Coin Press - Egypt joins Saudi air defense

NYSE - LSE
BCC -2.17% 63.01 $
BCE 2.42% 21.86 $
GSK -0.13% 47.76 $
NGG 0.13% 79.82 $
RIO -2.71% 72.73 $
BTI -1.11% 56.84 $
RBGPF -0.4% 75 $
BP -1.08% 42.75 $
CMSD -0.54% 18.65 $
CMSC -1.35% 18.9 $
JRI -1.71% 10.53 $
VOD -1.15% 14.02 $
AZN -0.61% 174.35 $
RELX -0.75% 38.54 $
RYCEF -7.13% 16.4 $

Egypt joins Saudi air defense




Egyptian troops had been in Saudi Arabia for months before Cairo publicly acknowledged their presence. Their air defense mission binds the security of Saudi cities to Egypt’s interest in keeping the Suez Canal busy. It also reveals how Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is dividing the work of defending his kingdom among allies willing to offer very different kinds of help.

 

On November 19, 2026, a Houthi missile struck the Riyadh tower that houses Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund. A day later, the Saudi-led coalition said it had struck Yemen’s Red Sea port of Hodeidah. The Houthis warned airlines to stay out of Saudi airspace. Deadly attacks had already interrupted flights at Riyadh’s main airport in October. What began as a war over who governs Yemen now reaches people boarding flights in the Saudi capital and families buying food brought ashore on the Yemeni coast.

 

What Cairo agreed to defend
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi offered military help on October 17. Nine days later, in a closed session, Egypt’s House of Representatives gave him the two-thirds majority he sought to help defend Saudi Arabia. In November, Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty disclosed that Egyptian forces had gone to the kingdom months earlier, at Riyadh’s request, during the escalation with Iran. Parliament had authorized Sisi to reinforce a deployment whose existence he had yet to acknowledge publicly.

 

Abdelatty described an air defense mission that included protecting holy sites in Saudi Arabia, home to Mecca and Medina. He gave no troop count. Cairo has announced no Egyptian airstrikes in Yemen. That distinction matters in a country with painful memories of the 1960s, when President Gamal Abdel Nasser sent tens of thousands of Egyptian troops to North Yemen to support the republicans. Saudi Arabia backed the royalists. The two governments that once supported opposite sides in Yemen now have to decide how far their shared interests there extend.

 

The view from Suez
Egypt has a reason of its own to care what happens off Yemen. A captain approaching the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean must first pass through Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow strait between Yemen and the Horn of Africa. When a shipping line sends an Asia-to-Europe vessel around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid that passage, Egypt loses a toll more than a thousand miles away. Every mile of the Suez Canal can remain open and the revenue still disappears.

 

In October, 1,490 vessels passed through Suez and revenue reached $724 million, up from $373 million a year earlier. One trade that has helped the recovery is Saudi oil. Saudi crude can travel by pipeline from the eastern oilfields to Yanbu, on the kingdom’s western coast. A tanker loading there can sail north to Suez without passing through either the Strait of Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb. A Saudi tanker and a container ship from Asia can pay tolls at the same Egyptian canal after voyages with very different exposure to the war.

 

Canal traffic is only one part of Egypt’s financial relationship with Riyadh. As the two governments discussed military assistance in October, Cairo was also seeking to roll over a $5.3 billion Saudi deposit at its central bank. Extending a deposit of that size eases the immediate call on the dollars Egypt needs to pay for imports and service its debt. Riyadh thus matters to the Egyptian treasury twice over, as a creditor and as an oil exporter whose tankers use the canal.

 

There is a precedent closer than Nasser’s campaign. The Houthis took Sanaa in 2014. When Saudi Arabia intervened on behalf of Yemen’s internationally recognized government in March 2015, four Egyptian naval vessels passed through Suez toward the Gulf of Aden. Egypt’s interest in the shipping lane has endured through successive phases of the war. What Sisi has now made explicit is his willingness to put Egyptian forces on Saudi soil to defend the kingdom itself.

 

Washington still has a say
Saudi Arabia has been assembling several kinds of help. On August 7, it signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement with Turkey and Pakistan. Egypt has considered joining. Its deployment proceeded separately, at Saudi invitation. The difference became particularly clear on October 26. While Egyptian legislators voted on defending the kingdom, senior Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani officials were in Tehran discussing how to ease tensions with Iran. Riyadh could ask Cairo for protection and speak directly to the government that backs the Houthis on the same day.

 

In September, President Donald Trump declined a Saudi request for American strikes on the Houthis. His administration offered intelligence sharing and help with targeting. On November 19, the same day the missile hit the Saudi capital, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman met Admiral Brad Cooper, the head of U.S. Central Command, in Riyadh. For the crown prince, access to American intelligence and to the senior U.S. commander in the region still matters. Neither gives him the authority to commit American forces. Egypt’s willingness to provide forces gives him an option that does not require the White House to change its mind.

 

For Yemenis, the pressing question is whether any of these arrangements can shorten the fighting. By November 10, the renewed hostilities had displaced an estimated 174,000 children. Hodeidah, the port the coalition struck ten days later, is the main entry point for food and other supplies into the Houthi-held north. On November 16, Abdelatty and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, discussed efforts to prevent further fighting. Egypt has good reason to pursue those talks alongside its military commitment. Air defenses can protect people inside Saudi Arabia. They can do little for a Yemeni family waiting for food to come ashore at Hodeidah.



Featured


Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Да здравствует Украина

Es lebe die Ukraine - Да здравствует Украина - Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Nech žije Ukrajina - Länge leve Ukraina - תחי אוקראינה - Lang leve Oekraïne - Да живее Украйна - Elagu Ukraina - Kauan eläköön Ukraina - Vive l'Ukraine - Ζήτω η Ουκρανία - 乌克兰万岁 - Viva Ucrania - Ať žije Ukrajina - Çok yaşa Ukrayna - Viva a Ucrânia - Trăiască Ucraina - ウクライナ万歳 - Tegyvuoja Ukraina - Lai dzīvo Ukraina - Viva l'Ucraina - Hidup Ukraina - تحيا أوكرانيا - Vivat Ucraina - ขอให้ยูเครนจงเจริญ - Ucraina muôn năm - ژوندی دی وی اوکراین - Yashasin Ukraina - Озак яшә Украина - Živjela Ukrajina - 우크라이나 만세 - Mabuhay ang Ukraine - Lenge leve Ukraina - Nyob ntev Ukraine - Да живее Украина - გაუმარჯოს უკრაინას - Hidup Ukraine - Vivu Ukrainio - Længe leve Ukraine - Živjela Ukrajina - Жыве Украіна - Yaşasın Ukrayna - Lengi lifi Úkraína - Lank lewe die Oekraïne

Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

China’s local debt comes home

In Zunyi, a city in southwestern China, the banks agreed to wait a decade for the first yuan of principal. At the end of 2022, the city-owned Zunyi Road and Bridge Construction Group reached an agreement with its lenders on 15.6 billion yuan in loans. It would pay interest for ten years and repay the principal over the following ten. On that schedule, the banks will still be collecting on loans from China’s building boom in the early 2040s.Nearly four years later, the land market that once sustained local borrowing is still shrinking. Across China, local governments raised 1.85 trillion yuan from granting rights to use state-owned land in the first ten months of 2026, down 25.8 percent from a year earlier. For a household with a mortgage, the same property slump can mean a home worth less than its owners paid for it. For the city where they live, it means fewer developers willing to bid for the next plot. Both still owe money borrowed in better years.Land acquired this outsized role partly because of a tax reform in 1994. Beijing took a larger share of revenue while provinces, cities and counties remained responsible for much of the cost of schools, health care and infrastructure. Central transfers covered part of the gap. A fast-growing city had another option. It could grant a developer long-term rights to a site and collect much of the value of those rights up front.Local officials could also set up a company to borrow from banks or sell bonds. These companies, known as local government financing vehicles, helped pay for roads, bridges and industrial parks. A new road could attract factories and make the surrounding plots more valuable. The city could then collect more at its next land auction. Lenders had reason to expect municipal backing even when the company alone had signed the loan agreement.The weak point was the distance between what a project was worth to a city and what it earned for its owner. A free road could cut the cost of getting goods to market without generating a yuan in tolls. As long as developers bid more for nearby land, the city had a way to cover the difference. Once the housing market turned in 2021, some borrowers needed another loan to service the last one. That dependence on fresh money is what invites the comparison with a pyramid scheme. It also explains how a city can own valuable infrastructure and still struggle to pay a bill.Beijing’s response has changed who signs for the debt:In November 2024, lawmakers approved an extra six trillion yuan in local borrowing authority over three years to refinance eligible hidden debt. A further 800 billion yuan a year was earmarked from existing special bond quotas for five years, bringing the package to ten trillion yuan. By November 11, 2026, local governments had issued about 99 percent of the six-trillion-yuan tranche, shifting obligations once carried off the books onto public balance sheets. A province can borrow more cheaply and for longer than a troubled municipal company. The interest saving is real. The principal still falls due.Beijing has also tightened scrutiny of new projects in heavily indebted regions. That curbs the ability of one city to borrow for an industrial park simply because its neighbor is building one. It leaves local officials with less discretion over worthwhile projects as well. In October 2026, Beijing allocated 300 billion yuan of unused borrowing capacity to help counties and urban districts meet day-to-day expenses. Keeping existing services running now competes for borrowing capacity once associated with building new ones.Families can feel the squeeze even while the city pays its bondholders on time:Local financing companies have fallen behind on bills to suppliers. A contractor waiting for a municipal client to settle an invoice still has to find the cash for wages and materials. In effect, the business is lending the city money every week the bill goes unpaid.For homeowners, the loss can be more lasting. A fall in an apartment’s resale value reduces the equity available to owners who need to move, while the bank still has a claim on the outstanding mortgage. Cheaper homes help prospective buyers, but a worker whose next paycheck depends on construction has a reason to postpone buying. Investment in residential buildings fell 21.4 percent in the first ten months of 2026. Families also have medical bills and retirement to plan for. As the cushion provided by housing equity shrinks, keeping more cash in the bank makes sense. Beijing is counting on those same households to spend more.In Shangqiu, in Henan province, residents have already seen how narrowly a public service can survive a cash shortage. In February 2023, the city’s bus operator announced that it would suspend services, citing pandemic losses and a subsidy shortfall. It said it could no longer pay staff or charge its electric buses. The city intervened within hours and the buses kept running. The banks in Zunyi could wait a decade for a principal payment. Shangqiu’s passengers needed a bus the next morning.