Coin Press - Gaza on the cusp of civil war

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Gaza on the cusp of civil war




In the days following a fragile ceasefire in early October 2025, the Gaza Strip – already devastated by two years of war – has been shaken by a wave of internecine violence. The militant group that has ruled the enclave for nearly two decades has responded to the power vacuum left by Israel’s withdrawal by turning its guns on rival militias and local clans. What began as an attempt to re‑establish order in lawless streets has degenerated into summary executions, sieges and pitched battles that many residents say risk pushing Gaza to the brink of civil war.

From ceasefire to crackdown
A United States‑brokered truce between Israel and the rulers of Gaza took effect in early October, ending a bloody two‑year conflict and leading to a prisoner‑hostage exchange. The agreement envisaged the group’s disarmament and the handover of civilian administration to a Palestinian technocratic committee under international supervision. Yet just days after the ceasefire, militants re‑emerged from their tunnels, freed the last living Israeli hostages and deployed thousands of fighters in uniform across Gaza’s ruined streets. Security officials say they killed thirty‑two members of a clan‑affiliated gang in Gaza City that they accuse of looting aid and collaborating with Israel, while losing six of their own men. A widely circulated video showed masked gunmen ordering seven blindfolded men to kneel before shooting them; bystanders shouted religious slogans and denounced the victims as traitors. The group later confirmed that the executions were real and justified them as punishment for treason.

Officials sympathetic to the crackdown argue that the militants simply stepped into the vacuum created when Israeli forces targeted and dismantled the local police during the war. As the regular security apparatus collapsed, powerful families and armed factions – some reportedly receiving arms or cash from Israel – seized control of neighbourhoods, hijacked aid convoys and terrorised residents. According to Gaza’s truckers’ union, gangs “looted aid and killed people under the protection of the occupation”. Israeli sources acknowledge providing support to anti‑militant clans such as the Popular Forces led by Yasser Abu Shabab, though they deny involvement in theft. The result has been a patchwork of competing militias vying for influence in a landscape strewn with debris.

Sieges and summary executions
The militant rulers have sought to present their campaign as a restoration of law and order. Their newly formed Sahem (Arrow) unit comprises intelligence and enforcement personnel tasked with dismantling armed gangs and seizing weapons. In several neighbourhoods their fighters have directed traffic, appointed temporary administrators and offered an amnesty: anyone accused of collaboration who had not shed blood could surrender their arms and have their record expunged. Officials say more than seventy gang members have taken advantage of the offer and that over fifty “gang hubs” have been dismantled. Videos released by the group’s internal media arm depict uniformed officers patrolling markets and reassuring residents that a “merciful hand” awaits those who repent.

Behind this veneer of due process lies a brutal reality. On the first day of the ceasefire, fighters surrounded the Doghmush family compound in Gaza City and laid siege for three days. Members of the Doghmush clan, one of Gaza’s most powerful families, were accused of murdering a journalist and a militant commander and of looting humanitarian aid. When seven men on Hamas’ wanted list refused to surrender, security forces stormed the neighbourhood and killed more than fifteen people. Witnesses described troops going door to door, verifying identities and torturing detainees; some victims had fingernails ripped out. Rights groups such as Al Mezan and the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights have condemned these extrajudicial killings.

Similar scenes unfolded in Khan Younis, where fighters targeted the Majadla clan after accusing them of murdering two resistance fighters. Local reports say the Israeli army intervened during the shoot‑out, killing seven militants. The militia later claimed to have killed Ahmad Tarabin, the right‑hand man of Yasser Abu Shabab, and to have attacked gangs led by Rami Hillis in Gaza City. In separate operations the Sahem unit publicly executed three men it accused of collaborating with Israel. Palestinian analyst Reham Owda says these actions are designed not only to punish collaborators but to demonstrate that the group’s security officers should be part of any future governing body.

Clans, militias and the spectre of civil war
The violence has exposed deep fissures within Gaza’s social fabric. The Doghmush, Hilles and Majadla families have longstanding feuds with Hamas dating back to the movement’s takeover of the Strip in 2007. Many of these clans maintain their own armed wings and have at times aligned with Fatah or the Palestinian Authority. During the recent war they took advantage of the chaos to settle scores and, according to multiple reports, to cooperate with Israeli forces. Saleh Aljafarawi, a 28‑year‑old journalist who gained prominence for his war coverage, was shot dead while reporting on fighting between Hamas and the Doghmush clan; his body, still wearing a press jacket, was later recovered from a truck. Residents who fled the gunfire told reporters they were “running from their own people” rather than Israeli bombardment.

The risk of wider civil strife grew when a new militia calling itself “The People’s Army – Forces of Northern Gaza” released a video declaring that it had taken control of parts of northern Gaza. Nine masked men, armed with rifles and seated around a table, pledged to rebuild the area and provide security but warned Hamas to stay away. The group’s statement promised “decisive force” against any attempt by Hamas to enter its territory and proclaimed that “the era of your tyranny has ended”. The emergence of this militia, coupled with ongoing clashes with established clans, has prompted fears that the Palestinian territory could descend into outright civil war.

In addition to the People’s Army, militias led by Hussam al‑Astal in Khan Younis and Yasser Abu Shabab in Rafah continue to defy Hamas. These groups reportedly receive weapons from Israel and have recruited hundreds of fighters, paying attractive salaries. According to a security official quoted in local reports, Hamas had killed Abu Shabab’s lieutenant and was working to eliminate him. Abu Shabab has denied collaboration and vowed to resist. Sheikh Husni al‑Mughni, head of Gaza’s Higher Committee for Tribal Affairs, insists that the clans support the crackdown and that justice has been served, but many families now demand weapons to defend themselves. Human rights advocates warn that such dynamics could ignite a cycle of revenge killings.

Political implications
The internal conflict has reverberated across Palestinian politics. The Palestinian Authority, which administers parts of the West Bank, condemned what it described as “horrible crimes” and “vile terrorism” in Gaza. Officials in Ramallah argue that the violence undermines efforts to unify Palestinian institutions under a single law and weapon. They accuse Hamas of bombarding clan houses with rockets and rocket‑propelled grenades in an attempt to “break the backbone of clans”. At least nineteen Doghmush members and eight Hamas fighters were killed in one confrontation, according to internal ministry sources.

The United States, which brokered the ceasefire and proposed a 20‑point peace plan for Gaza, has offered mixed signals. On his way to the Middle East, President Donald Trump told reporters that Hamas had been granted a temporary green light to police Gaza. “They do want to stop the problems, and they’ve been open about it, and we gave them approval for a period of time,” he said. He later compared the crackdown to his own fight against violent gangs and said that killing gang members did not bother him. Nonetheless, he reiterated that Hamas must disarm and warned that if it refuses, it will be disarmed “quickly and perhaps violently”.

Israeli leaders, meanwhile, insist that the war is not over until Hamas is dismantled. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has acknowledged arming clans opposed to Hamas, and Israeli forces remain in control of parts of northern Gaza and Rafah. Observers say the internal violence may provide Israel and its allies with leverage to force a demilitarisation deal. However, the sight of militants executing alleged collaborators in public squares has also drawn international criticism and could complicate the formation of a new governing authority.

A fragile truce in jeopardy
The ceasefire that began with the release of Israeli hostages may yet collapse under the weight of Gaza’s internal wars. In addition to the Doghmush confrontation, reports have surfaced of clashes with the Majadla and Hilles clans, as well as targeted assassinations of suspected collaborators. In one weekend alone, at least twenty‑seven people, including a journalist and a son of a senior Hamas official, were killed in battles between Hamas and the Dughmush clan. Another report put the clan’s casualties at fifty‑two, with twelve militants killed, including the son of senior official Bassem Naim; witnesses said fighters used ambulances to storm the neighbourhood.

Despite the bloodshed, some residents welcome the return of uniformed officers to the streets. A medic from Jabaliya refugee camp told reporters that seeing police again provided a sense of normalcy after months of anarchy. Others fear the crackdown has unleashed forces beyond anyone’s control. In social media posts, some Gaza residents argue that the gangs targeted by Hamas were “more dangerous than the occupation” itself and that swift justice was necessary. Critics counter that the extrajudicial killings violate international law and risk fuelling cycles of revenge.

The outcome may hinge on whether the rival clans and newly formed militias decide to accept the amnesty or continue to fight. The interior ministry has set a deadline for suspects to surrender, warning that anyone who fails to do so will face arrest and prosecution. Hossam al‑Astal, a militia leader with ties to Israel, has already rejected the ultimatum, calling the fighters “rats” and urging them to repent before it is too late. As the deadline approaches, many Gazans brace for further bloodletting.

Conclusion
Gaza is teetering on the edge. What was intended as a pause in the war with Israel has exposed the territory’s underlying fractures: feuding clans, armed gangs, foreign proxies and a ruling movement determined to hold onto its weapons. The current campaign may succeed in dismantling some militias and restoring a measure of order, but at the cost of deepening social rifts and undermining prospects for a peaceful transition. Unless a credible, inclusive security arrangement emerges – one that curbs the power of rival gangs and ensures accountability for all – the threat of civil war will continue to loom over the battered enclave.



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Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Да здравствует Украина

Es lebe die Ukraine - Да здравствует Украина - Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Nech žije Ukrajina - Länge leve Ukraina - תחי אוקראינה - Lang leve Oekraïne - Да живее Украйна - Elagu Ukraina - Kauan eläköön Ukraina - Vive l'Ukraine - Ζήτω η Ουκρανία - 乌克兰万岁 - Viva Ucrania - Ať žije Ukrajina - Çok yaşa Ukrayna - Viva a Ucrânia - Trăiască Ucraina - ウクライナ万歳 - Tegyvuoja Ukraina - Lai dzīvo Ukraina - Viva l'Ucraina - Hidup Ukraina - تحيا أوكرانيا - Vivat Ucraina - ขอให้ยูเครนจงเจริญ - Ucraina muôn năm - ژوندی دی وی اوکراین - Yashasin Ukraina - Озак яшә Украина - Živjela Ukrajina - 우크라이나 만세 - Mabuhay ang Ukraine - Lenge leve Ukraina - Nyob ntev Ukraine - Да живее Украина - გაუმარჯოს უკრაინას - Hidup Ukraine - Vivu Ukrainio - Længe leve Ukraine - Živjela Ukrajina - Жыве Украіна - Yaşasın Ukrayna - Lengi lifi Úkraína - Lank lewe die Oekraïne

Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

Europe’s arms money maze

Europe’s rearmament has acquired an uncomfortable companion: uncertainty about what the money actually buys. In Germany, an argument over defence-related borrowing has raised questions about whether exceptional debt is producing genuinely additional expenditure. In Estonia, unreliable inventory records and disputed ammunition contracts have brought ministerial accountability into the foreground. These are different problems, but they meet at the same point: a larger budget is not a reliable measure of a stronger defence.The contention that nobody knows what is happening to Europe’s weapons money goes too far. Budgets are published, procurement bodies operate and auditors are identifying failures. Nor do these cases establish that funds have disappeared into Russian hands or that the Kremlin engineered the difficulties. The more defensible conclusion is also more useful: Europe cannot judge rearmament by the volume of money announced. It must establish what has been purchased, accepted and made ready for use.That distinction matters strategically. An adversary need not steal the money to benefit from delays, unusable equipment or a loss of confidence in the governments spending it.What the €800 billion actually meansThe scale of the spending is substantial. Combined defence expenditure across the European Union reached €418 billion in 2025, with €454 billion estimated for 2026. Those annual totals should not be confused with the much larger, multi-year headline attached to the EU’s rearmament financing plan. The widely cited €800 billion is potential financing capacity, not a single fund already transferred to arms manufacturers. Its main components are approximately €650 billion in possible additional national expenditure enabled by fiscal flexibility over four years, and €150 billion in loans through the Security Action for Europe instrument, known as SAFE. The loans must be repaid; the additional national spending depends on governments choosing to use the available room.These distinctions are indispensable to any honest assessment. Permission to borrow is not an order placed with a factory. An order is not a completed delivery. Equipment delivered to a warehouse is not necessarily equipment that troops can operate, maintain and replenish. Treating all these stages as interchangeable allows governments to claim progress before the military benefit exists.It also creates a temptation to add together figures that describe different periods or overlapping flows of money. A credible account of rearmament should distinguish financing arrangements from annual expenditure, and both from verified outputs. Otherwise, the public is left comparing impressive totals whose practical meaning is unclear.Germany’s argument over additional spendingOn 10 September, the Ifo Institute challenged the use of Germany’s defence-related borrowing exemption. It calculated an €11 billion gap between additional borrowing and the year-on-year increase in the relevant expenditure. Ifo’s argument was that 38.5 per cent of the additional debt had not produced additional defence and security spending, instead freeing room for other purposes in the ordinary budget. The Finance Ministry rejected the comparison as legally and methodologically flawed. The exemption concerns qualifying expenditure above one per cent of gross domestic product, rather than an increase over the previous year. Ifo, for its part, said its analysis concerned additional spending, not constitutionality.This is not evidence that €11 billion was stolen. It is a dispute over the relationship between an exceptional borrowing mechanism and the political expectation attached to it. The difference is important: an arrangement can comply with its legal design while delivering less additional expenditure than citizens understand the announcement to promise.The practical question is whether new borrowing expands defence capacity or changes the way existing commitments are financed. Those outcomes can coexist within the same budget. Refinancing an established obligation may be lawful and fiscally useful, but it should not be presented as though an equivalent amount of new military capability has been purchased. Germany’s dispute therefore points to a straightforward transparency test. Governments should identify the expenditure that would have occurred anyway, the genuinely additional commitments and the delivery milestones attached to them. Without that comparison, the argument risks becoming a contest between accounting definitions while the central question—what the armed forces actually gain—remains unanswered.Estonia’s warning from the accountsIn Estonia, the problems are more immediate. Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur announced on 2 September that he would step down, accepting political responsibility for failures exposed in defence administration and procurement. His announcement did not amount to an admission of personal corruption.The National Audit Office issued a qualified opinion concerning defence inventories valued at approximately €1.2 billion because their quantities, composition and valuation could not be established reliably. It also questioned an unexplained retrospective adjustment of €99.7 million to the previous year’s inventory figures. That does not mean €1.2 billion of weapons has vanished. An unreliable balance is not the same thing as a proven loss. It means the records are insufficiently dependable to establish what the balance represents—a serious weakness in any organisation, and particularly consequential in one responsible for military readiness.Inadequate records can obstruct decisions long before a final financial loss is demonstrated. Commanders and purchasing authorities need to distinguish usable stock from equipment awaiting inspection, repair or replacement. If those categories are unclear, another procurement decision may rest on a mistaken understanding of what is already available.Auditing is therefore more than an exercise in retrospective blame. A trustworthy inventory helps determine what must be bought next, how urgently it is needed and whether previous purchases fulfilled their purpose. Poor accounting can undermine operational planning even where no theft is established.Paid for is not the same as usableEstonia’s ammunition procurement for Ukraine illustrates a second difficulty. The audit identified disputed advance payments and warned of a potential exposure to the state budget of around €70 million. That figure describes a risk, not a final, adjudicated loss.The controversy includes contracts involving the Italian company Datasel. Pevkur described ammunition delivered under the disputed arrangements as incomplete and of insufficient quality, rather than simply non-existent. Datasel disputes the criticism and has said that goods delivered and invoiced were worth approximately €58 million against about €59 million in advances. The company’s account is a contested position, not a judicial finding.The disagreement exposes a distinction that matters beyond this particular supplier. A payment record, an invoice, the physical presence of goods and acceptance of those goods for their intended use answer different questions. A supplier may point to shipments while a purchasing authority disputes whether the contractual requirement has been met. The existence of equipment does not, by itself, resolve an argument over quality or completeness.For Ukraine, the decisive consideration is usable military support. For the public authorities financing it, the additional questions are whether payment conditions were appropriate, inspections were timely and contractual protections can recover money when performance is disputed. Those questions should be settled through evidence and the relevant proceedings, not through premature declarations of guilt.The procurement lesson is nonetheless clear. Emergency purchasing needs traceable contracts, independently verified acceptance and a dependable record linking each payment to performance. Urgency may justify faster decisions. It cannot make the distinction between an invoice and a functioning delivery disappear.An oversight system split across institutionsEurope’s defence financing does not sit within a single system of scrutiny. National budgets, EU programmes, loans and off-budget arrangements have different institutional responsibilities. The European Court of Auditors’ September review described complex governance and uneven oversight arrangements, rather than a continent-wide absence of auditing.SAFE falls within the European Court of Auditors’ remit. The European Peace Facility, outside the ordinary EU budget, has its own College of Auditors. National defence expenditure is scrutinised through national institutions. The distinction is between different mandates, not between money that is automatically checked and money that is automatically unaccountable. The difficulty arises at the joins. A public explanation may follow the announcement of a financing package, while a procurement body follows the contract and an operational authority follows the equipment. Unless those accounts can be reconciled, citizens and legislators may struggle to establish the complete journey from political promise to accepted delivery.Secrecy complicates that task, but it need not prevent it. Publishing ammunition locations or technical vulnerabilities would be irresponsible. Giving properly authorised auditors access to contracts, inspections and payment records is a different matter. The need to protect operational information should not become a general excuse for withholding financial evidence.Nor should procurement integrity be treated as a rival to speed. Clearly assigned responsibility, verifiable milestones and early checks can prevent disputes from developing into expensive attempts to recover money after the event. The relevant choice is between controls that work during procurement and explanations demanded after something has gone wrong.Where Putin could benefitThese failures do not establish that Vladimir Putin has obtained everything he wanted. A Europe that turns rising expenditure into effective forces would represent a very different outcome. There is also no demonstrated Russian role in the particular German budget dispute or the Estonian accounting and contractual problems described here.The potential advantage for Moscow is indirect. Delayed or disputed deliveries can leave the intended recipient weaker than the expenditure suggests. Confusing financial claims can make it harder to defend further commitments. A succession of procurement controversies could erode confidence not only in individual contracts, but in the wider case for supporting Ukraine and strengthening European defence.That is a strategic risk, not proof of an accomplished Russian victory. The public identification of problems is itself evidence that scrutiny exists. A minister accepting political responsibility, auditors challenging unreliable balances and a government being pressed to explain its borrowing are mechanisms through which democratic systems can correct failure. Their value depends on what happens afterwards.The answer is neither to abandon rearmament nor to shield it from criticism. Governments should report progress in terms that connect money to results: contracts awarded, payments made, equipment accepted and capabilities available, with sensitive details reserved for secure oversight. Disputed transactions should remain visible until resolved rather than disappearing beneath the next spending announcement.Europe does not need to prove its determination by producing another larger number. It needs to demonstrate that the money already committed is becoming usable strength. Until it does, the distance between those two things remains an opportunity for the adversary it is trying to deter.