Coin Press - Argentina reshapes oil

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Argentina reshapes oil

For decades Venezuela was synonymous with oil wealth. With more than 300 billion barrels of crude in the ground, the country was once among the top global producers, pumping more than 3 million barrels per day in the late 1990s. Today that legacy has been squandered. A combination of nationalization, decades of under‑investment, corruption and increasingly severe sanctions left the once‑mighty industry in disrepair. Production fell to roughly half a million barrels a day during the pandemic and only recovered to about one million barrels per day by the end of 2025. Analysts warn that reviving output to historic levels would require annual investments of around US$10 billion for at least a decade.

The heavy, extra‑viscous crude that constitutes most of Venezuela’s reserves requires diluents such as condensate to flow through pipelines and be exported. With domestic production of light hydrocarbons down to a few tens of thousands of barrels per day, the industry depends on imports to make its oil marketable. Infrastructure has also deteriorated: many refineries operate at a fraction of their capacity, pipelines leak into Lake Maracaibo and other waterways, and some equipment has been cannibalized for spare parts. Even modest increases in exports in early 2026 were achieved under tight supervision from the United States and did little to change the structural problems afflicting the sector. In short, the country with the world’s largest crude reserves is unlikely to flood the market any time soon.

Argentina’s shale revolution
While Venezuela languishes, Argentina has emerged as a bright spot in Latin American energy. At the heart of this renaissance is Vaca Muerta, an 8.6‑million‑acre shale formation in the Neuquén Basin. Energy officials estimate it contains roughly 16 billion barrels of technically recoverable shale oil and more than 300 trillion cubic feet of natural gas resources. Until recently these riches were largely untapped, but a combination of technological advances in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, favourable global oil prices, and improved infrastructure have unleashed a wave of production. Argentina’s oil output surged 50 % from early 2021 to September 2024, with unconventional wells providing the lion’s share of growth. By September 2025, total crude oil production averaged 833,874 barrels per day, a record for the country, and unconventional output alone hit 550,881 barrels per day — a 30 % increase year on year. Oil from Vaca Muerta now accounts for roughly two‑thirds of national output, while the same formation provides almost three‑quarters of Argentina’s natural gas.

Vaca Muerta’s geology makes it a highly attractive asset. Its shale layers are thicker than those of the Eagle Ford and Bakken plays in the United States and comparable in quality to the Permian Basin. Wells drilled there boast high productivity and low breakeven costs; estimates suggest producers can make money at US$36 to US$45 per barrel. The crude is light and low in sulfur, making it easier to refine and resulting in a smaller carbon footprint than many other petroleum grades. Yet only about a tenth of the formation is currently under development, hinting at decades of growth potential.

Infrastructure and policy – turning resources into exports
Rapid growth in shale output has forced Argentina to rethink its infrastructure. A wave of new pipelines and policy reforms is turning the country from a net importer of hydrocarbons into a potential exporter. On the oil side, the Vaca Muerta Norte pipeline to Chile came into service in 2023, and the massive Vaca Muerta Oil Sur (VMOS) project — now under construction — will connect the shale patch to the Atlantic coast with an eventual capacity of 180,000 barrels per day by late 2026. Five huge storage tanks, each more than 30 metres tall and 87 metres across, are being built to handle the flow. Crude oil exports rose by about one‑third per year between 2017 and 2023 as pipeline bottlenecks were eased, and new capacity is expected to unlock even more shipments.

On the gas side, the Perito Francisco Pascasio Moreno pipeline began operations in 2023, transporting up to 0.7 billion cubic feet per day northwards. A second phase will increase capacity to 1.2 billion cubic feet per day by 2028. Work is also underway to reverse the flow of the Gasoducto Norte pipeline so that Vaca Muerta gas can be exported to Brazil. These projects have already reduced Argentina’s dependence on imported natural gas; liquefied natural gas imports were down 43 % in the first nine months of 2024, and pipeline imports from Bolivia ended entirely in September 2024. Talks are underway to send Argentine gas through Bolivia to Brazil, underscoring the region’s shifting energy flows.

Policy has been just as important as bricks and mortar. In mid‑2024 the Argentine Congress approved the so‑called “Ley Bases,” sweeping economic reforms that limit government intervention in energy markets, allow permit holders to transport and export hydrocarbons freely, and authorize long‑term liquefied natural gas export licences. A complementary large‑investment regime offers 30 years of tax stability, duty‑free import of capital goods and free mobility of capital to investors in energy, mining and infrastructure projects. Together with the Plan Gas programs, which guarantee prices and long‑term contracts for producers, these measures have catalyzed investment from both domestic and foreign companies. The energy ministry envisions US$30 billion in annual energy exports by 2030. A consortium led by Argentina’s state‑controlled YPF, along with Pan American Energy, Pampa Energía and Harbour Energy, is fast‑tracking a floating LNG project expected to start shipping liquefied natural gas in 2027. The first phase has secured approval to export 11.5 million cubic metres of natural gas per day under a 30‑year licence, potentially generating about US$1 billion a year in revenue.

Economic impact and regional dynamics
This shale boom is reshaping Argentina’s economy. In 2025 the energy trade balance recorded a surplus of about US$7.8 billion — the largest in more than three decades. Energy exports reached record levels, providing much‑needed foreign currency to a country long plagued by chronic shortages. President Javier Milei’s administration sees the sector as a pillar of his broader strategy to stabilize public finances and attract private investment. Investors have responded: new drilling has propelled Argentina into the top tier of Latin American producers. By late 2025 the country ranked fourth in the region behind Brazil, Venezuela and Guyana, having briefly overtaken Colombia before Guyana’s offshore megaprojects came online. With projections for shale output to exceed one million barrels per day by the end of the decade, Argentina could soon challenge Venezuela’s fading dominance in regional oil markets.

The shift also has geopolitical implications. Argentina’s gas will soon flow north to Chile, Uruguay and potentially Brazil, reducing those countries’ reliance on Bolivian and LNG supplies. Meanwhile, Venezuela’s stagnation and the uncertainty surrounding sanctions have created openings for other producers. Even with some restrictions eased in early 2026 to allow U.S. companies to trade Venezuelan oil, production constraints remain and exports are effectively supervised by Washington. Export volumes around 800,000 barrels per day in early 2026 were still below what the country shipped a decade ago. As a result, Latin American refiners and importers are increasingly looking to Argentina’s light sweet crude and Brazil’s offshore barrels, rather than Venezuela’s heavy grades.

Challenges and prospects
Despite the upbeat trajectory, Argentina faces challenges. Rapid production growth has outpaced pipeline and storage capacity, leading to occasional flaring or forced well shut‑ins. Unconventional gas output dipped in late 2025 due to maintenance and infrastructure bottlenecks. The success of the energy export strategy hinges on finishing major pipelines on time, maintaining policy consistency across changes of government, and managing environmental impacts. Shale development requires large volumes of water and can provoke local opposition if not handled responsibly. Additionally, although the Ley Bases and investment regime are promising, Argentina’s history of policy reversals makes long‑term investors cautious.

Still, the contrast with Venezuela could not be starker. While one country struggles to maintain basic production amid sanctions, corruption and crumbling equipment, the other is building pipelines, signing long‑term LNG contracts, and capturing the attention of global energy investors. For those watching Latin America’s oil map, the message is clear: the future of the region’s hydrocarbon story may lie in the shale fields of Neuquén rather than the degraded refineries of Carabobo. The era when Venezuela’s vast reserves automatically translated into influence is over. Argentina, once a minor player, is now poised to become a significant exporter and a driver of regional energy integration. Investors, policymakers and neighbours are increasingly looking south of the Andes for supply security and economic opportunity.

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Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

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US China race hits 2027

When NASA’s Artemis II crew splashed down in April 2026 after looping around the Moon, it rekindled interest in human spaceflight. The United States had not sent astronauts near the lunar surface in more than half a century, and its return came amid an unmistakable rivalry with a rising power. Over the last decade China has methodically tested rockets, landers and rovers, assembled its own orbital outpost and dispatched missions across the Solar System. The world’s two largest economies are now openly competing to build a permanent human presence on and around the Moon, to harvest its resources and to set the standards that will govern space for decades to come.Although the race evokes memories of the Cold War, experts stress that today’s contest is more complex. Rather than a sprint to plant a flag, the current competition is a marathon to establish infrastructure and routines for sustained exploration. 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Under President Donald Trump, NASA’s focus returned to the Moon, and Congress has largely sustained funding. Lawmakers such as Senator Ted Cruz emphasise that America must simultaneously maintain leadership in low Earth orbit, where the International Space Station nears the end of its life, and embark on a new era of exploration. The challenge is to integrate commercial capabilities—particularly SpaceX’s Starship system, which will serve as a lunar lander—with NASA’s heavy‑lift rockets and Orion capsule. In low Earth orbit, U.S. companies are also competing to build private space stations as the ISS winds down.Behind the headline missions is a robust commercial ecosystem. SpaceX’s Falcon and Starship rockets have dramatically lowered launch costs, enabling a boom in satellite deployment and paving the way for large‑scale lunar logistics. Other firms are developing lunar landers, cargo services and in‑orbit data processing that uses artificial intelligence to analyze imagery directly in space rather than sending raw data back to Earth. Proponents say these technologies will revolutionize Earth observation, communications and defence, creating an “orbital economy” that could be worth trillions. Critics, however, worry about the potential for an uncontrolled proliferation of satellites, increasing the risk of collision and creating space debris—known as the Kessler syndrome—that could render some orbits unusable.Beijing’s blueprint: Chang’e, Tiangong and mega‑constellationsChina’s lunar ambitions were late to emerge but have progressed steadily since the Chang’e programme began in 2007. In the past decade the China National Space Administration has landed robotic spacecraft on the Moon’s near and far sides, returned lunar samples to Earth and placed two rovers on the surface. Its next steps include launching the Chang’e‑7 mission in late 2026 to explore the lunar south pole and Chang’e‑8 in 2029 to test technologies such as in‑situ resource utilization. These missions will lay the groundwork for an International Lunar Research Station that Beijing plans to build with Russia and other partners in the 2030s. Chinese officials say a crewed landing will occur before 2030, using the new Long March‑10 rocket, Mengzhou spacecraft and Lanyue lander. Tests of these systems began in 2025 and are progressing on schedule, according to state media.The difference between the U.S. and Chinese approaches is striking. China’s lunar timeline has remained largely steady, with milestones set years in advance and executed through successive five‑year plans. Analysts note that the one‑party state does not face the congressional budget battles or policy reversals common in Washington, allowing it to align industries, financing and state priorities around long‑term goals. Xi Jinping has framed space exploration as part of national rejuvenation, and the aerospace sector is listed among the strategic industries of the future. At the same time China is rapidly expanding its presence in Earth orbit. It operates the Tiangong space station, assembled in modules launched between 2021 and 2022, and plans to add a co‑orbiting telescope module. Chinese astronauts routinely conduct long‑duration missions and record‑setting spacewalks from Tiangong.Beyond human spaceflight, China is building its own satellite megaconstellations. The Thousand Sails network aims to deploy more than a thousand satellites by 2027 and potentially 14,000 by the 2030s to provide global broadband and compete with SpaceX’s Starlink. The defence‑oriented Guowang constellation could add another 13,000 satellites by 2035. China had over 800 satellites in orbit at the start of 2025—more than any country except the United States, which has nearly 9,000—but its launch rate is accelerating. In 2024 China launched 68 orbital rockets, second only to the U.S., and is testing reusable boosters and powerful new engines. It is also pursuing a Mars sample‑return mission that could bring material back to Earth by 2031, potentially beating NASA’s delayed Mars campaign. Observers say these achievements reflect an ecosystem that now rivals the U.S. in breadth, even if China still lags in private sector innovation and reusable rocket technology.Why 2027 mattersThe year 2027 stands out as a make‑or‑break point in the unfolding space competition. For NASA, the planned in‑orbit docking demonstration will show whether its architecture—combining the Orion crew capsule with privately built lunar landers—can actually work. This test has already been inserted into the Artemis sequence as a separate mission, and without it the agency cannot risk sending astronauts to the lunar surface. Success would keep the 2028 landing on track and bolster confidence in the United States’ ability to lead; failure could postpone human landings by years and give China a psychological and strategic advantage. Some observers argue that delays would also erode congressional support and funding, since political attention could shift to Mars or Earth‑orbit projects.For China, the mid‑2020s are equally crucial. By the end of 2026 the Chang’e‑7 probe is expected to deliver data from the Moon’s south pole, and the Thousand Sails constellation could surpass the 1,000‑satellite mark a year later. Meanwhile, low‑altitude tests of the Long March‑10 and Mengzhou systems in 2025 and 2026 will set the stage for full‑scale flight tests. If all proceeds as planned, China will enter 2027 with an integrated system for human lunar flight, a mature space station and an expanding commercial sector. The momentum could position Beijing to attempt its first crewed lunar landing by the end of the decade, perhaps just a year or two after Artemis III.The symbolic stakes of who returns to the Moon first resonate beyond space professionals. Many commentators see access to lunar resources such as water ice and helium‑3 as future economic boons, enabling fuel production, life support and even fusion energy. Others worry that these expectations could inflame geopolitical tensions and lead to the partition of the lunar surface. Online discussions are filled with references to science‑fiction series like For All Mankind and Star Wars, a sign of how popular culture shapes perceptions of space. Some people lament the absence of Europe in the high‑profile contest, expressing frustration that the European Space Agency is not competing at the same level. Others note that the proliferation of mega‑constellations could spoil the night sky for astronomy and raise the risk of collisions. A common thread is the belief that space is becoming another arena for geopolitical rivalry and that humanity must balance exploration with responsibility.What’s at stakeAt the heart of the new space race is a struggle over norms and infrastructure. The country that first establishes a sustained presence on the Moon will likely influence how lunar resources are allocated, how safety zones are defined and how future claims are adjudicated. China’s plan for an International Lunar Research Station is open to partners but would be led by Beijing and Moscow, while the U.S. promotes the Artemis Accords, a set of principles signed by more than thirty nations that emphasise transparency, peaceful use and the protection of heritage sites. The two frameworks represent competing visions of governance. Some analysts worry that parallel bases could harden rival blocs and complicate cooperation on scientific projects.Economic motives also loom large. The Moon’s south pole contains ice deposits that can be split into oxygen and hydrogen for rocket fuel; its regolith may hold helium‑3, a potential fuel for fusion reactors; and rare earth elements could be mined for electronics. Companies envisage extracting these materials and using them to support lunar factories, orbital refineries and interplanetary missions. Observers point out that many of these prospects are speculative and that the technological and legal challenges are formidable. Nevertheless, the prospect of a trillion‑dollar space economy drives investment from governments and venture capital. Commentators on social media often joke about “all those beautiful minerals” and wonder whether space will become a battlefield for humans. Others warn that competition could trigger an arms race, with anti‑satellite weapons and military platforms turning Earth orbit into a contested zone.Environmental concerns add another layer of complexity. Mega‑constellations of thousands of satellites enable global internet and Earth‑observing services, but they also contribute to light pollution and radio interference that hamper astronomical research. Critics argue that launching tens of thousands of spacecraft to benefit a small fraction of the population is not worth degrading the natural beauty of the night sky. Campaigners call for international regulation to ensure that orbits remain sustainable and that debris is removed. The U.S. Federal Communications Commission and international bodies are beginning to address these issues, but enforcement remains weak.Beyond the U.S. and ChinaWhile the rivalry between Washington and Beijing dominates headlines, other actors are shaping the space landscape. India, which landed a spacecraft near the lunar south pole in 2023, plans its own crewed missions and has an eye on lunar resources. Russia remains formally involved with China’s lunar base plan despite its own economic struggles. Private corporations across the globe are developing lunar landers, communications relays and space‑based manufacturing. Even as the European Space Agency grapples with funding and policy issues, European companies supply critical hardware, such as the service module for Orion and lunar lander technology. Japan, Canada and the United Arab Emirates are all planning missions that will contribute to lunar exploration or the construction of the Lunar Gateway, a planned station in lunar orbit.Taken together, these efforts suggest that the future of space will be multipolar. The outcome of the 2027 milestones will not end the race but will set the trajectory for the coming decade. Whether the United States and China choose to cooperate or compete will influence how quickly humanity establishes a foothold beyond Earth and whether the benefits of space are shared or monopolized.An uncertain finish lineThe United States and China are already locked in a fierce competition for space. Both nations have articulated ambitious lunar roadmaps, invested billions in rockets, spacecraft and infrastructure, and rallied their citizens with promises of national renewal and scientific glory. Yet the space environment today is far more complex than during the Apollo era. Private companies wield unprecedented influence, environmental and legal questions remain unresolved, and the stakes extend from lunar ice to orbital broadband and planetary defence. The year 2027 will be a crucial inflection point: a successful docking test for Artemis and the continued pace of China’s Chang’e and megaconstellation programmes will signal whether each nation can execute its plans on schedule. Failure or delay on either side could alter perceptions of leadership and open space for newcomers.As the countdown to these milestones advances, policymakers, engineers and citizens alike grapple with what the space race means. Will it inspire cooperation and new frontiers of knowledge, or will it deepen divisions and militarize the heavens? Will the Moon become a laboratory for sustainable living or a quarry for minerals? And can humanity develop rules and norms to manage an increasingly crowded sky? The answers will emerge over the next several years. For now, the only certainty is that the competition is real, the challenges are immense and the outcome will shape the cosmic future of us all.