Coin Press - Rare Earth Standoff

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Rare Earth Standoff




China’s dominance over the supply of rare‑earth elements has long been a source of leverage in its dealings with the West. Rare earths are a group of 17 metallic elements used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, semiconductors and defence systems. Because they are essential for magnets, lasers and radar systems in everything from smart phones to F‑35 fighter jets, the monopoly held by one country carries major strategic implications. The latest round of export curbs announced in early October has thrust rare earths back into the centre of global diplomacy.

China tightens its grip
In Announcement No. 61 released by China’s Ministry of Commerce, Beijing expanded existing export restrictions by adding five rare‑earth elements—holmium, erbium, thulium, europium and ytterbium—to an already restrictive list. The ministry also required foreign companies to obtain licences to export magnets or semiconductor materials that contain more than 0.1 percent of heavy rare‑earth metals derived from China. These rules apply even when the finished products are made outside China, effectively extending Beijing’s jurisdiction to any product anywhere in the world that uses Chinese rare‑earth materials.

Officials justified the restrictions by citing national security and the dual‑use nature of rare‑earth items. China said certain foreign organisations had been transferring or processing rare‑earth materials and then passing them on for military use, and that tighter oversight was necessary to prevent threats to national security. The commerce ministry argued that implementing export controls is a normal part of international practice, pointing out that other major economies have similar rules. Beijing emphasised that it remained open to dialogue and would approve licences for civilian uses.

The timing of the announcement was significant. It came just weeks before a scheduled meeting between President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping in South Korea and only days after U.S. lawmakers proposed tougher restrictions on chip exports to China. Analysts believe the move was designed to increase China’s leverage ahead of those talks and to pressure Washington to loosen its own export controls. Kristin Vekasi, an expert on Indo‑Pacific affairs, described it as “pre‑meeting choreography” intended to signal that Beijing is willing to weaponise its dominant position in the rare‑earths supply chain.

The strategic importance of rare earths
Rare earths are used in a wide range of civil and military technologies. According to research from a prominent security think‑tank, they are critical for fighter jets, submarines, Tomahawk missiles, radar systems and smart bombs. They also underpin the magnets used in electric vehicles and wind turbines and are essential for semiconductors that power artificial‑intelligence chips and advanced consumer electronics. China mines around 60 percent of the world’s rare‑earth ores, controls about 90 percent of separation and processing capacity, and manufactures roughly 93 percent of rare‑earth magnets. The United States imported 70 percent of its rare‑earth compounds and metals from China between 2020 and 2023.

By restricting exports, Beijing signals that it is prepared to exploit this dominance. Although the rules will not fully take effect until November 8 and December 1, the mere threat has rattled defence contractors and technology companies in the United States. The restrictions bar overseas defence users from receiving licences and impose case‑by‑case scrutiny on export applications involving advanced semiconductors. This could delay shipments of magnets and chips vital to everything from drones to radar systems. China has also prohibited its citizens from assisting foreign rare‑earth projects without prior approval, tightening control over expertise as well as raw materials.

Trump taps the brakes on tariff escalation
Washington responded with an initial threat to impose 100 percent tariffs on all Chinese goods if Beijing did not roll back its measures. U.S. officials denounced the restrictions as a “global supply‑chain power grab”. Yet Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and trade representative Jamieson Greer emphasised that the United States did not want to decouple from China; they hinted that a negotiated compromise was still possible. In the weeks that followed, the White House attempted to calm financial markets by pausing some of its own tariff hikes, moving to cut duties on Chinese imports from 145 percent to 30 percent for a 90‑day truce.

This temporary reprieve, reached after talks in Geneva in mid‑May, included an agreement to slash steep tariffs on both sides and to lift earlier export countermeasures. China agreed to drop restrictions issued in April, while the United States reduced its tariffs for three months. Markets rallied, with global stock indices hitting new highs as traders welcomed the pause in hostilities. Critics, however, saw the move as a retreat by Washington rather than a Chinese concession; they noted that previous freezes had done little to resolve deeper disagreements over trade imbalances and fentanyl exports. A Reuters analysis described Trump’s on‑again off‑again tariff policy as a rollercoaster that has left investors struggling to plan for the next deadline.

With the next truce set to expire in November, U.S. officials signalled they might extend the pause in exchange for a delay in China’s new licensing regime. Bessent suggested rolling over the 90‑day tariff reprieve for a longer period to give negotiators more time. At the same time, he warned that Washington was prepared to take further action if Beijing proved to be an unreliable supplier. The administration has also discussed taking strategic stakes in domestic rare‑earths companies and establishing price floors and stockpiles to reduce dependence on Chinese supplies. As Bessent told reporters, the goal is to ensure the United States is never again vulnerable to a single supplier for critical materials.

Market and industrial reactions
China’s move jolted commodity markets. Shares in Chinese rare‑earth producers surged when the announcement was made; U.S. rare‑earth miners such as MP Materials and Energy Fuels also jumped as investors anticipated higher prices. Chinese companies Northern Rare Earth Group and Shenghe Resources gained close to 10 percent, while U.S. firms Critical Metals Corp and Energy Fuels saw double‑digit increases. The price reaction underscored how sensitive markets are to supply‑side news in an industry dominated by a handful of players.

The restrictions also triggered diplomatic ripples. Japan’s finance minister raised the issue at a meeting of the Group of Seven, calling for a coordinated response. European exporters, still recovering from the volatility unleashed by Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs in April, worried that another escalation could derail their recovery. Analysts noted that gold prices have risen sharply as investors seek a hedge against tariff‑induced inflation.

U.S. manufacturers have been pressing the government to secure alternative supplies. Noveon Magnetics, currently the only U.S. manufacturer of rare‑earth magnets, recently partnered with Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths to build a domestic supply chain. The Department of War (formerly the Department of Defense) invested $400 million in MP Materials and extended a $150 million loan to expand its processing facility in California. These measures aim to add heavy rare‑earth separation capacity in the United States and ensure long‑term supply.

A high‑stakes meeting on the horizon
Despite the heated rhetoric, both sides appear keen to avoid a full‑blown trade rupture. Chinese officials have stressed that export licences for civilian use will be approved. They argued that the United States has long maintained similar rules and accused Washington of exaggerating the impact of the controls. Beijing also noted that U.S. export controls on advanced semiconductors and related equipment have been in place since the 1950s.

For its part, Washington knows that an abrupt decoupling would harm both economies. The United States still depends heavily on Chinese rare‑earths, and high tariffs threaten to raise prices for consumers and industries. Polls suggest that volatile trade policies have shaken investor confidence. Moreover, because rare‑earth supply chains are global, any disruption would also hurt Chinese producers who rely on foreign buyers.

As Trump prepares to meet Xi in South Korea, the rare‑earth dispute has become a litmus test for the broader U.S.–China relationship. Analysts say Beijing is unlikely to abandon the restrictions unless Washington offers concessions on chip exports or scales back tariff threats. At the same time, the United States will struggle to build an independent supply chain quickly enough to neutralise China’s leverage. The outcome of the meeting could determine whether the world’s two largest economies slide deeper into economic confrontation or find a path back to cooperation.

Conclusion
The rare‑earth saga illustrates the complex interplay between economic security and geopolitical power. By expanding export controls, China has reminded the world that it holds a powerful card in its hands. The United States, in turn, has responded with tariff threats, pauses and plans to develop its own capacity. Both sides claim to seek cooperation even as they sharpen their negotiating tools. With the South Korea summit looming, the next moves will shape not only the future of the rare‑earths market but also the trajectory of U.S.–China relations and the global economy as a whole.



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Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Да здравствует Украина

Es lebe die Ukraine - Да здравствует Украина - Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Nech žije Ukrajina - Länge leve Ukraina - תחי אוקראינה - Lang leve Oekraïne - Да живее Украйна - Elagu Ukraina - Kauan eläköön Ukraina - Vive l'Ukraine - Ζήτω η Ουκρανία - 乌克兰万岁 - Viva Ucrania - Ať žije Ukrajina - Çok yaşa Ukrayna - Viva a Ucrânia - Trăiască Ucraina - ウクライナ万歳 - Tegyvuoja Ukraina - Lai dzīvo Ukraina - Viva l'Ucraina - Hidup Ukraina - تحيا أوكرانيا - Vivat Ucraina - ขอให้ยูเครนจงเจริญ - Ucraina muôn năm - ژوندی دی وی اوکراین - Yashasin Ukraina - Озак яшә Украина - Živjela Ukrajina - 우크라이나 만세 - Mabuhay ang Ukraine - Lenge leve Ukraina - Nyob ntev Ukraine - Да живее Украина - გაუმარჯოს უკრაინას - Hidup Ukraine - Vivu Ukrainio - Længe leve Ukraine - Živjela Ukrajina - Жыве Украіна - Yaşasın Ukrayna - Lengi lifi Úkraína - Lank lewe die Oekraïne

Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

Europe’s arms money maze

Europe’s rearmament has acquired an uncomfortable companion: uncertainty about what the money actually buys. In Germany, an argument over defence-related borrowing has raised questions about whether exceptional debt is producing genuinely additional expenditure. In Estonia, unreliable inventory records and disputed ammunition contracts have brought ministerial accountability into the foreground. These are different problems, but they meet at the same point: a larger budget is not a reliable measure of a stronger defence.The contention that nobody knows what is happening to Europe’s weapons money goes too far. Budgets are published, procurement bodies operate and auditors are identifying failures. Nor do these cases establish that funds have disappeared into Russian hands or that the Kremlin engineered the difficulties. The more defensible conclusion is also more useful: Europe cannot judge rearmament by the volume of money announced. It must establish what has been purchased, accepted and made ready for use.That distinction matters strategically. An adversary need not steal the money to benefit from delays, unusable equipment or a loss of confidence in the governments spending it.What the €800 billion actually meansThe scale of the spending is substantial. Combined defence expenditure across the European Union reached €418 billion in 2025, with €454 billion estimated for 2026. Those annual totals should not be confused with the much larger, multi-year headline attached to the EU’s rearmament financing plan. The widely cited €800 billion is potential financing capacity, not a single fund already transferred to arms manufacturers. Its main components are approximately €650 billion in possible additional national expenditure enabled by fiscal flexibility over four years, and €150 billion in loans through the Security Action for Europe instrument, known as SAFE. The loans must be repaid; the additional national spending depends on governments choosing to use the available room.These distinctions are indispensable to any honest assessment. Permission to borrow is not an order placed with a factory. An order is not a completed delivery. Equipment delivered to a warehouse is not necessarily equipment that troops can operate, maintain and replenish. Treating all these stages as interchangeable allows governments to claim progress before the military benefit exists.It also creates a temptation to add together figures that describe different periods or overlapping flows of money. A credible account of rearmament should distinguish financing arrangements from annual expenditure, and both from verified outputs. Otherwise, the public is left comparing impressive totals whose practical meaning is unclear.Germany’s argument over additional spendingOn 10 September, the Ifo Institute challenged the use of Germany’s defence-related borrowing exemption. It calculated an €11 billion gap between additional borrowing and the year-on-year increase in the relevant expenditure. Ifo’s argument was that 38.5 per cent of the additional debt had not produced additional defence and security spending, instead freeing room for other purposes in the ordinary budget. The Finance Ministry rejected the comparison as legally and methodologically flawed. The exemption concerns qualifying expenditure above one per cent of gross domestic product, rather than an increase over the previous year. Ifo, for its part, said its analysis concerned additional spending, not constitutionality.This is not evidence that €11 billion was stolen. It is a dispute over the relationship between an exceptional borrowing mechanism and the political expectation attached to it. The difference is important: an arrangement can comply with its legal design while delivering less additional expenditure than citizens understand the announcement to promise.The practical question is whether new borrowing expands defence capacity or changes the way existing commitments are financed. Those outcomes can coexist within the same budget. Refinancing an established obligation may be lawful and fiscally useful, but it should not be presented as though an equivalent amount of new military capability has been purchased. Germany’s dispute therefore points to a straightforward transparency test. Governments should identify the expenditure that would have occurred anyway, the genuinely additional commitments and the delivery milestones attached to them. Without that comparison, the argument risks becoming a contest between accounting definitions while the central question—what the armed forces actually gain—remains unanswered.Estonia’s warning from the accountsIn Estonia, the problems are more immediate. Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur announced on 2 September that he would step down, accepting political responsibility for failures exposed in defence administration and procurement. His announcement did not amount to an admission of personal corruption.The National Audit Office issued a qualified opinion concerning defence inventories valued at approximately €1.2 billion because their quantities, composition and valuation could not be established reliably. It also questioned an unexplained retrospective adjustment of €99.7 million to the previous year’s inventory figures. That does not mean €1.2 billion of weapons has vanished. An unreliable balance is not the same thing as a proven loss. It means the records are insufficiently dependable to establish what the balance represents—a serious weakness in any organisation, and particularly consequential in one responsible for military readiness.Inadequate records can obstruct decisions long before a final financial loss is demonstrated. Commanders and purchasing authorities need to distinguish usable stock from equipment awaiting inspection, repair or replacement. If those categories are unclear, another procurement decision may rest on a mistaken understanding of what is already available.Auditing is therefore more than an exercise in retrospective blame. A trustworthy inventory helps determine what must be bought next, how urgently it is needed and whether previous purchases fulfilled their purpose. Poor accounting can undermine operational planning even where no theft is established.Paid for is not the same as usableEstonia’s ammunition procurement for Ukraine illustrates a second difficulty. The audit identified disputed advance payments and warned of a potential exposure to the state budget of around €70 million. That figure describes a risk, not a final, adjudicated loss.The controversy includes contracts involving the Italian company Datasel. Pevkur described ammunition delivered under the disputed arrangements as incomplete and of insufficient quality, rather than simply non-existent. Datasel disputes the criticism and has said that goods delivered and invoiced were worth approximately €58 million against about €59 million in advances. The company’s account is a contested position, not a judicial finding.The disagreement exposes a distinction that matters beyond this particular supplier. A payment record, an invoice, the physical presence of goods and acceptance of those goods for their intended use answer different questions. A supplier may point to shipments while a purchasing authority disputes whether the contractual requirement has been met. The existence of equipment does not, by itself, resolve an argument over quality or completeness.For Ukraine, the decisive consideration is usable military support. For the public authorities financing it, the additional questions are whether payment conditions were appropriate, inspections were timely and contractual protections can recover money when performance is disputed. Those questions should be settled through evidence and the relevant proceedings, not through premature declarations of guilt.The procurement lesson is nonetheless clear. Emergency purchasing needs traceable contracts, independently verified acceptance and a dependable record linking each payment to performance. Urgency may justify faster decisions. It cannot make the distinction between an invoice and a functioning delivery disappear.An oversight system split across institutionsEurope’s defence financing does not sit within a single system of scrutiny. National budgets, EU programmes, loans and off-budget arrangements have different institutional responsibilities. The European Court of Auditors’ September review described complex governance and uneven oversight arrangements, rather than a continent-wide absence of auditing.SAFE falls within the European Court of Auditors’ remit. The European Peace Facility, outside the ordinary EU budget, has its own College of Auditors. National defence expenditure is scrutinised through national institutions. The distinction is between different mandates, not between money that is automatically checked and money that is automatically unaccountable. The difficulty arises at the joins. A public explanation may follow the announcement of a financing package, while a procurement body follows the contract and an operational authority follows the equipment. Unless those accounts can be reconciled, citizens and legislators may struggle to establish the complete journey from political promise to accepted delivery.Secrecy complicates that task, but it need not prevent it. Publishing ammunition locations or technical vulnerabilities would be irresponsible. Giving properly authorised auditors access to contracts, inspections and payment records is a different matter. The need to protect operational information should not become a general excuse for withholding financial evidence.Nor should procurement integrity be treated as a rival to speed. Clearly assigned responsibility, verifiable milestones and early checks can prevent disputes from developing into expensive attempts to recover money after the event. The relevant choice is between controls that work during procurement and explanations demanded after something has gone wrong.Where Putin could benefitThese failures do not establish that Vladimir Putin has obtained everything he wanted. A Europe that turns rising expenditure into effective forces would represent a very different outcome. There is also no demonstrated Russian role in the particular German budget dispute or the Estonian accounting and contractual problems described here.The potential advantage for Moscow is indirect. Delayed or disputed deliveries can leave the intended recipient weaker than the expenditure suggests. Confusing financial claims can make it harder to defend further commitments. A succession of procurement controversies could erode confidence not only in individual contracts, but in the wider case for supporting Ukraine and strengthening European defence.That is a strategic risk, not proof of an accomplished Russian victory. The public identification of problems is itself evidence that scrutiny exists. A minister accepting political responsibility, auditors challenging unreliable balances and a government being pressed to explain its borrowing are mechanisms through which democratic systems can correct failure. Their value depends on what happens afterwards.The answer is neither to abandon rearmament nor to shield it from criticism. Governments should report progress in terms that connect money to results: contracts awarded, payments made, equipment accepted and capabilities available, with sensitive details reserved for secure oversight. Disputed transactions should remain visible until resolved rather than disappearing beneath the next spending announcement.Europe does not need to prove its determination by producing another larger number. It needs to demonstrate that the money already committed is becoming usable strength. Until it does, the distance between those two things remains an opportunity for the adversary it is trying to deter.