planners alike.

Yet the ethical costs are steep. Lifting sanctions without demanding improvements in Eritrea’s human‑rights record could embolden other authoritarian regimes to leverage strategic assets for impunity. Critics argue that normalisation would reward a government that has shown little willingness to reform. “Normally, when we lift sanctions, the country has done something to merit it,” one former U.S. intelligence official observed. “It is the exact same militarised, autocratic state that it has been since 1993. If we are going to reward them, what are we getting for it?” There is also concern that closer ties with Washington might embolden Isaias to clamp down further on dissidents, secure in the knowledge that strategic necessity outweighs moral condemnation.

There are practical risks, too. Eritrea’s relationship with the United States has been volatile. After years of isolation, Asmara may be wary of becoming dependent on a superpower that could change course after the next election. The regime’s long‑standing anti‑American rhetoric and its alliance with other pariah states such as Russia and North Korea suggest that any partnership will be transactional and fragile. In his independence day address Isaias openly questioned whether Trump’s policies could reverse America’s decline and mocked Washington’s claims to military supremacy. He lamented “threats and intimidation” and asked why Iran alone should be sanctioned for pursuing nuclear technology. These remarks underline the ideological gulf between the two governments.

In the broader Horn of Africa, a U.S.–Eritrea alignment could also upset delicate balances. Ethiopia and Eritrea remain locked in disputes over borders and access to the sea. Ethiopia’s government has hinted at historic claims to Eritrean coastline, raising fears of renewed conflict. Sudan is embroiled in civil war, Somalia remains unstable and Djibouti hosts China’s first overseas military base alongside American, French, Japanese and Italian forces. Any perception that Washington is endorsing Eritrea could deepen rivalries and encourage other powers to strengthen their own proxies. Russia, which has supplied arms to Eritrea and is expanding its presence in Africa, may respond by deepening ties with Ethiopia or Sudan. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, long‑standing patrons of Asmara, could resent an American incursion into their sphere of influence.

The narrow path between realism and complicity
As the war with Iran rages, the temptation to make quick deals will only grow. The Biden administration faced similar pressures when the Houthis first attacked ships in the Red Sea, and it launched air strikes without resolving underlying conflicts. Trump, with his penchant for bold gestures, appears willing to gamble on an illiberal partner if it offers tactical advantages. Eritrea’s president, ever the political survivor, is adept at extracting concessions from larger powers while giving little in return. The result could be a marriage of convenience that serves immediate security needs but undermines long‑term stability and values.

For a policy to be sustainable, Washington would need to insist on tangible human‑rights improvements in Eritrea as part of any agreement. These could include a verifiable plan to end indefinite conscription, release political prisoners and allow independent media. Sanctions relief could be made conditional on such steps, rather than granted outright. Regional diplomacy with Ethiopia and Sudan would also be essential to prevent the new partnership from inflaming territorial disputes. Finally, transparency is crucial: American voters and lawmakers deserve to know when their government contemplates alliances with regimes that run counter to democratic principles.

The calculus facing the United States is stark. To keep oil flowing and commerce moving, it needs control of the Red Sea. To check Iran’s influence, it must maintain pressure on the Houthis and secure alternative supply routes. But courting a brutal dictatorship carries moral hazards and strategic pitfalls. As Isaias Afwerki lectures the world about justice while presiding over a security state, he provides a mirror for Western hypocrisy. Whether Trump’s secretive outreach to Eritrea will prove a masterstroke or a misstep remains to be seen. What is certain is that the people of Eritrea — long conscripted, silenced and marginalized — deserve more than to be pawns in a geopolitical game.



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Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

Europe’s arms money maze

Europe’s rearmament has acquired an uncomfortable companion: uncertainty about what the money actually buys. In Germany, an argument over defence-related borrowing has raised questions about whether exceptional debt is producing genuinely additional expenditure. In Estonia, unreliable inventory records and disputed ammunition contracts have brought ministerial accountability into the foreground. These are different problems, but they meet at the same point: a larger budget is not a reliable measure of a stronger defence.The contention that nobody knows what is happening to Europe’s weapons money goes too far. Budgets are published, procurement bodies operate and auditors are identifying failures. Nor do these cases establish that funds have disappeared into Russian hands or that the Kremlin engineered the difficulties. The more defensible conclusion is also more useful: Europe cannot judge rearmament by the volume of money announced. It must establish what has been purchased, accepted and made ready for use.That distinction matters strategically. An adversary need not steal the money to benefit from delays, unusable equipment or a loss of confidence in the governments spending it.What the €800 billion actually meansThe scale of the spending is substantial. Combined defence expenditure across the European Union reached €418 billion in 2025, with €454 billion estimated for 2026. Those annual totals should not be confused with the much larger, multi-year headline attached to the EU’s rearmament financing plan. The widely cited €800 billion is potential financing capacity, not a single fund already transferred to arms manufacturers. Its main components are approximately €650 billion in possible additional national expenditure enabled by fiscal flexibility over four years, and €150 billion in loans through the Security Action for Europe instrument, known as SAFE. The loans must be repaid; the additional national spending depends on governments choosing to use the available room.These distinctions are indispensable to any honest assessment. Permission to borrow is not an order placed with a factory. An order is not a completed delivery. Equipment delivered to a warehouse is not necessarily equipment that troops can operate, maintain and replenish. Treating all these stages as interchangeable allows governments to claim progress before the military benefit exists.It also creates a temptation to add together figures that describe different periods or overlapping flows of money. A credible account of rearmament should distinguish financing arrangements from annual expenditure, and both from verified outputs. Otherwise, the public is left comparing impressive totals whose practical meaning is unclear.Germany’s argument over additional spendingOn 10 September, the Ifo Institute challenged the use of Germany’s defence-related borrowing exemption. It calculated an €11 billion gap between additional borrowing and the year-on-year increase in the relevant expenditure. Ifo’s argument was that 38.5 per cent of the additional debt had not produced additional defence and security spending, instead freeing room for other purposes in the ordinary budget. The Finance Ministry rejected the comparison as legally and methodologically flawed. The exemption concerns qualifying expenditure above one per cent of gross domestic product, rather than an increase over the previous year. Ifo, for its part, said its analysis concerned additional spending, not constitutionality.This is not evidence that €11 billion was stolen. It is a dispute over the relationship between an exceptional borrowing mechanism and the political expectation attached to it. The difference is important: an arrangement can comply with its legal design while delivering less additional expenditure than citizens understand the announcement to promise.The practical question is whether new borrowing expands defence capacity or changes the way existing commitments are financed. Those outcomes can coexist within the same budget. Refinancing an established obligation may be lawful and fiscally useful, but it should not be presented as though an equivalent amount of new military capability has been purchased. Germany’s dispute therefore points to a straightforward transparency test. Governments should identify the expenditure that would have occurred anyway, the genuinely additional commitments and the delivery milestones attached to them. Without that comparison, the argument risks becoming a contest between accounting definitions while the central question—what the armed forces actually gain—remains unanswered.Estonia’s warning from the accountsIn Estonia, the problems are more immediate. Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur announced on 2 September that he would step down, accepting political responsibility for failures exposed in defence administration and procurement. His announcement did not amount to an admission of personal corruption.The National Audit Office issued a qualified opinion concerning defence inventories valued at approximately €1.2 billion because their quantities, composition and valuation could not be established reliably. It also questioned an unexplained retrospective adjustment of €99.7 million to the previous year’s inventory figures. That does not mean €1.2 billion of weapons has vanished. An unreliable balance is not the same thing as a proven loss. It means the records are insufficiently dependable to establish what the balance represents—a serious weakness in any organisation, and particularly consequential in one responsible for military readiness.Inadequate records can obstruct decisions long before a final financial loss is demonstrated. Commanders and purchasing authorities need to distinguish usable stock from equipment awaiting inspection, repair or replacement. If those categories are unclear, another procurement decision may rest on a mistaken understanding of what is already available.Auditing is therefore more than an exercise in retrospective blame. A trustworthy inventory helps determine what must be bought next, how urgently it is needed and whether previous purchases fulfilled their purpose. Poor accounting can undermine operational planning even where no theft is established.Paid for is not the same as usableEstonia’s ammunition procurement for Ukraine illustrates a second difficulty. The audit identified disputed advance payments and warned of a potential exposure to the state budget of around €70 million. That figure describes a risk, not a final, adjudicated loss.The controversy includes contracts involving the Italian company Datasel. Pevkur described ammunition delivered under the disputed arrangements as incomplete and of insufficient quality, rather than simply non-existent. Datasel disputes the criticism and has said that goods delivered and invoiced were worth approximately €58 million against about €59 million in advances. The company’s account is a contested position, not a judicial finding.The disagreement exposes a distinction that matters beyond this particular supplier. A payment record, an invoice, the physical presence of goods and acceptance of those goods for their intended use answer different questions. A supplier may point to shipments while a purchasing authority disputes whether the contractual requirement has been met. The existence of equipment does not, by itself, resolve an argument over quality or completeness.For Ukraine, the decisive consideration is usable military support. For the public authorities financing it, the additional questions are whether payment conditions were appropriate, inspections were timely and contractual protections can recover money when performance is disputed. Those questions should be settled through evidence and the relevant proceedings, not through premature declarations of guilt.The procurement lesson is nonetheless clear. Emergency purchasing needs traceable contracts, independently verified acceptance and a dependable record linking each payment to performance. Urgency may justify faster decisions. It cannot make the distinction between an invoice and a functioning delivery disappear.An oversight system split across institutionsEurope’s defence financing does not sit within a single system of scrutiny. National budgets, EU programmes, loans and off-budget arrangements have different institutional responsibilities. The European Court of Auditors’ September review described complex governance and uneven oversight arrangements, rather than a continent-wide absence of auditing.SAFE falls within the European Court of Auditors’ remit. The European Peace Facility, outside the ordinary EU budget, has its own College of Auditors. National defence expenditure is scrutinised through national institutions. The distinction is between different mandates, not between money that is automatically checked and money that is automatically unaccountable. The difficulty arises at the joins. A public explanation may follow the announcement of a financing package, while a procurement body follows the contract and an operational authority follows the equipment. Unless those accounts can be reconciled, citizens and legislators may struggle to establish the complete journey from political promise to accepted delivery.Secrecy complicates that task, but it need not prevent it. Publishing ammunition locations or technical vulnerabilities would be irresponsible. Giving properly authorised auditors access to contracts, inspections and payment records is a different matter. The need to protect operational information should not become a general excuse for withholding financial evidence.Nor should procurement integrity be treated as a rival to speed. Clearly assigned responsibility, verifiable milestones and early checks can prevent disputes from developing into expensive attempts to recover money after the event. The relevant choice is between controls that work during procurement and explanations demanded after something has gone wrong.Where Putin could benefitThese failures do not establish that Vladimir Putin has obtained everything he wanted. A Europe that turns rising expenditure into effective forces would represent a very different outcome. There is also no demonstrated Russian role in the particular German budget dispute or the Estonian accounting and contractual problems described here.The potential advantage for Moscow is indirect. Delayed or disputed deliveries can leave the intended recipient weaker than the expenditure suggests. Confusing financial claims can make it harder to defend further commitments. A succession of procurement controversies could erode confidence not only in individual contracts, but in the wider case for supporting Ukraine and strengthening European defence.That is a strategic risk, not proof of an accomplished Russian victory. The public identification of problems is itself evidence that scrutiny exists. A minister accepting political responsibility, auditors challenging unreliable balances and a government being pressed to explain its borrowing are mechanisms through which democratic systems can correct failure. Their value depends on what happens afterwards.The answer is neither to abandon rearmament nor to shield it from criticism. Governments should report progress in terms that connect money to results: contracts awarded, payments made, equipment accepted and capabilities available, with sensitive details reserved for secure oversight. Disputed transactions should remain visible until resolved rather than disappearing beneath the next spending announcement.Europe does not need to prove its determination by producing another larger number. It needs to demonstrate that the money already committed is becoming usable strength. Until it does, the distance between those two things remains an opportunity for the adversary it is trying to deter.