Coin Press - AI's transatlantic debt trap

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AI's transatlantic debt trap




The borrowing behind artificial intelligence is creating financial obligations that reach far beyond Silicon Valley. A reversal could damage American growth, strain public finances and transmit losses to Europe. The danger deserves scrutiny, although claims of an inevitable US bankruptcy go beyond the evidence.

 

The most consequential feature of the artificial intelligence boom may ultimately be its financing. Behind the expanding capabilities of software models lies an enormous physical investment programme: data centres, processors, power infrastructure and the networks connecting them. These assets require money today. The revenues expected to justify them must arrive over many years.

 

That gap between immediate expenditure and future earnings is where technological optimism becomes financial risk. A business can develop useful products and still earn too little to service the obligations accumulated while building them. An economy can benefit from a new technology while suffering substantial losses on the investments made in anticipation of its success. By November 2026, the scale of borrowing had made that distinction increasingly important. Debt issuance associated with advanced computing infrastructure exceeded $680 billion through October, compared with $130 billion during the whole of 2023. Its share of nonfinancial investment-grade corporate debt issuance had risen from less than 6 per cent to approximately 31 per cent.

 

Those figures describe financing, rather than a direct measure of AI revenues or productive capacity. Nevertheless, they show how substantially credit markets have become involved in underwriting the expansion. If earnings disappoint, the consequences will extend beyond shareholders willing to accept the risks of a speculative technology investment.

 

The financial commitments extend beyond conventional debt.
The balance sheet offers only a partial view of the obligations surrounding the build-out. By the second quarter of 2026, seven major technology companies had accumulated more than $1 trillion in undiscounted commitments for leases that had yet to begin, alongside over $2 trillion in other obligations, including guarantees and contractual commitments. These amounts are neither immediately payable debts nor directly comparable with discounted balance-sheet liabilities. They nevertheless represent future claims on resources. Their significance becomes clearer when a project’s anticipated income weakens while its contractual obligations remain in place.

 

Consider the economics of a data centre financed against a long-term customer commitment. The contract helps the developer borrow and gives lenders confidence that the completed facility will have an occupant. But the arrangement can also bind the customer to payments long after its expectations about computing demand have changed. The financing distributes exposure among different entities without necessarily eliminating the underlying commercial risk.

 

Technological progress can complicate the calculation. More efficient models and cheaper computing could make AI services more accessible, benefiting customers and encouraging adoption. For an investor who financed expensive equipment on the assumption of sustained scarcity and premium prices, the same development could weaken returns. Technological success and investment success need not arrive together. Interlocking investments add another layer. Fourteen publicly disclosed transactions since 2023 linked approximately $300 billion in equity investment and $650 billion in debt with $1.4 trillion in future revenue commitments. These arrangements connect funding decisions with subsequent purchases of computing services or chips.

 

The analytical concern is that several apparently separate assets may depend on the same underlying customer. If that customer struggles, the supplier could face weaker sales, a declining investment valuation and exposure through a guarantee at the same time. Revenue commitments can support construction, but they cannot substitute indefinitely for commercially sustainable demand.

 

How a private investment reversal could reach the public finances
An AI downturn would initially affect companies, investors and lenders. Its wider economic impact would depend on the scale of cancelled investment, the distribution of losses and the ability of the financial system to continue extending credit. The first transmission channel would be business spending. A company that postpones a major computing project also reduces orders for equipment, construction and related services. Suppliers facing weaker demand may then defer their own investment or hiring. The effect can spread well beyond the firms that originally misjudged the market.

 

A second channel would run through household wealth. Falling equity valuations can weaken consumption, particularly when losses affect households with substantial stock-market exposure. A third would operate through credit: lenders facing losses or greater uncertainty may tighten financing conditions even for borrowers with little direct involvement in AI.
None of these mechanisms requires the technology itself to fail. A sufficiently large gap between expected and realised profitability would be enough.

 

The United States would enter such a downturn with an already substantial fiscal deficit. In the financial year ending on September 30, 2026, the federal budget shortfall was approximately $2 trillion, an increase of $217 billion from the previous year. That deficit cannot reasonably be attributed to AI. It does, however, define the fiscal starting point from which Washington would have to respond to a major economic shock.

 

A recession would tend to reduce tax receipts while increasing expenditure on income support and other automatic stabilisers. Emergency assistance, if policymakers chose to provide it, could create additional costs. Private losses would not automatically become public liabilities; that would depend on the institutions affected, existing guarantees and subsequent political decisions.

 

The claim that AI could “bankrupt America” therefore requires precision. The federal government is a sovereign borrower issuing debt in its own currency, with taxing powers and access to a monetary system fundamentally different from those of a company. A technology-sector collapse would not mechanically render it insolvent. The more credible danger is a deterioration in the relationship between growth, borrowing costs and public debt. Weaker economic activity could worsen the budget balance just as investors became more sensitive to fiscal risk. Conversely, a flight towards safe assets could lower Treasury yields and cushion part of the shock. The outcome would depend on whether the downturn primarily damaged growth expectations or also undermined confidence in public finances.

 

Europe is already connected to the financing cycle.
Europe’s exposure cannot be assessed simply by counting its own AI developers. European investors participate in American equity markets, purchase technology-company bonds and finance businesses throughout the infrastructure supply chain. A shock originating in US computing investment could therefore cross the Atlantic through portfolios and credit markets before appearing in trade figures.

 

American technology companies are also raising funds directly in European currencies. Alphabet launched a second euro-denominated bond sale of 2026 in early November, following a €9 billion issue in May. This is a concrete connection between American investment plans and European pools of savings.

 

Additional issuance can give investors access to a wider range of highly rated securities. It can also intensify competition for capital. If investors demand higher yields to absorb a larger supply of bonds, other borrowers may face less favourable financing conditions. That is a potential market effect, rather than proof that every technology-company bond displaces a European industrial investment.

 

There is also a domestic European credit exposure. Estimates for the first quarter of 2026 attributed approximately 0.9 percentage points of annual aggregate credit growth to the AI boom, roughly one quarter of the total. European AI developers and adopters had increased their leverage more than comparable businesses without similar exposure.
This does not establish that those loans are unsound. European AI firms also tend to hold larger cash buffers than comparable peers, and internal financing remains important. The figures nevertheless demonstrate that Europe is participating in the investment cycle through its own corporate borrowing as well as through overseas assets.

 

A deterioration in American demand could create a further channel. European suppliers serving the global computing industry might face weaker orders, while businesses elsewhere in the economy could be affected by a broader US slowdown. The severity would vary considerably across countries and sectors. Treating Europe as a single, uniformly exposed balance sheet would obscure those differences.

 

The crucial distinction is between a market correction and a systemic crisis.
A fall in technology shares, even a large one, would not automatically produce a banking emergency. Equity investors can absorb losses without interrupting payments, deposits or ordinary business lending. Strong corporate cash flows, adequate bank capital and stable funding could prevent an investment correction from becoming a general financial crisis.

 

The outcome becomes more dangerous when losses meet leverage and urgent cash demands. An investor required to post additional collateral may sell assets unrelated to the original problem. A lender unable to establish the value of its security may withdraw financing. Several institutions trying to reduce similar exposures simultaneously can push prices down further. The central question is therefore who ultimately bears the loss and whether that institution has the resources and time to absorb it. The nominal size of announced AI investment cannot answer that question. Neither can a headline valuation or the credit rating of the strongest company in a financing chain.

 

There are substantial reasons to resist a deterministic collapse narrative. Large technology groups have profitable established businesses. AI adoption can improve productivity and create revenue outside the infrastructure industry. Lower computing costs could expand demand enough to support continued growth, even if some early investments prove uneconomic.

 

But those possibilities do not remove the financing challenge. Useful infrastructure can be built at an excessive price. Strong long-term demand can coexist with weak near-term cash generation. A commercially promising project can become distressed if its repayment schedule leaves too little room for delays.

 

The warning for Washington and Europe is consequently specific. As AI investment becomes more dependent on debt, guarantees and long-term commitments, a disappointment in earnings can create obligations that are harder to absorb than a decline in share prices alone. Public finances could suffer through slower growth and crisis intervention, while European investors and businesses could incur losses through several connected markets. The decisive test will be whether durable customer revenues grow fast enough to support the financial promises already made. The technology may continue advancing even if parts of its investment boom unravel. America and Europe would still have to deal with the bill.



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Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

The dollar's strange turn

The dollar is strengthening in currency markets while its share of global foreign exchange reserves is declining. Central banks are accumulating gold, yet digital finance is creating additional channels for holding and transferring dollars. These developments reveal a monetary system changing in several directions at once, with consequences that extend well beyond the daily exchange rate.   By 13 November, the dollar was trading near its highest level against a basket of major currencies in 19 months. The euro stood at roughly $1.10, while the Japanese yen hovered close to 160 per dollar. Two-year US Treasury yields had risen by about 34 basis points over the week to around 4.87%, reflecting a substantial reassessment of the outlook for American interest rates. Those figures sit uneasily alongside another development. In the second quarter of 2026, the dollar’s share of global foreign exchange reserves fell to 56.70%. Its position in official reserve portfolios was becoming less concentrated even as its exchange rate subsequently strengthened.   The apparent contradiction becomes easier to understand once the dollar’s different functions are separated. Its price against other currencies, its place in central bank portfolios and its use in international payments respond to different incentives and operate over different timescales.   A rally driven by uncomfortable economicsThe latest advance has been supported by persistent inflation and expectations of tighter monetary policy. Stronger-than-expected inflation figures and firm comments from Federal Reserve officials pushed investors to reconsider how far US interest rates might rise.   Higher expected interest rates can support a currency by increasing the prospective return on assets denominated in it. That mechanism helps explain why troubling inflation news can coincide with a stronger dollar. Investors may respond to the anticipated policy response before the underlying economic problem has been resolved. The implications for households are quite different. A dollar that buys more euros or yen can still buy fewer goods and services at home. External currency strength and domestic purchasing power measure separate things.   For businesses, the effects are similarly uneven. A stronger dollar can reduce some import costs over time, while making American exports more expensive for foreign customers. Companies earning substantial revenues overseas can also face a reduction in the dollar value of those earnings. The exchange rate redistributes pressure across the economy; its rise alone says little about whether that pressure is becoming easier to bear.   The refuge is being judged more carefullyThe dollar’s behaviour during the tariff turmoil of April 2025 exposed a vulnerability that remains relevant. American equities fell, Treasury prices came under pressure and the currency weakened. In a conventional flight to safety, investors would normally expect stronger demand for dollars and US government debt.   The unusual combination mattered because the disturbance originated partly in American policy. Investors had to assess the reliability of the assets they would ordinarily use for protection. A rise in Treasury yields can therefore carry different messages. It may reflect stronger growth or expectations of higher policy rates. It can also reflect greater compensation demanded for inflation, uncertainty or the risks associated with holding longer-term debt. The direction of yields alone cannot distinguish between these explanations.   The lesson from that episode is that the dollar’s defensive qualities depend partly on the nature of the shock. Deep markets and abundant liquidity remain considerable advantages, but their value is reinforced by confidence in policy and institutions. That confidence has to survive periods when Washington itself becomes a source of uncertainty.   A smaller share of a larger reserve poolThe reserve figures require equally careful interpretation. Global foreign exchange reserves increased from $13.10 trillion in the first quarter of 2026 to $13.22 trillion in the second. Dollar-denominated holdings were broadly unchanged, while holdings in euros and several other currencies increased. The dollar’s share consequently declined from 57.18% to 56.70% without a corresponding large-scale reduction in the amount of dollars held. The euro’s share rose from 20.04% to 20.60%, while the Chinese renminbi reached 2.11%.   This distinction changes the meaning of the numbers. Reserve managers can diversify by directing additional funds towards other currencies while retaining their existing dollar portfolios. A declining percentage does not establish that central banks are collectively liquidating American assets.The latest quarterly changes also cannot be explained primarily by exchange-rate movements, whose valuation effects were limited during the period. Portfolio decisions and other asset-price changes played a greater role.   The resulting picture is one of gradual redistribution. The dollar remains far ahead of its nearest competitors, even as reserve managers reduce the concentration of their holdings.   Gold offers a different form of protectionGold provides another indication of changing reserve preferences. Estimated net purchases by central banks and other official institutions reached approximately 321 tonnes in the third quarter of 2026, bringing purchases during the first nine months to about 675 tonnes. These totals include estimates of activity that has not been publicly disclosed. Reported net purchases for the third quarter were around 120 tonnes, substantially below the estimated overall figure. That gap limits how confidently individual countries’ intentions can be inferred from the headline total.   Gold has an attraction that a government bond cannot replicate: the metal itself is no other institution’s liability. It can therefore serve a distinct purpose in portfolios designed to withstand political or financial disruption. It also pays no interest and can fluctuate sharply in price. Its accumulation indicates demand for diversification and resilience, but does not establish that it can assume the dollar’s functions in lending, invoicing and everyday settlement.   The dollar remains embedded in the machineryThe structure of international finance continues to favour the US currency. In April 2025, the dollar appeared on one side of 89.2% of foreign exchange transactions, compared with 88.4% in 2022. Average daily turnover across the global foreign exchange market reached approximately $9.6 trillion.   These figures measure trading activity, a different function from the accumulation of official reserves. Each currency transaction involves two currencies, so the dollar’s participation rate should not be interpreted as a share of worldwide savings or wealth. Its extensive use nevertheless demonstrates how deeply it is embedded in financial operations. Businesses borrow in dollars, investors hedge dollar exposures and financial institutions obtain dollar funding. Existing contracts and established markets create continuing demand even when some participants would prefer greater diversification.   Replacing that infrastructure requires liquid investment markets, dependable legal arrangements and the ability to move substantial sums without excessive cost. A competing payment platform or a bilateral agreement to use another currency can change particular transactions. Reproducing the full range of dollar financing remains a much larger undertaking.   Digital finance is carrying dollars into new placesOne of the most consequential changes is taking place through stablecoins: privately issued digital tokens designed to maintain a specified value, commonly one US dollar. These instruments can make dollar-denominated value accessible through digital wallets and trading platforms, including in places where conventional access to foreign-currency banking is limited. Their use creates another route through which households and businesses can save, transfer or transact in dollars.   The connection with American government debt is already substantial. Tether reported approximately $184 billion in USDT issuance and $132.4 billion in direct and indirect exposure to US Treasury bills at the end of September 2026. Its total reserve assets were approximately $191.5 billion. Those figures illustrate a financial link that can be overlooked in discussions of cryptocurrency. Demand for a privately issued digital dollar can support demand for the short-term securities used to back it. This creates an important possibility: governments may seek greater monetary independence while private users continue choosing dollar-denominated products. Official diversification and wider digital dollar access can develop simultaneously.   The arrangement also introduces additional dependencies. Users rely on an issuer’s reserves, redemption arrangements and operational systems. Digital access changes how dollar exposure is obtained; it does not eliminate the need to examine the institutions supporting it.   America’s borrowing needs remain a central weaknessThe expansion of dollar access takes place against a demanding fiscal background. The United States recorded a federal budget deficit of approximately $2.0 trillion in the fiscal year ending September 2026, equivalent to 6.2% of gross domestic product. Federal debt held by the public reached approximately 100% of GDP. Persistent borrowing requires sustained demand for government securities. The Treasury market’s size is an advantage for international investors because it offers an extensive supply of tradable assets. Maintaining confidence becomes more consequential as the volume of debt increases.   Higher interest rates complicate that relationship. They can support the dollar in currency markets while increasing financing costs as the government issues new debt and refinances maturing obligations. The immediate benefit to the exchange rate can therefore coexist with a worsening fiscal burden. Stablecoin reserves add a meaningful source of demand for short-term debt, but their importance should be kept in proportion. They cannot by themselves resolve the gap between federal revenue and expenditure or remove uncertainty about future borrowing costs.   The consequences reach beyond AmericaFor countries and companies with dollar liabilities but revenues in weaker local currencies, dollar appreciation can make debt service more expensive. Dollar-priced imports can also become harder to afford, complicating the work of central banks already facing domestic economic pressures.   These costs help explain the incentive to diversify. Yet the practical need to settle contracts, obtain financing and manage existing obligations can sustain dollar demand even among borrowers seeking to reduce their dependence. The evidence points towards a more differentiated monetary order. Reserve managers are spreading risk, digital platforms are broadening access to dollar instruments, and investors are examining American policy more closely.   What looks strange is the coexistence of these forces. A stronger exchange rate can accompany a smaller reserve share. Greater concern about US borrowing can coexist with continued demand for Treasury securities. Technologies intended to change finance can carry the dollar further into it. The decisive issue is how these relationships develop over time. America retains the benefits of a currency that much of the world continues to use. Preserving those benefits will depend on the credibility of the fiscal, monetary and institutional foundations beneath it.