Coin Press - Miracle in Germany: VW soars

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Miracle in Germany: VW soars




After years of sluggish performance and a dramatic plunge in profits, Volkswagen Group has stunned investors with a remarkable rebound. The company that once seemed mired in structural problems and market headwinds has recalibrated its strategy, restructured operations and embraced electrification to deliver a turnaround that many thought impossible. This article explains how the German carmaker fell so far and what has propelled its recent surge.

The long slide: profits and shares collapse
Volkswagen’s troubles became starkly apparent in late 2024. The group’s earnings before tax for the third quarter crashed almost 60 percent to €2.4 billion, down from €5.8 billion a year earlier. Sales slumped in China, its most important market, and costly electric vehicles (EVs) struggled to find buyers after Germany ended purchase subsidies. Management acknowledged that cutbacks were looming as it planned to close under‑utilised assembly lines and trim labour costs.

The slump was mirrored in the stock market. By mid‑2024 the share price had tumbled 72 percent from its 2021 peak to a 14‑year low near €91, wiping billions from investors’ holdings. Analysts blamed structural problems: high wage costs and overstaffing in Germany, expensive energy, and the legacy of Dieselgate litigation. Its operating margin for the first nine months of 2024 was just 2.1 percent, far below peers, raising fears that Europe’s largest carmaker was becoming uncompetitive.

Further pain arrived in early 2025. U.S. tariffs on cars exported from Europe, introduced by the Trump administration, led to a €1.5‑billion hit in the first half and forced Volkswagen to cut its sales and profit margin guidance. At the same time, the company booked a 4.7‑billion‑euro charge at Porsche related to a reversal of its electric‑vehicle strategy. The passenger‑car division’s operating profit plummeted 84.9 percent as electric models remained costly to build.

Strategic reset: cost‑cutting and partnerships
Recognising the severity of the situation, chief executive Oliver Blume launched an aggressive restructuring programme. Management promised to cut over 35 000 jobs through natural attrition by the end of the decade and aimed to save €1 billion annually by trimming bureaucracy and simplifying product lines. The company also reduced its five‑year investment plan by €15 billion, focusing resources on core brands and promising to make electric models profitable.

A key catalyst for renewed investor confidence was Volkswagen’s decision to accelerate electrification and seek external expertise. In June 2024 the group announced a joint venture with U.S. start‑up Rivian. Volkswagen committed to invest up to US$5 billion in Rivian and to develop a next‑generation software‑defined vehicle platform combining Rivian’s advanced electronics and software with Volkswagen’s scale. Executives highlighted that the partnership would allow both companies to share components, reduce costs and deliver connected vehicles faster.

Volkswagen also expanded its battery‑cell operations through subsidiary PowerCo and renegotiated supply agreements to lower input costs. By building new battery plants in Germany, Spain and Canada, the group aims to secure up to 170 gigawatt‑hours of capacity, although some projects have been delayed in response to weaker near‑term EV demand.

Electrification pays off: EV sales surge
The pivot toward electrification began to bear fruit in 2025. In the first half of the year, the group’s battery‑electric vehicle (BEV) deliveries rose by about 50 percent compared with the previous year. Total BEV sales reached 465 500, raising the battery‑electric share of total deliveries from 7 percent to 11 percent. The improvement was driven by strong demand in Europe, where BEV deliveries jumped about 90 percent; the group captured roughly 28 percent of the European BEV market and became the regional leader. New models such as the long‑range ID.7 sedan and the refreshed ID.4 crossover helped attract customers, while Skoda and Audi expanded their electric line‑ups.

Robust order inflows underscored growing confidence: the company reported that outstanding BEV orders in Western Europe were more than 60 percent higher than a year earlier. This surge indicated that the supply‑chain problems and software glitches that had plagued earlier launches were being resolved.

Investor sentiment improves
Despite the heavy tariff hit, the second half of 2025 brought signs of stabilisation. In July the company trimmed its full‑year sales and margin guidance, acknowledging that tariffs and restructuring costs would weigh on results, but shares recovered from a 4.6 percent fall to end the day 1 percent higher as investors were reassured that losses were contained and that luxury brands Audi and Porsche would recover in 2026. Chief executive Blume told investors that cost‑cutting had to be accelerated and expressed confidence that a trade deal reducing U.S. tariffs from 25 percent to 15 percent would materially improve margins.

In October, ahead of third‑quarter results, Volkswagen held a pre‑close call with investors. Analysts described the message as “reassuring”: management said operating profit would likely stay within guidance despite the tariff drag. Investors were comforted by solid sales momentum in the core brand, and the share price gained about 1.2 percent in early trading.

The group’s long‑term outlook remains cautious. In March it forecast a 2025 operating profit margin of 5.5–6.5 percent, only slightly above 2024 levels, as the costs of ramping up EV and battery production and uncertainties around U.S. trade policy continue to weigh on earnings. Yet analysts noted that the upper end of the margin range exceeded market expectations and called the plan credible.

Conclusion: from despair to cautious optimism
Volkswagen’s dramatic rebound after a 60 percent profit collapse illustrates how quickly fortunes can change when decisive action meets shifting market dynamics. Aggressive cost‑cutting, a strategic partnership with Rivian and a renewed focus on battery‑electric vehicles have begun to lift profits and restore investor confidence. While challenges remain – including unresolved trade tensions, high manufacturing costs and intense competition from Chinese EV manufacturers – the German giant has demonstrated that it can adapt. The “miracle” is not a sudden transformation but the result of disciplined restructuring, technological collaboration and a growing appetite for electric vehicles. Investors who once despaired at sinking margins now see signs of a sustainable turnaround.



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Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Да здравствует Украина

Es lebe die Ukraine - Да здравствует Украина - Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Nech žije Ukrajina - Länge leve Ukraina - תחי אוקראינה - Lang leve Oekraïne - Да живее Украйна - Elagu Ukraina - Kauan eläköön Ukraina - Vive l'Ukraine - Ζήτω η Ουκρανία - 乌克兰万岁 - Viva Ucrania - Ať žije Ukrajina - Çok yaşa Ukrayna - Viva a Ucrânia - Trăiască Ucraina - ウクライナ万歳 - Tegyvuoja Ukraina - Lai dzīvo Ukraina - Viva l'Ucraina - Hidup Ukraina - تحيا أوكرانيا - Vivat Ucraina - ขอให้ยูเครนจงเจริญ - Ucraina muôn năm - ژوندی دی وی اوکراین - Yashasin Ukraina - Озак яшә Украина - Živjela Ukrajina - 우크라이나 만세 - Mabuhay ang Ukraine - Lenge leve Ukraina - Nyob ntev Ukraine - Да живее Украина - გაუმარჯოს უკრაინას - Hidup Ukraine - Vivu Ukrainio - Længe leve Ukraine - Živjela Ukrajina - Жыве Украіна - Yaşasın Ukrayna - Lengi lifi Úkraína - Lank lewe die Oekraïne

Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

Europe’s arms money maze

Europe’s rearmament has acquired an uncomfortable companion: uncertainty about what the money actually buys. In Germany, an argument over defence-related borrowing has raised questions about whether exceptional debt is producing genuinely additional expenditure. In Estonia, unreliable inventory records and disputed ammunition contracts have brought ministerial accountability into the foreground. These are different problems, but they meet at the same point: a larger budget is not a reliable measure of a stronger defence.The contention that nobody knows what is happening to Europe’s weapons money goes too far. Budgets are published, procurement bodies operate and auditors are identifying failures. Nor do these cases establish that funds have disappeared into Russian hands or that the Kremlin engineered the difficulties. The more defensible conclusion is also more useful: Europe cannot judge rearmament by the volume of money announced. It must establish what has been purchased, accepted and made ready for use.That distinction matters strategically. An adversary need not steal the money to benefit from delays, unusable equipment or a loss of confidence in the governments spending it.What the €800 billion actually meansThe scale of the spending is substantial. Combined defence expenditure across the European Union reached €418 billion in 2025, with €454 billion estimated for 2026. Those annual totals should not be confused with the much larger, multi-year headline attached to the EU’s rearmament financing plan. The widely cited €800 billion is potential financing capacity, not a single fund already transferred to arms manufacturers. Its main components are approximately €650 billion in possible additional national expenditure enabled by fiscal flexibility over four years, and €150 billion in loans through the Security Action for Europe instrument, known as SAFE. The loans must be repaid; the additional national spending depends on governments choosing to use the available room.These distinctions are indispensable to any honest assessment. Permission to borrow is not an order placed with a factory. An order is not a completed delivery. Equipment delivered to a warehouse is not necessarily equipment that troops can operate, maintain and replenish. Treating all these stages as interchangeable allows governments to claim progress before the military benefit exists.It also creates a temptation to add together figures that describe different periods or overlapping flows of money. A credible account of rearmament should distinguish financing arrangements from annual expenditure, and both from verified outputs. Otherwise, the public is left comparing impressive totals whose practical meaning is unclear.Germany’s argument over additional spendingOn 10 September, the Ifo Institute challenged the use of Germany’s defence-related borrowing exemption. It calculated an €11 billion gap between additional borrowing and the year-on-year increase in the relevant expenditure. Ifo’s argument was that 38.5 per cent of the additional debt had not produced additional defence and security spending, instead freeing room for other purposes in the ordinary budget. The Finance Ministry rejected the comparison as legally and methodologically flawed. The exemption concerns qualifying expenditure above one per cent of gross domestic product, rather than an increase over the previous year. Ifo, for its part, said its analysis concerned additional spending, not constitutionality.This is not evidence that €11 billion was stolen. It is a dispute over the relationship between an exceptional borrowing mechanism and the political expectation attached to it. The difference is important: an arrangement can comply with its legal design while delivering less additional expenditure than citizens understand the announcement to promise.The practical question is whether new borrowing expands defence capacity or changes the way existing commitments are financed. Those outcomes can coexist within the same budget. Refinancing an established obligation may be lawful and fiscally useful, but it should not be presented as though an equivalent amount of new military capability has been purchased. Germany’s dispute therefore points to a straightforward transparency test. Governments should identify the expenditure that would have occurred anyway, the genuinely additional commitments and the delivery milestones attached to them. Without that comparison, the argument risks becoming a contest between accounting definitions while the central question—what the armed forces actually gain—remains unanswered.Estonia’s warning from the accountsIn Estonia, the problems are more immediate. Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur announced on 2 September that he would step down, accepting political responsibility for failures exposed in defence administration and procurement. His announcement did not amount to an admission of personal corruption.The National Audit Office issued a qualified opinion concerning defence inventories valued at approximately €1.2 billion because their quantities, composition and valuation could not be established reliably. It also questioned an unexplained retrospective adjustment of €99.7 million to the previous year’s inventory figures. That does not mean €1.2 billion of weapons has vanished. An unreliable balance is not the same thing as a proven loss. It means the records are insufficiently dependable to establish what the balance represents—a serious weakness in any organisation, and particularly consequential in one responsible for military readiness.Inadequate records can obstruct decisions long before a final financial loss is demonstrated. Commanders and purchasing authorities need to distinguish usable stock from equipment awaiting inspection, repair or replacement. If those categories are unclear, another procurement decision may rest on a mistaken understanding of what is already available.Auditing is therefore more than an exercise in retrospective blame. A trustworthy inventory helps determine what must be bought next, how urgently it is needed and whether previous purchases fulfilled their purpose. Poor accounting can undermine operational planning even where no theft is established.Paid for is not the same as usableEstonia’s ammunition procurement for Ukraine illustrates a second difficulty. The audit identified disputed advance payments and warned of a potential exposure to the state budget of around €70 million. That figure describes a risk, not a final, adjudicated loss.The controversy includes contracts involving the Italian company Datasel. Pevkur described ammunition delivered under the disputed arrangements as incomplete and of insufficient quality, rather than simply non-existent. Datasel disputes the criticism and has said that goods delivered and invoiced were worth approximately €58 million against about €59 million in advances. The company’s account is a contested position, not a judicial finding.The disagreement exposes a distinction that matters beyond this particular supplier. A payment record, an invoice, the physical presence of goods and acceptance of those goods for their intended use answer different questions. A supplier may point to shipments while a purchasing authority disputes whether the contractual requirement has been met. The existence of equipment does not, by itself, resolve an argument over quality or completeness.For Ukraine, the decisive consideration is usable military support. For the public authorities financing it, the additional questions are whether payment conditions were appropriate, inspections were timely and contractual protections can recover money when performance is disputed. Those questions should be settled through evidence and the relevant proceedings, not through premature declarations of guilt.The procurement lesson is nonetheless clear. Emergency purchasing needs traceable contracts, independently verified acceptance and a dependable record linking each payment to performance. Urgency may justify faster decisions. It cannot make the distinction between an invoice and a functioning delivery disappear.An oversight system split across institutionsEurope’s defence financing does not sit within a single system of scrutiny. National budgets, EU programmes, loans and off-budget arrangements have different institutional responsibilities. The European Court of Auditors’ September review described complex governance and uneven oversight arrangements, rather than a continent-wide absence of auditing.SAFE falls within the European Court of Auditors’ remit. The European Peace Facility, outside the ordinary EU budget, has its own College of Auditors. National defence expenditure is scrutinised through national institutions. The distinction is between different mandates, not between money that is automatically checked and money that is automatically unaccountable. The difficulty arises at the joins. A public explanation may follow the announcement of a financing package, while a procurement body follows the contract and an operational authority follows the equipment. Unless those accounts can be reconciled, citizens and legislators may struggle to establish the complete journey from political promise to accepted delivery.Secrecy complicates that task, but it need not prevent it. Publishing ammunition locations or technical vulnerabilities would be irresponsible. Giving properly authorised auditors access to contracts, inspections and payment records is a different matter. The need to protect operational information should not become a general excuse for withholding financial evidence.Nor should procurement integrity be treated as a rival to speed. Clearly assigned responsibility, verifiable milestones and early checks can prevent disputes from developing into expensive attempts to recover money after the event. The relevant choice is between controls that work during procurement and explanations demanded after something has gone wrong.Where Putin could benefitThese failures do not establish that Vladimir Putin has obtained everything he wanted. A Europe that turns rising expenditure into effective forces would represent a very different outcome. There is also no demonstrated Russian role in the particular German budget dispute or the Estonian accounting and contractual problems described here.The potential advantage for Moscow is indirect. Delayed or disputed deliveries can leave the intended recipient weaker than the expenditure suggests. Confusing financial claims can make it harder to defend further commitments. A succession of procurement controversies could erode confidence not only in individual contracts, but in the wider case for supporting Ukraine and strengthening European defence.That is a strategic risk, not proof of an accomplished Russian victory. The public identification of problems is itself evidence that scrutiny exists. A minister accepting political responsibility, auditors challenging unreliable balances and a government being pressed to explain its borrowing are mechanisms through which democratic systems can correct failure. Their value depends on what happens afterwards.The answer is neither to abandon rearmament nor to shield it from criticism. Governments should report progress in terms that connect money to results: contracts awarded, payments made, equipment accepted and capabilities available, with sensitive details reserved for secure oversight. Disputed transactions should remain visible until resolved rather than disappearing beneath the next spending announcement.Europe does not need to prove its determination by producing another larger number. It needs to demonstrate that the money already committed is becoming usable strength. Until it does, the distance between those two things remains an opportunity for the adversary it is trying to deter.