Coin Press - New York’s lost Luster

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New York’s lost Luster




New York City long prided itself on drawing the world’s brightest minds and deepest pockets. Yet the past decade has brought a slow ebb in the pool of people who power its economy. Population figures show the city’s ascent faltering: after years of growth, the number of residents began to decline in 2017 and then plunged by nearly half a million between April 2020 and July 2022. A modest rebound of about 120 000 people since 2022, largely through international migration, has not fully offset the losses. Domestic migration patterns reveal that most leavers initially head to suburbs around New York, but the states that gain the most are low‑tax, fast‑growing destinations such as Florida and Texas. High costs and quality‑of‑life concerns are recurring themes among those who leave.

Recent estimates released in 2025 show that New York’s pandemic‑era population decline is reversing. The city added about 87 000 residents between July 2023 and July 2024, lifting its total population to roughly 8.478 million. The state as a whole gained around 130 000 residents over the same period, recouping one‑third of the half‑million people lost between April 2020 and July 2022. These two consecutive years of growth reflect improved counts of international migration and shelter populations. Nevertheless, net domestic outmigration remains substantial—around 121 000 people in 2024—though that figure marks the lowest level since 2013 and is largely driven by low‑ and middle‑income households.

Millionaires and high‑earners: shrinking share of the nation’s wealth
New York’s public services depend heavily on a small number of wealthy residents. In 2022 millionaires represented less than 1 % of tax filers yet provided 44 % of state and 40 % of city personal‑income tax revenue. That reliance is threatened by a marked decline in the city’s share of national wealth. From 2010 to 2022 New York’s share of the United States’ millionaire households fell from 12.7 % to 8.7 %, dropping the state from second to fourth place behind California, Florida and Texas. While the number of millionaires in New York almost doubled during that period, comparable households more than tripled in California and Texas and quadrupled in Florida. Had New York retained its 2010 share of millionaires, the state and city would have collected about US$13 billion more in personal‑income tax in 2022.

The erosion is visible in migration data. Between 2019 and 2020, tax filings show that the number of city residents earning between US$150 000 and US$750 000 fell by nearly six percent, while those making more than US$750 000 dropped by almost ten percent. A study of address‑change data compiled by the state’s tax department found that in 2020 and 2021 more than six percent of millionaire households updated their addresses to locations outside New York; by 2023 that rate had fallen to below three percent, but it remains higher than before the pandemic. Meanwhile, high earners pay a combined state and city marginal tax rate that can exceed 13.5 %, a national high. Moving to nearby Connecticut can save a household earning US$1 million more than US$70 000 a year in state and local income taxes, and a US$5 million property can attract roughly US$23 000–48 000 less in annual property taxes. Such disparities give affluent households incentives to move without losing access to New York’s cultural attractions.

The pull of the Sun Belt and other competitors
The magnetism of Florida and Texas rests not only on their sunny climates. Neither state levies an income tax, and both boast lower living costs. Census data released in January 2025 show that Florida gained around 64 000 residents from other states between July 2023 and July 2024, while Texas added more than 85 000. During the same period New York recorded a net domestic migration loss of roughly 121 000 people. A report tracking wealth flows found that between 2013 and 2022 New York lost about US$517.5 billion in cumulative resident income as households moved away, while New Jersey lost US$170.1 billion; Florida on the other hand gained over US$1 trillion. Average incomes of people relocating from New York to Florida’s Miami‑Dade and Palm Beach counties exceeded US$266 000 and US$189 000 respectively.

Low taxes are not the only attraction. A detailed look at job trends reveals that New York is slowly losing ground in industries it once dominated. Since 1990 the share of city workers employed in finance and insurance has slipped from 11.5 % to 7.7 %. Of the 233 000 finance jobs created nationwide over the past five years, the state captured only 19 000. Major firms have been shifting managers and back‑office staff to lower‑cost markets such as Dallas, Salt Lake City, Alpharetta (Georgia) and Charlotte. New York’s combined state and local corporate tax rate can exceed 18 %, according to business associations; regulatory mandates on hiring practices and the high cost of compliance further add to operating expenses. These pressures encourage both start‑ups and established institutions to look elsewhere.

Lifestyle factors compound the economic calculus. Median monthly rent in the city now exceeds US$3 600, more than twice the US$1 700 average across the 50 largest U.S. cities. Annual nursery‑care fees average about US$26 000 and basic car insurance costs roughly US$1 729—both among the highest in the country. The federal cap on state‑and‑local tax deductions introduced in 2017 has increased effective tax rates for wealthy residents. High costs of living and limited deductions are cited by some of the city’s billionaire investors, including Paul Singer and Carl Icahn, who moved to Florida in recent years.

Business relocations and the corporate drip
Concerns over the city’s direction intensified after proposals for higher income and corporate taxes gained traction in the 2025 mayoral election. In the weeks following the vote, state records in Florida show that at least 27 firms registered by New York owners applied to expand operations there, while nine filed to relocate entirely. The mayor of Boca Raton reported that four corporate headquarters are already planning moves to his city, and he has received “too many to count” inquiries since the election. Local economic‑development officials in South Florida confirm that investment bankers and hedge‑fund managers are increasingly scouting office space. Civic leaders have responded by offering targeted incentives and promising to address growing pains such as housing and transport.

At home the city’s business landscape is changing. A moving‑industry report based on 24 million recorded moves found that from May 2024 to October 2025 New York lost 8 400 jobs in finance and more than 1 200 chain retail stores closed. While the data do not capture every corporate decision, they suggest that the losses are concentrated in high‑paying sectors that underpin the city’s tax base. Job growth since the pandemic has been skewed toward lower‑paid fields such as home healthcare and social assistance. Inflation‑adjusted private‑sector wages in New York fell 9 % between January 2020 and August 2025, whereas national wages rose 3 %.

Not just the wealthy: the middle‑class exodus
The narrative of billionaires fleeing masks a broader challenge. Data from the same moving‑industry report reveal that households earning between US$51 000 and US$200 000 account for the largest number of departures from New York City. People making US$51 000–100 000 recorded 66 158 outflows, followed closely by the US$101 000–200 000 group with 62 209. In contrast, departures among high‑income residents fell after the 2025 primary election. The report also notes that 88 % of newcomers earn under US$200 000, signalling a shift toward a lower‑income demographic. Working‑class and middle‑income households cite rising housing costs and the cost of raising children as primary reasons for leaving.

Research by an independent fiscal institute offers further nuance. After analysing eight years of migration records, the institute found that high earners typically move out of New York State at about one‑quarter the rate of other residents. The surge in wealthy departures during 2020 and 2021 was largely a temporary response to pandemic‑induced remote work. Migration rates for high earners returned to pre‑pandemic levels by 2022, and the state gained 17 500 millionaire households from 2020 through 2022 despite losing about 2 400. Statistical analysis showed no significant evidence that recent tax increases prompted high‑income migration; when affluent New Yorkers do move, they often choose other high‑tax states. Independent fact‑checkers note that working‑class New Yorkers, particularly Black and Hispanic residents and families with young children, leave at much higher rates than wealthy households.

Policy debates and social costs
Despite an improving population count, structural pressures remain. New York spends US$9 761 per resident on welfare and education—72 % more than Texas and 130 % more than Florida. Low‑income renters now devote 54 % of their income to rent, up from under 40 % in 1991; even a well‑paid professional must earn at least US$151 600 annually to ensure that rent on a studio consumes only 30 % of income. Without a rebound in finance or a dramatic housing boom, business leaders warn that New York could devolve into an “economically ordinary” US city, burdened by high rents and expanding welfare obligations.

Political debates have sharpened these tensions. The 2025 mayoral frontrunner, Zohran Mamdani, proposes adding a two‑percentage‑point surcharge on incomes above US$1 million and raising the corporate income‑tax rate to 11.5 % to fund universal childcare and free buses. Experts point out that tax‑induced mobility among high earners is small: studies by Northwestern University, the EU Tax Observatory and the Fiscal Policy Institute indicate that wealthy households rarely move solely because of tax differentials. Nevertheless, policy analysts caution that imposing the nation’s highest marginal rates could gradually erode the tax base.

Statistics from the Citizens Budget Commission show that more than 125 000 New Yorkers relocated to Florida between 2018 and 2022, carrying nearly US$14 billion in adjusted gross income. Such figures fuel both sides of the debate: proponents of higher taxes argue that migration flows are limited, while opponents warn that revenue losses could accelerate. The city’s 2025 “City of Yes” zoning reforms spurred construction of about 34 000 apartments in a single year, but housing supply remains tight. The interplay between taxes, housing costs and public services will determine whether New York regains its footing or continues to lose ground to lower‑cost competitors.

A city at a crossroads
New York’s appeal has always rested on its ability to offer unmatched cultural life, economic opportunity and diversity. The recent outflows of wealth, talent and businesses threaten this model. With millionaires comprising less than one percent of residents yet contributing nearly half of personal‑income tax revenue, the departure of even a few thousand people can blow a hole in public finances. The value proposition for middle‑income families is equally in jeopardy as housing and childcare costs soar. Meanwhile, the definancialisation of the local economy and the relocation of corporate headquarters erode the city’s job base. Taken together, these trends give credence to the image of a city that is “sinking” under the weight of its own costs.

Yet the picture is not one of unrelenting decline. International migration, natural population growth and inbound investment continue to sustain New York. Surveys show that residents still value the city’s parks, cultural institutions and transit network despite concerns about safety and affordability. The challenge for policymakers is to balance progressive social aims with economic competitiveness: to improve public services and housing affordability while keeping tax rates and business costs from driving away the very people and companies who fund them.



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Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Да здравствует Украина

Es lebe die Ukraine - Да здравствует Украина - Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Nech žije Ukrajina - Länge leve Ukraina - תחי אוקראינה - Lang leve Oekraïne - Да живее Украйна - Elagu Ukraina - Kauan eläköön Ukraina - Vive l'Ukraine - Ζήτω η Ουκρανία - 乌克兰万岁 - Viva Ucrania - Ať žije Ukrajina - Çok yaşa Ukrayna - Viva a Ucrânia - Trăiască Ucraina - ウクライナ万歳 - Tegyvuoja Ukraina - Lai dzīvo Ukraina - Viva l'Ucraina - Hidup Ukraina - تحيا أوكرانيا - Vivat Ucraina - ขอให้ยูเครนจงเจริญ - Ucraina muôn năm - ژوندی دی وی اوکراین - Yashasin Ukraina - Озак яшә Украина - Živjela Ukrajina - 우크라이나 만세 - Mabuhay ang Ukraine - Lenge leve Ukraina - Nyob ntev Ukraine - Да живее Украина - გაუმარჯოს უკრაინას - Hidup Ukraine - Vivu Ukrainio - Længe leve Ukraine - Živjela Ukrajina - Жыве Украіна - Yaşasın Ukrayna - Lengi lifi Úkraína - Lank lewe die Oekraïne

Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

Europe’s arms money maze

Europe’s rearmament has acquired an uncomfortable companion: uncertainty about what the money actually buys. In Germany, an argument over defence-related borrowing has raised questions about whether exceptional debt is producing genuinely additional expenditure. In Estonia, unreliable inventory records and disputed ammunition contracts have brought ministerial accountability into the foreground. These are different problems, but they meet at the same point: a larger budget is not a reliable measure of a stronger defence.The contention that nobody knows what is happening to Europe’s weapons money goes too far. Budgets are published, procurement bodies operate and auditors are identifying failures. Nor do these cases establish that funds have disappeared into Russian hands or that the Kremlin engineered the difficulties. The more defensible conclusion is also more useful: Europe cannot judge rearmament by the volume of money announced. It must establish what has been purchased, accepted and made ready for use.That distinction matters strategically. An adversary need not steal the money to benefit from delays, unusable equipment or a loss of confidence in the governments spending it.What the €800 billion actually meansThe scale of the spending is substantial. Combined defence expenditure across the European Union reached €418 billion in 2025, with €454 billion estimated for 2026. Those annual totals should not be confused with the much larger, multi-year headline attached to the EU’s rearmament financing plan. The widely cited €800 billion is potential financing capacity, not a single fund already transferred to arms manufacturers. Its main components are approximately €650 billion in possible additional national expenditure enabled by fiscal flexibility over four years, and €150 billion in loans through the Security Action for Europe instrument, known as SAFE. The loans must be repaid; the additional national spending depends on governments choosing to use the available room.These distinctions are indispensable to any honest assessment. Permission to borrow is not an order placed with a factory. An order is not a completed delivery. Equipment delivered to a warehouse is not necessarily equipment that troops can operate, maintain and replenish. Treating all these stages as interchangeable allows governments to claim progress before the military benefit exists.It also creates a temptation to add together figures that describe different periods or overlapping flows of money. A credible account of rearmament should distinguish financing arrangements from annual expenditure, and both from verified outputs. Otherwise, the public is left comparing impressive totals whose practical meaning is unclear.Germany’s argument over additional spendingOn 10 September, the Ifo Institute challenged the use of Germany’s defence-related borrowing exemption. It calculated an €11 billion gap between additional borrowing and the year-on-year increase in the relevant expenditure. Ifo’s argument was that 38.5 per cent of the additional debt had not produced additional defence and security spending, instead freeing room for other purposes in the ordinary budget. The Finance Ministry rejected the comparison as legally and methodologically flawed. The exemption concerns qualifying expenditure above one per cent of gross domestic product, rather than an increase over the previous year. Ifo, for its part, said its analysis concerned additional spending, not constitutionality.This is not evidence that €11 billion was stolen. It is a dispute over the relationship between an exceptional borrowing mechanism and the political expectation attached to it. The difference is important: an arrangement can comply with its legal design while delivering less additional expenditure than citizens understand the announcement to promise.The practical question is whether new borrowing expands defence capacity or changes the way existing commitments are financed. Those outcomes can coexist within the same budget. Refinancing an established obligation may be lawful and fiscally useful, but it should not be presented as though an equivalent amount of new military capability has been purchased. Germany’s dispute therefore points to a straightforward transparency test. Governments should identify the expenditure that would have occurred anyway, the genuinely additional commitments and the delivery milestones attached to them. Without that comparison, the argument risks becoming a contest between accounting definitions while the central question—what the armed forces actually gain—remains unanswered.Estonia’s warning from the accountsIn Estonia, the problems are more immediate. Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur announced on 2 September that he would step down, accepting political responsibility for failures exposed in defence administration and procurement. His announcement did not amount to an admission of personal corruption.The National Audit Office issued a qualified opinion concerning defence inventories valued at approximately €1.2 billion because their quantities, composition and valuation could not be established reliably. It also questioned an unexplained retrospective adjustment of €99.7 million to the previous year’s inventory figures. That does not mean €1.2 billion of weapons has vanished. An unreliable balance is not the same thing as a proven loss. It means the records are insufficiently dependable to establish what the balance represents—a serious weakness in any organisation, and particularly consequential in one responsible for military readiness.Inadequate records can obstruct decisions long before a final financial loss is demonstrated. Commanders and purchasing authorities need to distinguish usable stock from equipment awaiting inspection, repair or replacement. If those categories are unclear, another procurement decision may rest on a mistaken understanding of what is already available.Auditing is therefore more than an exercise in retrospective blame. A trustworthy inventory helps determine what must be bought next, how urgently it is needed and whether previous purchases fulfilled their purpose. Poor accounting can undermine operational planning even where no theft is established.Paid for is not the same as usableEstonia’s ammunition procurement for Ukraine illustrates a second difficulty. The audit identified disputed advance payments and warned of a potential exposure to the state budget of around €70 million. That figure describes a risk, not a final, adjudicated loss.The controversy includes contracts involving the Italian company Datasel. Pevkur described ammunition delivered under the disputed arrangements as incomplete and of insufficient quality, rather than simply non-existent. Datasel disputes the criticism and has said that goods delivered and invoiced were worth approximately €58 million against about €59 million in advances. The company’s account is a contested position, not a judicial finding.The disagreement exposes a distinction that matters beyond this particular supplier. A payment record, an invoice, the physical presence of goods and acceptance of those goods for their intended use answer different questions. A supplier may point to shipments while a purchasing authority disputes whether the contractual requirement has been met. The existence of equipment does not, by itself, resolve an argument over quality or completeness.For Ukraine, the decisive consideration is usable military support. For the public authorities financing it, the additional questions are whether payment conditions were appropriate, inspections were timely and contractual protections can recover money when performance is disputed. Those questions should be settled through evidence and the relevant proceedings, not through premature declarations of guilt.The procurement lesson is nonetheless clear. Emergency purchasing needs traceable contracts, independently verified acceptance and a dependable record linking each payment to performance. Urgency may justify faster decisions. It cannot make the distinction between an invoice and a functioning delivery disappear.An oversight system split across institutionsEurope’s defence financing does not sit within a single system of scrutiny. National budgets, EU programmes, loans and off-budget arrangements have different institutional responsibilities. The European Court of Auditors’ September review described complex governance and uneven oversight arrangements, rather than a continent-wide absence of auditing.SAFE falls within the European Court of Auditors’ remit. The European Peace Facility, outside the ordinary EU budget, has its own College of Auditors. National defence expenditure is scrutinised through national institutions. The distinction is between different mandates, not between money that is automatically checked and money that is automatically unaccountable. The difficulty arises at the joins. A public explanation may follow the announcement of a financing package, while a procurement body follows the contract and an operational authority follows the equipment. Unless those accounts can be reconciled, citizens and legislators may struggle to establish the complete journey from political promise to accepted delivery.Secrecy complicates that task, but it need not prevent it. Publishing ammunition locations or technical vulnerabilities would be irresponsible. Giving properly authorised auditors access to contracts, inspections and payment records is a different matter. The need to protect operational information should not become a general excuse for withholding financial evidence.Nor should procurement integrity be treated as a rival to speed. Clearly assigned responsibility, verifiable milestones and early checks can prevent disputes from developing into expensive attempts to recover money after the event. The relevant choice is between controls that work during procurement and explanations demanded after something has gone wrong.Where Putin could benefitThese failures do not establish that Vladimir Putin has obtained everything he wanted. A Europe that turns rising expenditure into effective forces would represent a very different outcome. There is also no demonstrated Russian role in the particular German budget dispute or the Estonian accounting and contractual problems described here.The potential advantage for Moscow is indirect. Delayed or disputed deliveries can leave the intended recipient weaker than the expenditure suggests. Confusing financial claims can make it harder to defend further commitments. A succession of procurement controversies could erode confidence not only in individual contracts, but in the wider case for supporting Ukraine and strengthening European defence.That is a strategic risk, not proof of an accomplished Russian victory. The public identification of problems is itself evidence that scrutiny exists. A minister accepting political responsibility, auditors challenging unreliable balances and a government being pressed to explain its borrowing are mechanisms through which democratic systems can correct failure. Their value depends on what happens afterwards.The answer is neither to abandon rearmament nor to shield it from criticism. Governments should report progress in terms that connect money to results: contracts awarded, payments made, equipment accepted and capabilities available, with sensitive details reserved for secure oversight. Disputed transactions should remain visible until resolved rather than disappearing beneath the next spending announcement.Europe does not need to prove its determination by producing another larger number. It needs to demonstrate that the money already committed is becoming usable strength. Until it does, the distance between those two things remains an opportunity for the adversary it is trying to deter.