Coin Press - Syria's forgotten tragedy

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Syria's forgotten tragedy




The Syrian Arab Republic has endured more than a decade of civil war and geopolitical strife. After opposition groups led by Hay’at Tahrir al‑Sham forced President Bashar al‑Assad from power on 8 December 2024, a transitional government promised a path toward elections and reform. Yet the promise of peace has not ended suffering. Instead, violence intensified in early 2025 when identity‑based massacres by government forces and allied militias killed at least 1,400 people in Alawi‑majority areas of Tartous, Latakia and Hama, and later more than 1,500 Druze and Bedouin civilians were killed in Suwayda. The transitional authorities created commissions on transitional justice and missing persons, but human rights monitors report that these bodies have made little progress in consulting victims or ensuring accountability. A new constitution approved in March 2025 concentrates power in the executive and grants the president broad authority, raising fears of renewed authoritarianism.

Humanitarian emergency
The change of government has done little to alleviate an extraordinary humanitarian crisis. More than 90 percent of Syrians live below the poverty line and over 16.5 million people require aid. Food insecurity is acute: the Famine Early Warning Systems Network estimates that 6.99 million people will face crisis levels of hunger through April 2026, meaning at least a quarter of the population is at risk. Years of fighting have decimated irrigation systems and public infrastructure, and three consecutive years of drought have destroyed crops. Funding shortfalls have left one million Syrians without monthly food assistance and only 8 percent of subsistence farmers received emergency agricultural support last year.

The war has also produced one of the world’s largest displacement crises. Even after the fall of Assad, more than 4.5 million Syrian refugees remain abroad while over 7 million people are internally displaced. A fragile economy and limited reconstruction have discouraged returns. In October 2025 the International Organization for Migration estimated that roughly 581,000 refugees had returned home since the change of government. However, countries that once offered safe haven are tightening restrictions: European states have halted processing of Syrian asylum claims and the United States announced an end to Temporary Protected Status in September 2025. Neighboring countries like Türkiye and Lebanon have continued to summarily deport Syrians.

Systemic violence and insecurity
Human rights monitors document ongoing abuses across Syria. Security forces and armed groups carry out extrajudicial killings, torture, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detentions. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic notes that targeted attacks based on religious affiliation, ethnicity, age and gender may amount to war crimes. The Commission reports that the government has initiated arrests and trials of only 14 alleged perpetrators, leaving the responsibility of senior officials unaddressed. In the south, Israeli forces have pushed into the UN‑monitored demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Quneitra, establishing military posts and seizing villages. Residents report forced displacement, home demolitions, denial of access to farmland and transfer of detainees to Israel. Israel also intensified airstrikes on Syrian military infrastructure, carrying out more than 277 strikes against arms depots, missile facilities and air defense batteries between December 2024 and September 2025.

Violence is not confined to the south. In mid‑2025 clashes between government‑aligned forces and Druze fighters in Sweida killed around 1,000 people, including hundreds of civilians. Arbitrary detentions by the Syrian Democratic Forces in the northeast continued, and tens of thousands of alleged ISIS suspects and their families are held in degrading conditions at the al‑Hol and Roj camps. Although the transitional government signed an agreement with the SDF to integrate its institutions into the state, implementation has stalled.

Struggling institutions and lost generations
The protracted conflict has shattered basic services. Infrastructure for shelter, health care, electricity, water and sanitation is in ruins. Fuel shortages and soaring food prices compound the hardship. The education system is near collapse: 40 percent of school infrastructure has been destroyed and 2.5 million children are out of school. An additional 1.6 million children risk dropping out, raising the specter of multiple lost generations. While humanitarian organizations have established informal education centers and child‑friendly spaces, the scale of need far exceeds available resources. Aid agencies warn that without immediate funding, millions of children will never return to a classroom.

Public sentiment and media neglect
Many observers and Syrians living abroad express frustration that the world’s attention has shifted elsewhere. They criticize mainstream media for devoting little coverage to Syria’s continuing crises and lament that global compassion fatigue leaves Syrian civilians to suffer in silence. Commenters on international forums argue that the international community responds swiftly to crises elsewhere but remains indifferent to Syria’s tragedy. These voices call for renewed media focus, humanitarian solidarity and accountability for those responsible for atrocities. Others warn that regional and great‑power rivalries continue to fuel conflict, with foreign military interventions aggravating violence and undermining Syria’s sovereignty. There is widespread skepticism about the transitional government’s commitment to human rights reforms, given the slow pace of accountability and its concentration of power. Despite these misgivings, many Syrians still pin their hopes on the prospect of a constitution that enshrines rule of law and inclusive governance.

Conclusion
The horrors unfolding in Syria are not relics of the past but present‑day realities. A change of regime has not brought peace; instead, Syrians face hunger, displacement, renewed violence and an uncertain political future. International observers warn that unresolved grievances and rampant impunity threaten to ignite further sectarian violence. To prevent further tragedy, the world must not look away. Urgent humanitarian aid is needed to avert famine and rebuild shattered infrastructure. Meaningful accountability for war crimes, inclusive political reform and the safe return of refugees are essential to Syria’s future. Until these goals are met, the Syrian people’s suffering will remain a forgotten tragedy.



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Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

India's island choke point

The language of revenge makes for an arresting headline, but it obscures the more consequential story unfolding on Great Nicobar. India is not constructing a mechanism that can simply be activated to halt Chinese trade. It is attempting to convert a remote and sparsely developed island into a forward maritime hub from which it can observe strategic shipping routes, support naval and air operations and, in a serious crisis, make Chinese access to the Indian Ocean more difficult and expensive.Great Nicobar is the southernmost large island in India’s Andaman and Nicobar archipelago. It lies closer to Indonesia than to the Indian mainland and sits near the approaches to the Strait of Malacca, one of the most important maritime passages in the world. The island is also approximately forty nautical miles from a heavily used east-west shipping corridor. That geography gives Great Nicobar a significance far greater than its size or population might suggest. Vessels travelling between the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and the South China Sea must pass through a limited number of navigable channels. The Strait of Malacca remains the principal commercial route because alternatives through the Sunda and Lombok straits generally require longer voyages, more fuel and additional time.For China, whose economic strength depends heavily on seaborne exports, raw materials and imported energy, this is a persistent strategic vulnerability. For India, the same geography offers an opportunity to transform an isolated territory into an advanced observation, logistics and deterrence platform.A nine-billion-dollar transformationThe Great Nicobar development programme is commonly described as an investment worth roughly nine billion dollars, although its estimated cost has changed as the plans have been revised. The wider programme is currently valued at approximately 81,000 crore rupees and covers around 166 square kilometres.It combines four interconnected projects. The first is a deep-water international container transhipment port at Galathea Bay. The second is a new airport intended for both civilian and military use. The third is a gas and solar power complex with a planned capacity of 450 megavolt-amperes. The fourth is a new township with roads, water systems, communications, public services and industrial infrastructure.The initial two phases of the proposed port were appraised in 2026 at a combined cost of 48,862 crore rupees. They are designed to provide twelve container berths and an annual handling capacity of 11.8 million twenty-foot equivalent units. Longer-term plans could expand the port still further. Natural water depths of between twenty and thirty metres are among Galathea Bay’s most important commercial advantages. They could allow the terminal to receive the largest modern container ships without the severe draught restrictions encountered at many existing Indian ports.The new airport is equally significant. With an estimated investment of around 13,000 crore rupees, it is intended to accommodate civilian aircraft as well as military transports, maritime patrol aircraft and combat aircraft. Operational control is expected to rest with the Indian Navy, giving New Delhi a much larger aviation platform in the south-eastern Indian Ocean than is available at the existing airfield on the island.The port, airport and power facilities therefore cannot be understood as separate construction schemes. Together, they are intended to create the permanent logistical foundation required for sustained economic and military activity.India wants its cargo backThe commercial argument behind the project is substantial. India has historically routed a large share of its container transhipment traffic through foreign ports, particularly Colombo, Singapore and Port Klang. Containers arriving on large intercontinental vessels are frequently transferred at those hubs to smaller feeder ships serving Indian destinations.That arrangement costs India revenue, creates dependence on infrastructure outside its jurisdiction and reduces its influence over regional shipping networks. A competitive deep-water terminal at Great Nicobar could intercept cargo moving between the Indian Ocean and East Asia while serving ports on India’s eastern coast, Bangladesh, Myanmar and other parts of Southeast Asia. The location is attractive, but geography alone does not create a successful port. Shipping companies choose terminals according to price, reliability, vessel turnaround times, customs efficiency, digital systems, frequency of feeder connections and the availability of repair, storage and bunkering services. Galathea Bay will have to compete not only with Singapore, Colombo and Port Klang but also with emerging Indian facilities such as Vizhinjam.The financial structure reveals how difficult that competition may be. The first two port phases have been designed as a public-private partnership, with Indian-controlled ownership and a proposed concession period of fifty years. Project planners sought viability-gap assistance of 12,230 crore rupees to reduce the risk for private investors. Financial appraisers concluded that the requested support did not fit the standard viability-gap funding framework. The ports ministry may therefore have to provide capital assistance from its own budget or seek a separate political decision. This is a crucial detail. It suggests that Great Nicobar’s strategic value may justify public expenditure that would be difficult to defend on commercial returns alone.In other words, the port is not merely a business venture. It is strategic infrastructure with a commercial component.What the island changes for ChinaThe most immediate military benefit would be improved maritime domain awareness. Radar installations, long-range aircraft, drones, naval vessels and intelligence systems based closer to the Malacca approaches would give India a clearer picture of movements between the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Chinese naval deployments in the Indian Ocean have become more regular over the past two decades. Warships assigned to anti-piracy patrols, survey vessels, submarines and support ships have all demonstrated Beijing’s growing ability to operate far from the Chinese coastline. Access to ports developed or operated by Chinese companies has also increased Beijing’s logistical options across the region.A fully equipped Great Nicobar hub would allow India to monitor those movements from a much more advantageous position. It could support patrol aircraft for longer periods, shorten response times and provide fuel, maintenance and communications closer to the principal maritime routes. This does not mean that India could effortlessly close the Strait of Malacca. The expression “choking Beijing” is strategically evocative but operationally misleading. The strait is bordered by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. India does not control it, and any attempt to block commercial shipping would constitute an extraordinary act with global economic and military consequences. Maintaining an effective blockade against a major power would require persistent naval and air superiority, extensive intelligence, secure logistics and cooperation from other states.Great Nicobar is therefore not a switch with which India can turn off Chinese trade. Its importance lies in deterrence and strategic uncertainty. It could increase the number of assets China would need to protect its sea lanes, make covert naval movement more difficult and force Beijing to devote greater attention to the eastern Indian Ocean.Alternative Chinese routes do exist. Ships can use the Sunda or Lombok straits, while pipelines through Myanmar and overland corridors through Pakistan provide limited diversification. None of them can easily replace the scale, efficiency and established commercial networks associated with the Malacca route. India does not need the ability to stop every Chinese vessel to gain leverage. It needs the credible capacity to observe movements, complicate operations and impose additional costs during a confrontation.A forward base must also surviveBuilding runways, quays and radar stations is only the beginning. A remote installation becomes strategically valuable only when it can continue operating under pressure.Great Nicobar will require secure fuel storage, ammunition facilities, maintenance depots, air-defence systems, hardened aircraft shelters, redundant communications and dependable supply links. It must also be protected against submarine activity, missile attacks, cyber disruption and sabotage. The island’s distance from India’s main industrial and military centres creates a logistical challenge. Personnel, spare parts, construction materials and emergency supplies must travel long distances by sea or air. Severe weather can interrupt those connections, while the narrow local infrastructure base leaves little room for failure.A highly visible airport and port without adequate protection could become targets rather than instruments of leverage. The strategic value of Great Nicobar will consequently depend less on ceremonial inaugurations than on the unglamorous systems that keep aircraft flying, ships supplied and sensors functioning during a crisis.The project could also assist India in humanitarian relief and disaster response. A major airport, deep-water port and permanent logistics network would provide a forward base for operations after cyclones, earthquakes or tsunamis across Southeast Asia. Such capabilities would strengthen India’s claim to be a dependable regional security partner rather than merely a country seeking military advantage over China.The ecological price cannot be hiddenGreat Nicobar is not an empty piece of territory. It contains tropical rainforest, mangroves, coral habitats and numerous endemic species. Galathea Bay is associated with the nesting grounds of giant leatherback turtles, while the island is also home to the Nicobar megapode, saltwater crocodiles and other vulnerable wildlife. The project involves the diversion of approximately 130.75 square kilometres of forest land. Estimates indicate that close to one million trees could eventually be affected, although the government maintains that significant green areas will remain within the wider development zone.Authorities have imposed dozens of environmental conditions and planned compensatory afforestation covering more than ninety-seven square kilometres. The government also argues that the large majority of Great Nicobar will remain within forests, national parks, protected areas, a biosphere reserve and tribal conservation zones. The National Green Tribunal declined to stop the development in February 2026, concluding that there was no sufficient basis for overturning the existing environmental and coastal clearances. It nevertheless required strict compliance with the protective conditions.The ruling did not eliminate the underlying concerns. An island rainforest is a complex and isolated ecosystem that cannot simply be recreated through tree planting elsewhere. Forest loss can alter freshwater systems, coastal stability and wildlife migration even when a large percentage of the island formally remains protected.There is also a profound human dimension. Great Nicobar is home to the Nicobarese and the Shompen, one of the world’s most isolated indigenous communities. The government says the project will not physically displace them and has promised dedicated safeguards. The greater danger may arise from indirect contact. A large influx of construction workers, officials, traders and future residents could expose isolated communities to disease, cultural disruption and pressure on traditional territory. Preventing direct displacement will not be sufficient if the surrounding social and ecological conditions are transformed beyond recognition.A landscape shaped by disasterThe island lies in a seismically active region. The Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 devastated Great Nicobar, destroyed settlements and caused severe land subsidence at its southern end. Any new airport, port, power plant and township must therefore be designed for conditions far more demanding than those facing ordinary mainland infrastructure. Breakwaters, evacuation routes, emergency power systems, elevated storage, earthquake-resistant construction and redundant communications will all be essential. The financial cost of such resilience is high, but ignoring it would expose the entire programme to catastrophic failure.Environmental protection and disaster planning are not secondary obstacles to the strategic project. They are part of its strategic credibility. A port delayed by legal challenges, damaged by a natural disaster or surrounded by social conflict would weaken rather than strengthen India’s position.The project is not yet a finished weaponThe most important distinction is between ambition and operational reality. Great Nicobar is not currently capable of controlling the Malacca approaches on the scale suggested by dramatic descriptions of the project. In March 2026, the relevant public-private partnership committee recommended the first two port phases for further administrative consideration, subject to financial, contractual and ownership conditions. The airport had entered initial tendering, while the power plant and township remained at different stages of appraisal and approval.The latest public timetable indicates that physical work on the Galathea Bay port is expected to begin in 2028. That schedule is later than earlier expectations that an initial port phase might already be operating by that year. Even after construction begins, completing the full island transformation will require many years and potentially several decades. Financing, private-sector participation, environmental monitoring, supply-chain constraints and construction in a remote seismic location could all affect the schedule. Cost escalation is also likely to remain a concern as designs become more detailed.China will not stand still during that period. Beijing can strengthen alternative routes, expand naval deployments, increase cooperation with regional ports and develop capabilities intended to threaten Indian installations. Great Nicobar is therefore part of a continuing strategic competition rather than a final answer to it.India’s real revenge is strategic patienceDescribing the Great Nicobar project as India’s revenge on China captures the emotional appeal of a country turning geography against its principal Asian rival. Yet revenge is not the most accurate description. The project is better understood as an attempt to correct a long-standing imbalance. India possesses an island chain overlooking some of the world’s busiest sea routes, but for decades much of that geographical advantage remained underdeveloped. Great Nicobar represents an effort to convert position into capability.Success will not be measured by whether India can literally stop Chinese shipping. It will be measured by whether the island gives New Delhi reliable surveillance, faster military response, commercially viable port operations and a resilient logistics network without inflicting irreversible damage on the people and ecosystems already there.If those conditions are met, Great Nicobar could become one of India’s most consequential strategic investments. It would not choke Beijing in peacetime, but it could make China’s leaders think more carefully about the risks of confrontation in the Indian Ocean. That additional calculation is the true source of India’s leverage.