Coin Press - Argentina reshapes oil

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Argentina reshapes oil




For decades Venezuela was synonymous with oil wealth. With more than 300 billion barrels of crude in the ground, the country was once among the top global producers, pumping more than 3 million barrels per day in the late 1990s. Today that legacy has been squandered. A combination of nationalization, decades of under‑investment, corruption and increasingly severe sanctions left the once‑mighty industry in disrepair. Production fell to roughly half a million barrels a day during the pandemic and only recovered to about one million barrels per day by the end of 2025. Analysts warn that reviving output to historic levels would require annual investments of around US$10 billion for at least a decade.

The heavy, extra‑viscous crude that constitutes most of Venezuela’s reserves requires diluents such as condensate to flow through pipelines and be exported. With domestic production of light hydrocarbons down to a few tens of thousands of barrels per day, the industry depends on imports to make its oil marketable. Infrastructure has also deteriorated: many refineries operate at a fraction of their capacity, pipelines leak into Lake Maracaibo and other waterways, and some equipment has been cannibalized for spare parts. Even modest increases in exports in early 2026 were achieved under tight supervision from the United States and did little to change the structural problems afflicting the sector. In short, the country with the world’s largest crude reserves is unlikely to flood the market any time soon.

Argentina’s shale revolution
While Venezuela languishes, Argentina has emerged as a bright spot in Latin American energy. At the heart of this renaissance is Vaca Muerta, an 8.6‑million‑acre shale formation in the Neuquén Basin. Energy officials estimate it contains roughly 16 billion barrels of technically recoverable shale oil and more than 300 trillion cubic feet of natural gas resources. Until recently these riches were largely untapped, but a combination of technological advances in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, favourable global oil prices, and improved infrastructure have unleashed a wave of production. Argentina’s oil output surged 50 % from early 2021 to September 2024, with unconventional wells providing the lion’s share of growth. By September 2025, total crude oil production averaged 833,874 barrels per day, a record for the country, and unconventional output alone hit 550,881 barrels per day — a 30 % increase year on year. Oil from Vaca Muerta now accounts for roughly two‑thirds of national output, while the same formation provides almost three‑quarters of Argentina’s natural gas.

Vaca Muerta’s geology makes it a highly attractive asset. Its shale layers are thicker than those of the Eagle Ford and Bakken plays in the United States and comparable in quality to the Permian Basin. Wells drilled there boast high productivity and low breakeven costs; estimates suggest producers can make money at US$36 to US$45 per barrel. The crude is light and low in sulfur, making it easier to refine and resulting in a smaller carbon footprint than many other petroleum grades. Yet only about a tenth of the formation is currently under development, hinting at decades of growth potential.

Infrastructure and policy – turning resources into exports
Rapid growth in shale output has forced Argentina to rethink its infrastructure. A wave of new pipelines and policy reforms is turning the country from a net importer of hydrocarbons into a potential exporter. On the oil side, the Vaca Muerta Norte pipeline to Chile came into service in 2023, and the massive Vaca Muerta Oil Sur (VMOS) project — now under construction — will connect the shale patch to the Atlantic coast with an eventual capacity of 180,000 barrels per day by late 2026. Five huge storage tanks, each more than 30 metres tall and 87 metres across, are being built to handle the flow. Crude oil exports rose by about one‑third per year between 2017 and 2023 as pipeline bottlenecks were eased, and new capacity is expected to unlock even more shipments.

On the gas side, the Perito Francisco Pascasio Moreno pipeline began operations in 2023, transporting up to 0.7 billion cubic feet per day northwards. A second phase will increase capacity to 1.2 billion cubic feet per day by 2028. Work is also underway to reverse the flow of the Gasoducto Norte pipeline so that Vaca Muerta gas can be exported to Brazil. These projects have already reduced Argentina’s dependence on imported natural gas; liquefied natural gas imports were down 43 % in the first nine months of 2024, and pipeline imports from Bolivia ended entirely in September 2024. Talks are underway to send Argentine gas through Bolivia to Brazil, underscoring the region’s shifting energy flows.

Policy has been just as important as bricks and mortar. In mid‑2024 the Argentine Congress approved the so‑called “Ley Bases,” sweeping economic reforms that limit government intervention in energy markets, allow permit holders to transport and export hydrocarbons freely, and authorize long‑term liquefied natural gas export licences. A complementary large‑investment regime offers 30 years of tax stability, duty‑free import of capital goods and free mobility of capital to investors in energy, mining and infrastructure projects. Together with the Plan Gas programs, which guarantee prices and long‑term contracts for producers, these measures have catalyzed investment from both domestic and foreign companies. The energy ministry envisions US$30 billion in annual energy exports by 2030. A consortium led by Argentina’s state‑controlled YPF, along with Pan American Energy, Pampa Energía and Harbour Energy, is fast‑tracking a floating LNG project expected to start shipping liquefied natural gas in 2027. The first phase has secured approval to export 11.5 million cubic metres of natural gas per day under a 30‑year licence, potentially generating about US$1 billion a year in revenue.

Economic impact and regional dynamics
This shale boom is reshaping Argentina’s economy. In 2025 the energy trade balance recorded a surplus of about US$7.8 billion — the largest in more than three decades. Energy exports reached record levels, providing much‑needed foreign currency to a country long plagued by chronic shortages. President Javier Milei’s administration sees the sector as a pillar of his broader strategy to stabilize public finances and attract private investment. Investors have responded: new drilling has propelled Argentina into the top tier of Latin American producers. By late 2025 the country ranked fourth in the region behind Brazil, Venezuela and Guyana, having briefly overtaken Colombia before Guyana’s offshore megaprojects came online. With projections for shale output to exceed one million barrels per day by the end of the decade, Argentina could soon challenge Venezuela’s fading dominance in regional oil markets.

The shift also has geopolitical implications. Argentina’s gas will soon flow north to Chile, Uruguay and potentially Brazil, reducing those countries’ reliance on Bolivian and LNG supplies. Meanwhile, Venezuela’s stagnation and the uncertainty surrounding sanctions have created openings for other producers. Even with some restrictions eased in early 2026 to allow U.S. companies to trade Venezuelan oil, production constraints remain and exports are effectively supervised by Washington. Export volumes around 800,000 barrels per day in early 2026 were still below what the country shipped a decade ago. As a result, Latin American refiners and importers are increasingly looking to Argentina’s light sweet crude and Brazil’s offshore barrels, rather than Venezuela’s heavy grades.

Challenges and prospects
Despite the upbeat trajectory, Argentina faces challenges. Rapid production growth has outpaced pipeline and storage capacity, leading to occasional flaring or forced well shut‑ins. Unconventional gas output dipped in late 2025 due to maintenance and infrastructure bottlenecks. The success of the energy export strategy hinges on finishing major pipelines on time, maintaining policy consistency across changes of government, and managing environmental impacts. Shale development requires large volumes of water and can provoke local opposition if not handled responsibly. Additionally, although the Ley Bases and investment regime are promising, Argentina’s history of policy reversals makes long‑term investors cautious.

Still, the contrast with Venezuela could not be starker. While one country struggles to maintain basic production amid sanctions, corruption and crumbling equipment, the other is building pipelines, signing long‑term LNG contracts, and capturing the attention of global energy investors. For those watching Latin America’s oil map, the message is clear: the future of the region’s hydrocarbon story may lie in the shale fields of Neuquén rather than the degraded refineries of Carabobo. The era when Venezuela’s vast reserves automatically translated into influence is over. Argentina, once a minor player, is now poised to become a significant exporter and a driver of regional energy integration. Investors, policymakers and neighbours are increasingly looking south of the Andes for supply security and economic opportunity.



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Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

India's island choke point

The language of revenge makes for an arresting headline, but it obscures the more consequential story unfolding on Great Nicobar. India is not constructing a mechanism that can simply be activated to halt Chinese trade. It is attempting to convert a remote and sparsely developed island into a forward maritime hub from which it can observe strategic shipping routes, support naval and air operations and, in a serious crisis, make Chinese access to the Indian Ocean more difficult and expensive.Great Nicobar is the southernmost large island in India’s Andaman and Nicobar archipelago. It lies closer to Indonesia than to the Indian mainland and sits near the approaches to the Strait of Malacca, one of the most important maritime passages in the world. The island is also approximately forty nautical miles from a heavily used east-west shipping corridor. That geography gives Great Nicobar a significance far greater than its size or population might suggest. Vessels travelling between the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and the South China Sea must pass through a limited number of navigable channels. The Strait of Malacca remains the principal commercial route because alternatives through the Sunda and Lombok straits generally require longer voyages, more fuel and additional time.For China, whose economic strength depends heavily on seaborne exports, raw materials and imported energy, this is a persistent strategic vulnerability. For India, the same geography offers an opportunity to transform an isolated territory into an advanced observation, logistics and deterrence platform.A nine-billion-dollar transformationThe Great Nicobar development programme is commonly described as an investment worth roughly nine billion dollars, although its estimated cost has changed as the plans have been revised. The wider programme is currently valued at approximately 81,000 crore rupees and covers around 166 square kilometres.It combines four interconnected projects. The first is a deep-water international container transhipment port at Galathea Bay. The second is a new airport intended for both civilian and military use. The third is a gas and solar power complex with a planned capacity of 450 megavolt-amperes. The fourth is a new township with roads, water systems, communications, public services and industrial infrastructure.The initial two phases of the proposed port were appraised in 2026 at a combined cost of 48,862 crore rupees. They are designed to provide twelve container berths and an annual handling capacity of 11.8 million twenty-foot equivalent units. Longer-term plans could expand the port still further. Natural water depths of between twenty and thirty metres are among Galathea Bay’s most important commercial advantages. They could allow the terminal to receive the largest modern container ships without the severe draught restrictions encountered at many existing Indian ports.The new airport is equally significant. With an estimated investment of around 13,000 crore rupees, it is intended to accommodate civilian aircraft as well as military transports, maritime patrol aircraft and combat aircraft. Operational control is expected to rest with the Indian Navy, giving New Delhi a much larger aviation platform in the south-eastern Indian Ocean than is available at the existing airfield on the island.The port, airport and power facilities therefore cannot be understood as separate construction schemes. Together, they are intended to create the permanent logistical foundation required for sustained economic and military activity.India wants its cargo backThe commercial argument behind the project is substantial. India has historically routed a large share of its container transhipment traffic through foreign ports, particularly Colombo, Singapore and Port Klang. Containers arriving on large intercontinental vessels are frequently transferred at those hubs to smaller feeder ships serving Indian destinations.That arrangement costs India revenue, creates dependence on infrastructure outside its jurisdiction and reduces its influence over regional shipping networks. A competitive deep-water terminal at Great Nicobar could intercept cargo moving between the Indian Ocean and East Asia while serving ports on India’s eastern coast, Bangladesh, Myanmar and other parts of Southeast Asia. The location is attractive, but geography alone does not create a successful port. Shipping companies choose terminals according to price, reliability, vessel turnaround times, customs efficiency, digital systems, frequency of feeder connections and the availability of repair, storage and bunkering services. Galathea Bay will have to compete not only with Singapore, Colombo and Port Klang but also with emerging Indian facilities such as Vizhinjam.The financial structure reveals how difficult that competition may be. The first two port phases have been designed as a public-private partnership, with Indian-controlled ownership and a proposed concession period of fifty years. Project planners sought viability-gap assistance of 12,230 crore rupees to reduce the risk for private investors. Financial appraisers concluded that the requested support did not fit the standard viability-gap funding framework. The ports ministry may therefore have to provide capital assistance from its own budget or seek a separate political decision. This is a crucial detail. It suggests that Great Nicobar’s strategic value may justify public expenditure that would be difficult to defend on commercial returns alone.In other words, the port is not merely a business venture. It is strategic infrastructure with a commercial component.What the island changes for ChinaThe most immediate military benefit would be improved maritime domain awareness. Radar installations, long-range aircraft, drones, naval vessels and intelligence systems based closer to the Malacca approaches would give India a clearer picture of movements between the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Chinese naval deployments in the Indian Ocean have become more regular over the past two decades. Warships assigned to anti-piracy patrols, survey vessels, submarines and support ships have all demonstrated Beijing’s growing ability to operate far from the Chinese coastline. Access to ports developed or operated by Chinese companies has also increased Beijing’s logistical options across the region.A fully equipped Great Nicobar hub would allow India to monitor those movements from a much more advantageous position. It could support patrol aircraft for longer periods, shorten response times and provide fuel, maintenance and communications closer to the principal maritime routes. This does not mean that India could effortlessly close the Strait of Malacca. The expression “choking Beijing” is strategically evocative but operationally misleading. The strait is bordered by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. India does not control it, and any attempt to block commercial shipping would constitute an extraordinary act with global economic and military consequences. Maintaining an effective blockade against a major power would require persistent naval and air superiority, extensive intelligence, secure logistics and cooperation from other states.Great Nicobar is therefore not a switch with which India can turn off Chinese trade. Its importance lies in deterrence and strategic uncertainty. It could increase the number of assets China would need to protect its sea lanes, make covert naval movement more difficult and force Beijing to devote greater attention to the eastern Indian Ocean.Alternative Chinese routes do exist. Ships can use the Sunda or Lombok straits, while pipelines through Myanmar and overland corridors through Pakistan provide limited diversification. None of them can easily replace the scale, efficiency and established commercial networks associated with the Malacca route. India does not need the ability to stop every Chinese vessel to gain leverage. It needs the credible capacity to observe movements, complicate operations and impose additional costs during a confrontation.A forward base must also surviveBuilding runways, quays and radar stations is only the beginning. A remote installation becomes strategically valuable only when it can continue operating under pressure.Great Nicobar will require secure fuel storage, ammunition facilities, maintenance depots, air-defence systems, hardened aircraft shelters, redundant communications and dependable supply links. It must also be protected against submarine activity, missile attacks, cyber disruption and sabotage. The island’s distance from India’s main industrial and military centres creates a logistical challenge. Personnel, spare parts, construction materials and emergency supplies must travel long distances by sea or air. Severe weather can interrupt those connections, while the narrow local infrastructure base leaves little room for failure.A highly visible airport and port without adequate protection could become targets rather than instruments of leverage. The strategic value of Great Nicobar will consequently depend less on ceremonial inaugurations than on the unglamorous systems that keep aircraft flying, ships supplied and sensors functioning during a crisis.The project could also assist India in humanitarian relief and disaster response. A major airport, deep-water port and permanent logistics network would provide a forward base for operations after cyclones, earthquakes or tsunamis across Southeast Asia. Such capabilities would strengthen India’s claim to be a dependable regional security partner rather than merely a country seeking military advantage over China.The ecological price cannot be hiddenGreat Nicobar is not an empty piece of territory. It contains tropical rainforest, mangroves, coral habitats and numerous endemic species. Galathea Bay is associated with the nesting grounds of giant leatherback turtles, while the island is also home to the Nicobar megapode, saltwater crocodiles and other vulnerable wildlife. The project involves the diversion of approximately 130.75 square kilometres of forest land. Estimates indicate that close to one million trees could eventually be affected, although the government maintains that significant green areas will remain within the wider development zone.Authorities have imposed dozens of environmental conditions and planned compensatory afforestation covering more than ninety-seven square kilometres. The government also argues that the large majority of Great Nicobar will remain within forests, national parks, protected areas, a biosphere reserve and tribal conservation zones. The National Green Tribunal declined to stop the development in February 2026, concluding that there was no sufficient basis for overturning the existing environmental and coastal clearances. It nevertheless required strict compliance with the protective conditions.The ruling did not eliminate the underlying concerns. An island rainforest is a complex and isolated ecosystem that cannot simply be recreated through tree planting elsewhere. Forest loss can alter freshwater systems, coastal stability and wildlife migration even when a large percentage of the island formally remains protected.There is also a profound human dimension. Great Nicobar is home to the Nicobarese and the Shompen, one of the world’s most isolated indigenous communities. The government says the project will not physically displace them and has promised dedicated safeguards. The greater danger may arise from indirect contact. A large influx of construction workers, officials, traders and future residents could expose isolated communities to disease, cultural disruption and pressure on traditional territory. Preventing direct displacement will not be sufficient if the surrounding social and ecological conditions are transformed beyond recognition.A landscape shaped by disasterThe island lies in a seismically active region. The Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 devastated Great Nicobar, destroyed settlements and caused severe land subsidence at its southern end. Any new airport, port, power plant and township must therefore be designed for conditions far more demanding than those facing ordinary mainland infrastructure. Breakwaters, evacuation routes, emergency power systems, elevated storage, earthquake-resistant construction and redundant communications will all be essential. The financial cost of such resilience is high, but ignoring it would expose the entire programme to catastrophic failure.Environmental protection and disaster planning are not secondary obstacles to the strategic project. They are part of its strategic credibility. A port delayed by legal challenges, damaged by a natural disaster or surrounded by social conflict would weaken rather than strengthen India’s position.The project is not yet a finished weaponThe most important distinction is between ambition and operational reality. Great Nicobar is not currently capable of controlling the Malacca approaches on the scale suggested by dramatic descriptions of the project. In March 2026, the relevant public-private partnership committee recommended the first two port phases for further administrative consideration, subject to financial, contractual and ownership conditions. The airport had entered initial tendering, while the power plant and township remained at different stages of appraisal and approval.The latest public timetable indicates that physical work on the Galathea Bay port is expected to begin in 2028. That schedule is later than earlier expectations that an initial port phase might already be operating by that year. Even after construction begins, completing the full island transformation will require many years and potentially several decades. Financing, private-sector participation, environmental monitoring, supply-chain constraints and construction in a remote seismic location could all affect the schedule. Cost escalation is also likely to remain a concern as designs become more detailed.China will not stand still during that period. Beijing can strengthen alternative routes, expand naval deployments, increase cooperation with regional ports and develop capabilities intended to threaten Indian installations. Great Nicobar is therefore part of a continuing strategic competition rather than a final answer to it.India’s real revenge is strategic patienceDescribing the Great Nicobar project as India’s revenge on China captures the emotional appeal of a country turning geography against its principal Asian rival. Yet revenge is not the most accurate description. The project is better understood as an attempt to correct a long-standing imbalance. India possesses an island chain overlooking some of the world’s busiest sea routes, but for decades much of that geographical advantage remained underdeveloped. Great Nicobar represents an effort to convert position into capability.Success will not be measured by whether India can literally stop Chinese shipping. It will be measured by whether the island gives New Delhi reliable surveillance, faster military response, commercially viable port operations and a resilient logistics network without inflicting irreversible damage on the people and ecosystems already there.If those conditions are met, Great Nicobar could become one of India’s most consequential strategic investments. It would not choke Beijing in peacetime, but it could make China’s leaders think more carefully about the risks of confrontation in the Indian Ocean. That additional calculation is the true source of India’s leverage.