Coin Press - Brexit's broken promises

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Brexit's broken promises




When Britain voted to leave the European Union in June 2016, its advocates framed the decision as a liberation. “Take back control,” the slogan promised, conjuring images of a sovereign nation freed from Brussels’ shackles, setting its own rules, striking its own trade deals and funnelling the cost of EU membership into public services at home. Nearly a decade on, the gulf between promise and reality is stark. Far from ushering in a new era of prosperity, Brexit has acted as a slow‑burn drag on growth, decimated trade, hollowed out industries and left the nation diminished on the global stage.

A Smaller, Poorer Economy
The most striking measure of Brexit’s damage is the economy itself. By the start of 2025, Britain’s gross domestic product per capita was estimated to be about six to eight percent lower than it would have been had the country remained in the EU. Investment, once buoyed by London’s status as a gateway to Europe, is twelve to eighteen percent lower than it otherwise would be. Employment and productivity are both three to four percent below the counterfactual trajectory. These losses did not arrive overnight. Rather, uncertainty after the referendum delayed business decisions, diverted management time and encouraged firms to hold cash rather than expand. The protracted negotiations and repeated renegotiations – from the withdrawal agreement to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement and the Windsor Framework – sustained that uncertainty for years, causing what economists describe as a “slow‑burn hit” that accumulated over a decade.

Before the referendum, Britain grew at roughly the same pace as comparable economies. After 2016 the lines diverged. By early 2025, UK GDP per head had grown six to ten percentage points less than similar advanced economies, placing the country near the bottom of the league tables. Those patterns carry through to investment, employment and productivity. Much of the slump reflects higher trade barriers that reduced external demand, discouraged foreign direct investment and increased administrative burdens on companies that once seamlessly supplied both sides of the Channel.

Trade: From Gateway to Bottleneck
Brexit champions argued that leaving the single market would allow Britain to strike its own global trade deals. In reality, most “new” deals have simply rolled over agreements the UK already enjoyed as an EU member. The government’s own analysis shows that the flagship agreements with Japan and Australia are expected to add around 0.1 percentage points to GDP over fifteen years – rounding errors compared with the estimated four‑percent productivity hit inflicted by the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) with the EU. At the same time, British exporters have faced a thicket of paperwork, border checks and rules of origin requirements that add two to eight percent to the cost of shipping goods to the EU. Goods exports collapsed in early 2021 when the transition period ended and, despite partial recovery, remain below 2019 levels in real terms. Services exports have fared a little better but have still lost market share in key sectors such as financial services, where London’s dominance is slipping as companies move staff and trading activity to Paris, Frankfurt and Amsterdam.

The impact is not confined to exports. Imports from the EU are lower as well, meaning higher prices and less choice for consumers and businesses. Trade flows between Great Britain and Northern Ireland have been particularly strained. The Windsor Framework’s dual “green lane” and “red lane” system was meant to ease frictions, yet trade data show a persistent decline. Between 2020 and 2024‑25 the share of GB businesses selling to Northern Ireland fell from 5.7 percent to 3.9 percent; in manufacturing it dropped from 20.1 percent to 12.9 percent. In the year to April 2025, more than 15 percent of businesses reported lower sales to Northern Ireland and more than eight percent stopped trading altogether. Smaller firms have been hit hardest, deterred by complex customs forms, “Not‑For‑EU” labelling and the need to register as trusted traders. Agrifood exports have fallen by more than one fifth, while imports are down seven percent, hurting both farmers and consumers.

Labour: A Self‑Inflicted Shortage
“Freedom of movement” was among the key battlegrounds of the Brexit campaign. Leave proponents promised that ending it would reduce pressure on public services and open job opportunities for British workers. Instead, sectors that relied on EU labour are struggling to find staff. The post‑Brexit immigration system introduced a Skilled Worker visa, but it excludes many lower‑skilled occupations. Hospitality, hotels, warehousing, meat processing and construction – all industries that depended on EU workers – report acute shortages. The haulage industry faces a deficit of thousands of HGV drivers despite emergency visa schemes, because EU drivers prefer permanent employment in member states. A 2022 survey by the National Farmers’ Union found that at least £60 million worth of crops had been left to rot due to a lack of pickers, with nearly 40 percent of farmers reporting crop losses and farms operating with workforce gaps of around fourteen percent. Three years later, labour shortages remain a recurring complaint across the food supply chain, care homes and logistics firms.

The consequences of these shortages go beyond unharvested crops. Employers must pay higher wages and offer incentives to attract scarce staff, driving up costs. Many businesses cannot fill orders or expand because they lack workers. The promise that British workers would seamlessly replace EU migrants has not materialised, and training programmes take time to deliver results. Even sectors that qualify for visas, such as butchery and meat processing, struggle with bureaucratic barriers that prevent skilled workers from entering. Industry leaders warn that viable factories are at risk of closure simply because they cannot hire.

Public Finances and Services
One of the referendum’s most potent claims was that leaving the EU would release funds for the National Health Service. Instead, Brexit has strained the NHS. Hospitals relied heavily on EU doctors, nurses and carers; many have returned to the continent or chosen not to move to the UK under the new visa system. Shortages in social care mean hospitals cannot discharge patients because there is no one to look after them in the community, exacerbating waiting lists. Meanwhile, the cost of imported medicines and medical equipment has increased due to the weaker pound and new trade barriers. Far from a windfall, the Office for Budget Responsibility estimates that the long‑term impact of the TCA will reduce productivity by around four percent, lowering tax revenues and leaving less money to fund public services.

Political and Global Standing
Brexit was supposed to restore Britain’s sovereignty and global clout. Instead, it has sown division at home and diminished the UK’s influence abroad. The need to renegotiate access to the EU’s single market has consumed successive governments, leaving little energy for domestic reform. Scotland and Northern Ireland have strengthened ties with Europe and revived debates over independence and unification, respectively. On the world stage, London’s ability to shape EU policies from inside the club has vanished; it now must lobby from the outside. Businesses once viewed the UK as a bridge into Europe. Today many multinationals choose Dublin or Amsterdam instead.

Even officials who maintained neutrality now concede the scale of the damage. In October 2025 the governor of the Bank of England, Andrew Bailey, said that Brexit will weigh negatively on UK economic growth “for the foreseeable future.” He linked a decline in the UK’s potential growth rate from around 2.5 percent to 1.5 percent to lower productivity, an ageing population and post‑Brexit trade restrictions. Though he expressed hope that technological innovation could eventually offset the drag, his comments underscore how far the country has fallen from the confident predictions of 2016.

Conclusion and Future
A decade on, Brexit’s legacy is one of contradiction. Promises of economic renewal have given way to slower growth, weaker investment and stagnant living standards. The pledge to control borders has produced labour shortages that leave crops unpicked, factories understaffed and care homes desperate. The dream of unencumbered trade has led to higher costs, administrative headaches and a steady erosion of the UK’s position as a trading nation. Even the vaunted recovery of sovereignty has proved hollow as ministers spend their days negotiating with Brussels to mitigate the damage of their own decision. Far from delivering what was intended, Brexit has made Britain poorer, more divided and less influential – the opposite of what its architects promised.



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Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Да здравствует Украина

Es lebe die Ukraine - Да здравствует Украина - Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Nech žije Ukrajina - Länge leve Ukraina - תחי אוקראינה - Lang leve Oekraïne - Да живее Украйна - Elagu Ukraina - Kauan eläköön Ukraina - Vive l'Ukraine - Ζήτω η Ουκρανία - 乌克兰万岁 - Viva Ucrania - Ať žije Ukrajina - Çok yaşa Ukrayna - Viva a Ucrânia - Trăiască Ucraina - ウクライナ万歳 - Tegyvuoja Ukraina - Lai dzīvo Ukraina - Viva l'Ucraina - Hidup Ukraina - تحيا أوكرانيا - Vivat Ucraina - ขอให้ยูเครนจงเจริญ - Ucraina muôn năm - ژوندی دی وی اوکراین - Yashasin Ukraina - Озак яшә Украина - Živjela Ukrajina - 우크라이나 만세 - Mabuhay ang Ukraine - Lenge leve Ukraina - Nyob ntev Ukraine - Да живее Украина - გაუმარჯოს უკრაინას - Hidup Ukraine - Vivu Ukrainio - Længe leve Ukraine - Živjela Ukrajina - Жыве Украіна - Yaşasın Ukrayna - Lengi lifi Úkraína - Lank lewe die Oekraïne

Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

China’s cartel lifeline

China is not keeping Mexico’s drug cartels alive through a formal alliance, a military pact or an openly declared policy. The reality is more diffuse and, in operational terms, more useful. China-linked chemical suppliers, commercial intermediaries and underground banking networks have become crucial parts of the infrastructure that allows Mexican criminal organisations to manufacture synthetic drugs at scale, move them towards the United States and recycle the proceeds with remarkable speed. The relationship is not a single organisation. It is a market in which every participant solves a problem for somebody else.That distinction matters. There is no publicly demonstrated command structure in which Beijing directs the Sinaloa Cartel or the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación. Nor is every Chinese chemical company, exporter, student, business owner or currency broker involved in crime. Yet the available evidence shows that actors based in China or connected to Chinese commercial and underground banking systems have become indispensable enablers of Mexico’s synthetic-drug economy. They supply ingredients, reduce financial friction and provide the cartels with a global capacity that Mexican organisations could not reproduce as cheaply or efficiently on their own. The phrase saving the cartels is therefore provocative, but not meaningless. It describes an economic function rather than a political alliance.An industrial supply chain, not a secret pactThe modern fentanyl trade is less dependent on farmland than the heroin and cocaine businesses that preceded it. Synthetic drugs can be produced close to their final market, their potency makes transport exceptionally profitable, and their chemistry can be adjusted when a particular substance is banned. That has changed the balance of power inside organised crime. Access to chemicals, expertise, equipment and finance now matters as much as control over fields or remote trafficking corridors. When China placed fentanyl-related substances under class-wide control in 2019, the trade did not disappear. It changed form. Direct exports of finished fentanyl became more difficult, while Mexican organisations expanded their own synthesis using imported precursor and pre-precursor chemicals. The business moved one step upstream into the vast international chemical market, where many compounds have legitimate industrial or pharmaceutical uses and where criminal diversion can be concealed behind intermediaries, false descriptions, altered customs codes and shipments routed through third countries.Mexican brokers and cartel-linked procurement specialists search for suppliers, negotiate prices and arrange delivery through Pacific ports, air cargo, courier services and parcel networks. Some chemicals enter Mexico directly. Others pass through the United States or additional transit jurisdictions before reaching clandestine laboratories. Suppliers can switch to closely related compounds when regulators schedule a specific substance, leaving enforcement agencies trapped in a recurring race between chemical innovation and legal control. Not every company in the chain necessarily knows the ultimate destination or intended use of a shipment. That ambiguity is one reason the system is resilient. At the same time, recent prosecutions have described sellers who allegedly marketed chemicals for narcotics production, discussed concealment methods, accepted digital payments and tailored products to the requirements of traffickers. The supply chain ranges from wilful criminal partnership to negligent compliance and the exploitation of ordinary trade.Once the chemicals arrive, Mexican groups provide the violent and logistical layer. They operate laboratories, recruit chemists, press counterfeit tablets, move bulk powder and use established smuggling networks to cross the US border. The Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG remain the most important organisations in this market, although splinter groups, regional allies and independent brokers increasingly participate. The result is not a simple China-to-Mexico pipeline, but an adaptive commercial web.The financial machine behind the narcotics tradeChemicals are only half of the story. A cartel that cannot move, convert and reinvest its earnings is a cartel that cannot survive. This is where Chinese underground banking and money-laundering networks have become especially valuable. Mexican organisations accumulate enormous quantities of dollars from retail and wholesale drug sales in the United States. Physically moving that cash across the border is expensive and vulnerable to seizure. Conventional bank transfers create records and require explanations. Traditional laundering networks charge substantial fees because they assume serious legal and operational risk.At the same time, many Chinese citizens and businesses seek access to dollars outside China, whether to buy property, pay tuition, acquire luxury goods or move wealth beyond the country’s strict foreign-exchange controls. Most of those customers are not drug traffickers. Their demand for foreign currency nevertheless creates a pool of buyers that professional laundering networks can exploit. The broker matches the two sides. Cartel dollars collected in the United States are delivered to a buyer, deposited through a network of accounts or used to purchase goods. An equivalent amount of renminbi is then paid inside China through a separate domestic transaction. The cartel or its representative receives value in Mexico through pesos, commercial payments, goods, property or accounts controlled by front companies. The money does not need to travel from the United States to China and back through a conventional international transfer. Value moves, while the original currency often remains within the country where it was collected.This is the logic of the mirror transaction. It is fast, difficult to reconstruct and capable of serving two clients at once. The cartel disposes of incriminating cash. The Chinese customer acquires foreign spending power. The broker earns fees and may profit again through trade, exchange-rate spreads or the resale of goods.The laundering can then be layered through electronics, designer products, vehicles, property, casinos, restaurants, import-export companies, cashier’s cheques, peer-to-peer payments, shell businesses, stablecoins and other digital assets. Encrypted messaging allows couriers and brokers to verify cash pickups with serial numbers or photographs while revealing little about the wider network. Trade-based laundering is particularly effective because a legitimate shipment can disguise an illicit transfer of value through false invoices, overpricing, underpricing or transactions between related companies.Between 2020 and 2024, 137,153 suspicious activity reports covered approximately 312 billion dollars in activity potentially linked to Chinese money-laundering networks. That figure must not be mistaken for 312 billion dollars of proven cartel revenue. Suspicious activity reports may overlap, include attempted transfers and capture lawful as well as unlawful transactions. Even with that essential caveat, the scale shows how deeply these networks can touch banks, money-service businesses, property markets, retail commerce and digital payment systems.Recent cases expose the convergenceEvents during 2026 have made the structure increasingly visible. In May, two Chinese nationals were charged with participating in a transnational laundering organisation that allegedly served the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG. The alleged methods included mirror transfers, foreign bank accounts, encrypted communications, serial-number verification and trade-based laundering across the United States, Mexico, Latin America and China. In another case announced in March, six Chinese nationals and two pharmaceutical companies were charged in conspiracies involving chemical agents used to manufacture or adulterate fentanyl. Three defendants were also accused of attempting to provide material support to a person they believed represented the Gulf Cartel. The allegations illustrated how chemical sales, payment processing and cartel logistics can merge within the same commercial relationship.In June, a Honduras-based Chinese national pleaded guilty to drug trafficking, laundering and providing support to CJNG. The network had coordinated the laundering of more than 22 million dollars in proceeds from cocaine and fentanyl sales and used cryptocurrency, trade-based methods and encrypted communications. It had also participated in moving more than 450 kilograms of cocaine. Each case has its own legal facts, and charges remain allegations until proven. Taken together, however, the cases reveal a mature service economy. Cartels are no longer merely buying chemicals from distant factories and hiring unrelated launderers afterwards. They can draw on overlapping networks that arrange procurement, transport, payment, currency conversion, concealment and reinvestment.That integration reduces costs and makes disruption harder. Arresting a cartel lieutenant may remove one customer, but it does not eliminate the broker. Seizing one chemical shipment may delay a laboratory, but it does not destroy the supplier network. Closing one account often causes the money to migrate to another bank, another trade corridor or another digital asset.Beijing’s responsibility is real, but it is not simpleThe evidence does not justify treating every China-linked actor as an agent of the Chinese state. It does, however, raise serious questions about enforcement, regulatory incentives and the degree of political priority assigned to the problem. China possesses one of the world’s largest chemical and pharmaceutical manufacturing sectors. Its scale is a legitimate economic strength, but it also creates an enormous monitoring challenge. Small producers, trading companies, online sellers and freight intermediaries can be difficult to supervise, especially when the products are dual-use chemicals rather than finished narcotics. Criminal vendors can change company names, websites, payment channels and export descriptions faster than traditional investigations can proceed.Beijing has taken meaningful steps. It placed fentanyl-related substances under broad control, has prosecuted selected offenders and has participated in limited joint operations. In May 2026, China added three more chemicals to its controlled precursor list for exports to the United States, Canada and Mexico, while warning businesses about eight additional substances that could be used to manufacture synthetic drugs. A joint Chinese and US investigation also led to five arrests and drug seizures. Those actions demonstrate that cooperation is possible. They also expose the central weakness of molecule-by-molecule regulation. Once one chemical is controlled, traffickers can turn to a pre-precursor, a substitute compound or a different synthesis route. Effective enforcement therefore requires regulation of chemical families, rigorous customer verification, scrutiny of suspicious export patterns and rapid exchange of intelligence with destination countries.China argues that the fentanyl crisis is fundamentally an American problem driven by domestic demand and that Washington uses the issue as a geopolitical weapon. The first part contains an important truth. Without a vast consumer market in the United States, there would be no comparable revenue stream for the cartels. Yet demand does not absolve suppliers, brokers or governments from acting against criminal diversion. The crisis is simultaneously American in consumption, Mexican in large-scale production and transnational in chemistry and finance.Mexico is the manufacturing hub and the battlefieldMexico is not a passive victim of a foreign scheme. Its cartels choose to buy the chemicals, operate the laboratories, corrupt officials, intimidate communities and smuggle the finished drugs. They have converted geographic proximity to the United States into a decisive commercial advantage and have used decades of experience in cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine trafficking to build a synthetic-drug industry of global reach.The Mexican government has intensified seizures, laboratory raids, border deployments and transfers of major cartel figures to US custody. These actions have disrupted individual organisations and demonstrated a greater willingness to confront high-value targets. Yet the underlying business model has proved highly adaptable. Leadership losses can trigger fragmentation, succession wars and temporary chaos without eliminating the market for drugs, laundering or protection. Ports remain a critical vulnerability. The volume of legitimate trade makes comprehensive inspection impossible, while corruption, intimidation and falsified documentation can help suspicious cargo pass through. Local police forces and prosecutors often face far greater resources and firepower on the criminal side. National institutions may conduct spectacular operations, but sustained control requires reliable customs systems, protected investigators, independent courts and a financial intelligence structure capable of following money through legitimate businesses.Mexico’s insistence on sovereignty is understandable, especially when US officials speak of unilateral action. But sovereignty cannot become a shield against verifiable evidence or a substitute for institutional reform. Equally, Washington cannot treat Mexico merely as a source of danger while ignoring the American market that generates the profit and the financial channels through which much of that profit circulates.Why the cartels are being savedChina-linked networks save Mexican cartels in three practical ways. First, they preserve production by supplying an evolving menu of chemicals and equipment when specific substances are banned. Secondly, they make laundering cheaper and safer by matching drug dollars with demand for foreign currency and goods among Chinese customers. Thirdly, they internationalise cartel finance, allowing proceeds to be converted into property, trade, digital assets and legitimate-looking business revenue across several jurisdictions.The word saving should not be confused with charity or ideology. These are commercial relationships. Chemical suppliers want sales. Money brokers want fees. Chinese clients want access to overseas currency. Mexican cartels want inputs and clean value. Each party can participate without understanding the entire structure, and that fragmentation protects the system from collapse. Yet the phrase can also mislead. China is not the sole cause of cartel power. Mexico’s corruption and impunity, US drug demand, weaknesses in global trade controls, gaps in financial supervision and the extraordinary profitability of synthetic narcotics all sustain the same market. Removing one Chinese supplier would not end it. Reducing the availability of China-linked chemicals and laundering services across the system would, however, make cartel operations slower, more expensive and more vulnerable.What could actually break the chainA serious strategy must target the network rather than its nationality. Chemical producers should be required to verify customers, end users and unusual shipping routes. Export controls should cover families of dangerous compounds and be updated rapidly as synthesis methods change. Online platforms should be compelled to remove sellers that advertise concealment or narcotics applications. Ports need risk-based screening built on trade data, beneficial ownership records and intelligence about brokers, not merely random container searches.Financial enforcement must look beyond large international transfers. The most revealing signals may be repeated cash deposits, unexplained purchases of electronics, rapid credit-card repayments, property acquired through third parties, companies trading far beyond their apparent capacity and stablecoin flows that do not fit a customer’s profile. Banks, payment companies, casinos, estate agents, customs services and digital-asset platforms need to see themselves as parts of the same defensive system. Targeted sanctions and prosecutions can isolate the brokers who connect otherwise separate criminal markets. They are likely to be more effective than broad tariffs, which punish legitimate trade and can be absorbed or circumvented without identifying a single illicit shipment. Mutual legal assistance between China, Mexico and the United States must become faster, more routine and less dependent on the wider political climate.Enforcement alone will not resolve the crisis. The United States must continue reducing overdose deaths through treatment, prevention, naloxone access and a credible strategy for lowering demand. Mexico must strengthen institutions that protect ports, courts and local government from criminal capture. China must police chemical exporters and underground banking with the same seriousness it applies to threats it regards as central to domestic stability.The deepest danger is the belief that the fentanyl economy is a straight line from a Chinese factory to a Mexican laboratory and then across the US border. It is a web of legal commerce, criminal brokerage, digital finance, corrupt facilitation and consumer demand. That is why it survives arrests, sanctions and record seizures. China is not single-handedly keeping Mexico’s cartels alive. But China-linked chemical and financial networks have become one of the principal systems that allow them to adapt, recover and expand. Breaking that relationship would not end organised crime. It would remove one of its most efficient engines.