Coin Press - New York’s lost Luster

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New York’s lost Luster




New York City long prided itself on drawing the world’s brightest minds and deepest pockets. Yet the past decade has brought a slow ebb in the pool of people who power its economy. Population figures show the city’s ascent faltering: after years of growth, the number of residents began to decline in 2017 and then plunged by nearly half a million between April 2020 and July 2022. A modest rebound of about 120 000 people since 2022, largely through international migration, has not fully offset the losses. Domestic migration patterns reveal that most leavers initially head to suburbs around New York, but the states that gain the most are low‑tax, fast‑growing destinations such as Florida and Texas. High costs and quality‑of‑life concerns are recurring themes among those who leave.

Recent estimates released in 2025 show that New York’s pandemic‑era population decline is reversing. The city added about 87 000 residents between July 2023 and July 2024, lifting its total population to roughly 8.478 million. The state as a whole gained around 130 000 residents over the same period, recouping one‑third of the half‑million people lost between April 2020 and July 2022. These two consecutive years of growth reflect improved counts of international migration and shelter populations. Nevertheless, net domestic outmigration remains substantial—around 121 000 people in 2024—though that figure marks the lowest level since 2013 and is largely driven by low‑ and middle‑income households.

Millionaires and high‑earners: shrinking share of the nation’s wealth
New York’s public services depend heavily on a small number of wealthy residents. In 2022 millionaires represented less than 1 % of tax filers yet provided 44 % of state and 40 % of city personal‑income tax revenue. That reliance is threatened by a marked decline in the city’s share of national wealth. From 2010 to 2022 New York’s share of the United States’ millionaire households fell from 12.7 % to 8.7 %, dropping the state from second to fourth place behind California, Florida and Texas. While the number of millionaires in New York almost doubled during that period, comparable households more than tripled in California and Texas and quadrupled in Florida. Had New York retained its 2010 share of millionaires, the state and city would have collected about US$13 billion more in personal‑income tax in 2022.

The erosion is visible in migration data. Between 2019 and 2020, tax filings show that the number of city residents earning between US$150 000 and US$750 000 fell by nearly six percent, while those making more than US$750 000 dropped by almost ten percent. A study of address‑change data compiled by the state’s tax department found that in 2020 and 2021 more than six percent of millionaire households updated their addresses to locations outside New York; by 2023 that rate had fallen to below three percent, but it remains higher than before the pandemic. Meanwhile, high earners pay a combined state and city marginal tax rate that can exceed 13.5 %, a national high. Moving to nearby Connecticut can save a household earning US$1 million more than US$70 000 a year in state and local income taxes, and a US$5 million property can attract roughly US$23 000–48 000 less in annual property taxes. Such disparities give affluent households incentives to move without losing access to New York’s cultural attractions.

The pull of the Sun Belt and other competitors
The magnetism of Florida and Texas rests not only on their sunny climates. Neither state levies an income tax, and both boast lower living costs. Census data released in January 2025 show that Florida gained around 64 000 residents from other states between July 2023 and July 2024, while Texas added more than 85 000. During the same period New York recorded a net domestic migration loss of roughly 121 000 people. A report tracking wealth flows found that between 2013 and 2022 New York lost about US$517.5 billion in cumulative resident income as households moved away, while New Jersey lost US$170.1 billion; Florida on the other hand gained over US$1 trillion. Average incomes of people relocating from New York to Florida’s Miami‑Dade and Palm Beach counties exceeded US$266 000 and US$189 000 respectively.

Low taxes are not the only attraction. A detailed look at job trends reveals that New York is slowly losing ground in industries it once dominated. Since 1990 the share of city workers employed in finance and insurance has slipped from 11.5 % to 7.7 %. Of the 233 000 finance jobs created nationwide over the past five years, the state captured only 19 000. Major firms have been shifting managers and back‑office staff to lower‑cost markets such as Dallas, Salt Lake City, Alpharetta (Georgia) and Charlotte. New York’s combined state and local corporate tax rate can exceed 18 %, according to business associations; regulatory mandates on hiring practices and the high cost of compliance further add to operating expenses. These pressures encourage both start‑ups and established institutions to look elsewhere.

Lifestyle factors compound the economic calculus. Median monthly rent in the city now exceeds US$3 600, more than twice the US$1 700 average across the 50 largest U.S. cities. Annual nursery‑care fees average about US$26 000 and basic car insurance costs roughly US$1 729—both among the highest in the country. The federal cap on state‑and‑local tax deductions introduced in 2017 has increased effective tax rates for wealthy residents. High costs of living and limited deductions are cited by some of the city’s billionaire investors, including Paul Singer and Carl Icahn, who moved to Florida in recent years.

Business relocations and the corporate drip
Concerns over the city’s direction intensified after proposals for higher income and corporate taxes gained traction in the 2025 mayoral election. In the weeks following the vote, state records in Florida show that at least 27 firms registered by New York owners applied to expand operations there, while nine filed to relocate entirely. The mayor of Boca Raton reported that four corporate headquarters are already planning moves to his city, and he has received “too many to count” inquiries since the election. Local economic‑development officials in South Florida confirm that investment bankers and hedge‑fund managers are increasingly scouting office space. Civic leaders have responded by offering targeted incentives and promising to address growing pains such as housing and transport.

At home the city’s business landscape is changing. A moving‑industry report based on 24 million recorded moves found that from May 2024 to October 2025 New York lost 8 400 jobs in finance and more than 1 200 chain retail stores closed. While the data do not capture every corporate decision, they suggest that the losses are concentrated in high‑paying sectors that underpin the city’s tax base. Job growth since the pandemic has been skewed toward lower‑paid fields such as home healthcare and social assistance. Inflation‑adjusted private‑sector wages in New York fell 9 % between January 2020 and August 2025, whereas national wages rose 3 %.

Not just the wealthy: the middle‑class exodus
The narrative of billionaires fleeing masks a broader challenge. Data from the same moving‑industry report reveal that households earning between US$51 000 and US$200 000 account for the largest number of departures from New York City. People making US$51 000–100 000 recorded 66 158 outflows, followed closely by the US$101 000–200 000 group with 62 209. In contrast, departures among high‑income residents fell after the 2025 primary election. The report also notes that 88 % of newcomers earn under US$200 000, signalling a shift toward a lower‑income demographic. Working‑class and middle‑income households cite rising housing costs and the cost of raising children as primary reasons for leaving.

Research by an independent fiscal institute offers further nuance. After analysing eight years of migration records, the institute found that high earners typically move out of New York State at about one‑quarter the rate of other residents. The surge in wealthy departures during 2020 and 2021 was largely a temporary response to pandemic‑induced remote work. Migration rates for high earners returned to pre‑pandemic levels by 2022, and the state gained 17 500 millionaire households from 2020 through 2022 despite losing about 2 400. Statistical analysis showed no significant evidence that recent tax increases prompted high‑income migration; when affluent New Yorkers do move, they often choose other high‑tax states. Independent fact‑checkers note that working‑class New Yorkers, particularly Black and Hispanic residents and families with young children, leave at much higher rates than wealthy households.

Policy debates and social costs
Despite an improving population count, structural pressures remain. New York spends US$9 761 per resident on welfare and education—72 % more than Texas and 130 % more than Florida. Low‑income renters now devote 54 % of their income to rent, up from under 40 % in 1991; even a well‑paid professional must earn at least US$151 600 annually to ensure that rent on a studio consumes only 30 % of income. Without a rebound in finance or a dramatic housing boom, business leaders warn that New York could devolve into an “economically ordinary” US city, burdened by high rents and expanding welfare obligations.

Political debates have sharpened these tensions. The 2025 mayoral frontrunner, Zohran Mamdani, proposes adding a two‑percentage‑point surcharge on incomes above US$1 million and raising the corporate income‑tax rate to 11.5 % to fund universal childcare and free buses. Experts point out that tax‑induced mobility among high earners is small: studies by Northwestern University, the EU Tax Observatory and the Fiscal Policy Institute indicate that wealthy households rarely move solely because of tax differentials. Nevertheless, policy analysts caution that imposing the nation’s highest marginal rates could gradually erode the tax base.

Statistics from the Citizens Budget Commission show that more than 125 000 New Yorkers relocated to Florida between 2018 and 2022, carrying nearly US$14 billion in adjusted gross income. Such figures fuel both sides of the debate: proponents of higher taxes argue that migration flows are limited, while opponents warn that revenue losses could accelerate. The city’s 2025 “City of Yes” zoning reforms spurred construction of about 34 000 apartments in a single year, but housing supply remains tight. The interplay between taxes, housing costs and public services will determine whether New York regains its footing or continues to lose ground to lower‑cost competitors.

A city at a crossroads
New York’s appeal has always rested on its ability to offer unmatched cultural life, economic opportunity and diversity. The recent outflows of wealth, talent and businesses threaten this model. With millionaires comprising less than one percent of residents yet contributing nearly half of personal‑income tax revenue, the departure of even a few thousand people can blow a hole in public finances. The value proposition for middle‑income families is equally in jeopardy as housing and childcare costs soar. Meanwhile, the definancialisation of the local economy and the relocation of corporate headquarters erode the city’s job base. Taken together, these trends give credence to the image of a city that is “sinking” under the weight of its own costs.

Yet the picture is not one of unrelenting decline. International migration, natural population growth and inbound investment continue to sustain New York. Surveys show that residents still value the city’s parks, cultural institutions and transit network despite concerns about safety and affordability. The challenge for policymakers is to balance progressive social aims with economic competitiveness: to improve public services and housing affordability while keeping tax rates and business costs from driving away the very people and companies who fund them.



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Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

The dollar's strange turn

The dollar is strengthening in currency markets while its share of global foreign exchange reserves is declining. Central banks are accumulating gold, yet digital finance is creating additional channels for holding and transferring dollars. These developments reveal a monetary system changing in several directions at once, with consequences that extend well beyond the daily exchange rate.   By 13 November, the dollar was trading near its highest level against a basket of major currencies in 19 months. The euro stood at roughly $1.10, while the Japanese yen hovered close to 160 per dollar. Two-year US Treasury yields had risen by about 34 basis points over the week to around 4.87%, reflecting a substantial reassessment of the outlook for American interest rates. Those figures sit uneasily alongside another development. In the second quarter of 2026, the dollar’s share of global foreign exchange reserves fell to 56.70%. Its position in official reserve portfolios was becoming less concentrated even as its exchange rate subsequently strengthened.   The apparent contradiction becomes easier to understand once the dollar’s different functions are separated. Its price against other currencies, its place in central bank portfolios and its use in international payments respond to different incentives and operate over different timescales.   A rally driven by uncomfortable economicsThe latest advance has been supported by persistent inflation and expectations of tighter monetary policy. Stronger-than-expected inflation figures and firm comments from Federal Reserve officials pushed investors to reconsider how far US interest rates might rise.   Higher expected interest rates can support a currency by increasing the prospective return on assets denominated in it. That mechanism helps explain why troubling inflation news can coincide with a stronger dollar. Investors may respond to the anticipated policy response before the underlying economic problem has been resolved. The implications for households are quite different. A dollar that buys more euros or yen can still buy fewer goods and services at home. External currency strength and domestic purchasing power measure separate things.   For businesses, the effects are similarly uneven. A stronger dollar can reduce some import costs over time, while making American exports more expensive for foreign customers. Companies earning substantial revenues overseas can also face a reduction in the dollar value of those earnings. The exchange rate redistributes pressure across the economy; its rise alone says little about whether that pressure is becoming easier to bear.   The refuge is being judged more carefullyThe dollar’s behaviour during the tariff turmoil of April 2025 exposed a vulnerability that remains relevant. American equities fell, Treasury prices came under pressure and the currency weakened. In a conventional flight to safety, investors would normally expect stronger demand for dollars and US government debt.   The unusual combination mattered because the disturbance originated partly in American policy. Investors had to assess the reliability of the assets they would ordinarily use for protection. A rise in Treasury yields can therefore carry different messages. It may reflect stronger growth or expectations of higher policy rates. It can also reflect greater compensation demanded for inflation, uncertainty or the risks associated with holding longer-term debt. The direction of yields alone cannot distinguish between these explanations.   The lesson from that episode is that the dollar’s defensive qualities depend partly on the nature of the shock. Deep markets and abundant liquidity remain considerable advantages, but their value is reinforced by confidence in policy and institutions. That confidence has to survive periods when Washington itself becomes a source of uncertainty.   A smaller share of a larger reserve poolThe reserve figures require equally careful interpretation. Global foreign exchange reserves increased from $13.10 trillion in the first quarter of 2026 to $13.22 trillion in the second. Dollar-denominated holdings were broadly unchanged, while holdings in euros and several other currencies increased. The dollar’s share consequently declined from 57.18% to 56.70% without a corresponding large-scale reduction in the amount of dollars held. The euro’s share rose from 20.04% to 20.60%, while the Chinese renminbi reached 2.11%.   This distinction changes the meaning of the numbers. Reserve managers can diversify by directing additional funds towards other currencies while retaining their existing dollar portfolios. A declining percentage does not establish that central banks are collectively liquidating American assets.The latest quarterly changes also cannot be explained primarily by exchange-rate movements, whose valuation effects were limited during the period. Portfolio decisions and other asset-price changes played a greater role.   The resulting picture is one of gradual redistribution. The dollar remains far ahead of its nearest competitors, even as reserve managers reduce the concentration of their holdings.   Gold offers a different form of protectionGold provides another indication of changing reserve preferences. Estimated net purchases by central banks and other official institutions reached approximately 321 tonnes in the third quarter of 2026, bringing purchases during the first nine months to about 675 tonnes. These totals include estimates of activity that has not been publicly disclosed. Reported net purchases for the third quarter were around 120 tonnes, substantially below the estimated overall figure. That gap limits how confidently individual countries’ intentions can be inferred from the headline total.   Gold has an attraction that a government bond cannot replicate: the metal itself is no other institution’s liability. It can therefore serve a distinct purpose in portfolios designed to withstand political or financial disruption. It also pays no interest and can fluctuate sharply in price. Its accumulation indicates demand for diversification and resilience, but does not establish that it can assume the dollar’s functions in lending, invoicing and everyday settlement.   The dollar remains embedded in the machineryThe structure of international finance continues to favour the US currency. In April 2025, the dollar appeared on one side of 89.2% of foreign exchange transactions, compared with 88.4% in 2022. Average daily turnover across the global foreign exchange market reached approximately $9.6 trillion.   These figures measure trading activity, a different function from the accumulation of official reserves. Each currency transaction involves two currencies, so the dollar’s participation rate should not be interpreted as a share of worldwide savings or wealth. Its extensive use nevertheless demonstrates how deeply it is embedded in financial operations. Businesses borrow in dollars, investors hedge dollar exposures and financial institutions obtain dollar funding. Existing contracts and established markets create continuing demand even when some participants would prefer greater diversification.   Replacing that infrastructure requires liquid investment markets, dependable legal arrangements and the ability to move substantial sums without excessive cost. A competing payment platform or a bilateral agreement to use another currency can change particular transactions. Reproducing the full range of dollar financing remains a much larger undertaking.   Digital finance is carrying dollars into new placesOne of the most consequential changes is taking place through stablecoins: privately issued digital tokens designed to maintain a specified value, commonly one US dollar. These instruments can make dollar-denominated value accessible through digital wallets and trading platforms, including in places where conventional access to foreign-currency banking is limited. Their use creates another route through which households and businesses can save, transfer or transact in dollars.   The connection with American government debt is already substantial. Tether reported approximately $184 billion in USDT issuance and $132.4 billion in direct and indirect exposure to US Treasury bills at the end of September 2026. Its total reserve assets were approximately $191.5 billion. Those figures illustrate a financial link that can be overlooked in discussions of cryptocurrency. Demand for a privately issued digital dollar can support demand for the short-term securities used to back it. This creates an important possibility: governments may seek greater monetary independence while private users continue choosing dollar-denominated products. Official diversification and wider digital dollar access can develop simultaneously.   The arrangement also introduces additional dependencies. Users rely on an issuer’s reserves, redemption arrangements and operational systems. Digital access changes how dollar exposure is obtained; it does not eliminate the need to examine the institutions supporting it.   America’s borrowing needs remain a central weaknessThe expansion of dollar access takes place against a demanding fiscal background. The United States recorded a federal budget deficit of approximately $2.0 trillion in the fiscal year ending September 2026, equivalent to 6.2% of gross domestic product. Federal debt held by the public reached approximately 100% of GDP. Persistent borrowing requires sustained demand for government securities. The Treasury market’s size is an advantage for international investors because it offers an extensive supply of tradable assets. Maintaining confidence becomes more consequential as the volume of debt increases.   Higher interest rates complicate that relationship. They can support the dollar in currency markets while increasing financing costs as the government issues new debt and refinances maturing obligations. The immediate benefit to the exchange rate can therefore coexist with a worsening fiscal burden. Stablecoin reserves add a meaningful source of demand for short-term debt, but their importance should be kept in proportion. They cannot by themselves resolve the gap between federal revenue and expenditure or remove uncertainty about future borrowing costs.   The consequences reach beyond AmericaFor countries and companies with dollar liabilities but revenues in weaker local currencies, dollar appreciation can make debt service more expensive. Dollar-priced imports can also become harder to afford, complicating the work of central banks already facing domestic economic pressures.   These costs help explain the incentive to diversify. Yet the practical need to settle contracts, obtain financing and manage existing obligations can sustain dollar demand even among borrowers seeking to reduce their dependence. The evidence points towards a more differentiated monetary order. Reserve managers are spreading risk, digital platforms are broadening access to dollar instruments, and investors are examining American policy more closely.   What looks strange is the coexistence of these forces. A stronger exchange rate can accompany a smaller reserve share. Greater concern about US borrowing can coexist with continued demand for Treasury securities. Technologies intended to change finance can carry the dollar further into it. The decisive issue is how these relationships develop over time. America retains the benefits of a currency that much of the world continues to use. Preserving those benefits will depend on the credibility of the fiscal, monetary and institutional foundations beneath it.