Coin Press - Europe’s power shock

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Europe’s power shock




On 28 April 2025, an unprecedented power failure plunged most of Spain and Portugal into darkness. Within seconds the Iberian Peninsula lost around 15 gigawatts of generation—roughly 60 % of demand. Flights were grounded, public transport stopped, hospitals cancelled routine operations and emergency services were stretched. Spain’s interior ministry declared a national emergency, deploying 30 000 police officers, while grid operators scrambled to restore power. The outage, thought to have originated in a failed interconnector with France, highlighted the fragility of Europe’s interconnected grids. An industry association later reported that it took 23 hours for the Iberian grid to return to normal capacity.

Energy analysts noted that the blackout was not only a technical failure but also a structural one. Spain and Portugal depend heavily on wind and solar power, which provide more than 40 % of Spain’s electricity and over 60 % in Portugal. These sources supply little rotational inertia, so when the France–Spain interconnector tripped the system lacked the flexibility and backup capacity to stabilise itself. Reliance on a single interconnector also left the peninsula “islanded” and unable to import power quickly.

A continent on edge
The Iberian blackout came against a backdrop of soaring energy prices, economic malaise and rising electricity demand from data centres and electrified transport. Europe has spent the past two years grappling with the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which cut cheap gas supplies and forced governments to scramble for alternative fuels. Germany’s Energiewende, once a model for the energy transition, has been strained. After shutting down its last three reactors on 15 April 2023, Germany shifted from being a net exporter of electricity to a net importer; by November 2024 imports reached 25 terawatt‑hours, nearly triple the 2023 level. About half of the imported electricity came from France, Switzerland and Belgium—countries whose power systems are dominated by nuclear energy. Germany’s gross domestic product shrank 0.3 % in 2023 and was expected to contract again in 2024, and a survey of 3 300 businesses found that 37 % were considering reducing production or relocating because of high energy costs; the figure was 45 % among energy‑intensive firms.

The collapse of domestic nuclear generation has increased Germany’s reliance on coal and gas. In the first half of 2025 the share of fossil‑fuel electricity rose to 42.2 %, up from 38.4 % a year earlier, while power from renewables fell by almost six percent. Coal‑fired generation increased 9.3 % and gas‑fired output 11.6 %; weak winds cut wind output by 18 %, even as solar photovoltaic production jumped 28 %. The result has been higher emissions and greater dependence on imports.

Yet Germany’s grid remains resilient: the Federal Network Agency reported that power disruptions averaged 11.7 minutes per customer in 2024—one of the lowest figures in Europe—and the energy transition has not compromised supply security. Nevertheless, researchers warn that unexpected shocks like the Iberian blackout could occur if investment in grid flexibility and storage does not keep pace.

Nuclear renaissance across Europe
The energy crisis has prompted many European governments to re‑examine nuclear energy. Belgium has repealed its nuclear‑phase‑out law and plans new reactors, arguing that nuclear power provides reliable, low‑carbon electricity. Denmark, Italy, Poland, Sweden and Spain have all signalled interest in building new plants or extending existing reactors. Italy intends to bring nuclear power back by 2030, while Denmark and Sweden are exploring small modular reactors. The European Union already has about 100 reactors that supply almost a quarter of its electricity. Nuclear plants emit few air pollutants and provide round‑the‑clock power, making them attractive for countries seeking to cut emissions and reduce reliance on gas. Critics remain concerned about waste disposal and the possibility that investment in nuclear could divert resources from renewables.

This shift is visible at the political level. In September 2025, France and Germany adopted a joint energy roadmap that recognises nuclear energy as a low‑carbon technology eligible for European financing. The roadmap aims to end discrimination against nuclear projects and represents a departure from Germany’s long‑standing opposition. It does not alter national policies but signals a shared stance in forthcoming EU negotiations.

Germany’s political U‑turn
Germany’s nuclear exit has become a central issue in domestic politics. Surveys show that two‑thirds of Germans support the continued use of nuclear energy, and more than 40 % favour building new plants. A 2024 report argued that there are no significant technical obstacles to restarting closed reactors and that three units could be back online by 2028 if decommissioning were halted, adding about 4 gigawatts of capacity. The same report noted that a moratorium on dismantling reactors and amendments to the Atomic Energy Act are urgent prerequisites.

During the February 2025 election campaign, conservative leader Friedrich Merz pledged to revive nuclear power and build 50 gas‑fired plants to stabilise the grid. His party’s manifesto proposed an expert review on restarting closed reactors and research into advanced technologies such as small modular reactors. In a surprising political shift, Merz’s government subsequently stopped blocking efforts at the European level to recognise nuclear power as a sustainable investment. At a Franco‑German summit in Toulon, he and French president Emmanuel Macron agreed on the principle of non‑discrimination for nuclear projects in EU financing.

However, the internal debate is far from settled. Katherina Reiche, Germany’s economy and energy minister, ruled out a return to conventional nuclear plants, saying that the phase‑out is complete and that companies lack the confidence to invest. She argued that the opportunity to extend the last three reactors during the crisis had been missed and emphasised the government’s focus on developing a domestic fusion reactor and potentially small modular reactors. Reiche also insisted on a “reality check” for renewable expansion and called for up to 20 gigawatts of new gas‑fired backup capacity. Her position reflects caution within the coalition, and some experts note that restarting closed reactors may face legal and economic hurdles.

Industrial relief and future challenges
High energy costs continue to burden German industry. In November 2025 the ruling coalition agreed to introduce a subsidised power price of five euro cents per kilowatt‑hour for energy‑intensive companies until 2028, pending EU approval. The plan aims to ease the competitive disadvantage faced by manufacturers and includes tendering eight gigawatts of new gas‑fired capacity. Critics argue that subsidies are a stop‑gap and that longer‑term competitiveness requires affordable, low‑carbon baseload power and streamlined permitting for renewable projects.

The Iberian blackout served as a warning that Europe’s future grid must be flexible and resilient. Analysts emphasise the need for more interconnectors, battery storage and demand‑side management to accommodate variable renewables. Germany’s grid reliability remains among the best in Europe, yet the country’s growing dependence on imports and fossil fuels raises concerns about security and climate targets. The energy crisis has revived nuclear energy as a serious option across Europe, forcing policymakers to balance decarbonisation with security of supply. Whether Germany fully embraces nuclear again remains uncertain, but the debate underscores a broader realisation: the energy transition requires a diversified mix of technologies, robust infrastructure and pragmatic policies rather than dogma.



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Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Да здравствует Украина

Es lebe die Ukraine - Да здравствует Украина - Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Nech žije Ukrajina - Länge leve Ukraina - תחי אוקראינה - Lang leve Oekraïne - Да живее Украйна - Elagu Ukraina - Kauan eläköön Ukraina - Vive l'Ukraine - Ζήτω η Ουκρανία - 乌克兰万岁 - Viva Ucrania - Ať žije Ukrajina - Çok yaşa Ukrayna - Viva a Ucrânia - Trăiască Ucraina - ウクライナ万歳 - Tegyvuoja Ukraina - Lai dzīvo Ukraina - Viva l'Ucraina - Hidup Ukraina - تحيا أوكرانيا - Vivat Ucraina - ขอให้ยูเครนจงเจริญ - Ucraina muôn năm - ژوندی دی وی اوکراین - Yashasin Ukraina - Озак яшә Украина - Živjela Ukrajina - 우크라이나 만세 - Mabuhay ang Ukraine - Lenge leve Ukraina - Nyob ntev Ukraine - Да живее Украина - გაუმარჯოს უკრაინას - Hidup Ukraine - Vivu Ukrainio - Længe leve Ukraine - Živjela Ukrajina - Жыве Украіна - Yaşasın Ukrayna - Lengi lifi Úkraína - Lank lewe die Oekraïne

Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

Europe’s arms money maze

Europe’s rearmament has acquired an uncomfortable companion: uncertainty about what the money actually buys. In Germany, an argument over defence-related borrowing has raised questions about whether exceptional debt is producing genuinely additional expenditure. In Estonia, unreliable inventory records and disputed ammunition contracts have brought ministerial accountability into the foreground. These are different problems, but they meet at the same point: a larger budget is not a reliable measure of a stronger defence.The contention that nobody knows what is happening to Europe’s weapons money goes too far. Budgets are published, procurement bodies operate and auditors are identifying failures. Nor do these cases establish that funds have disappeared into Russian hands or that the Kremlin engineered the difficulties. The more defensible conclusion is also more useful: Europe cannot judge rearmament by the volume of money announced. It must establish what has been purchased, accepted and made ready for use.That distinction matters strategically. An adversary need not steal the money to benefit from delays, unusable equipment or a loss of confidence in the governments spending it.What the €800 billion actually meansThe scale of the spending is substantial. Combined defence expenditure across the European Union reached €418 billion in 2025, with €454 billion estimated for 2026. Those annual totals should not be confused with the much larger, multi-year headline attached to the EU’s rearmament financing plan. The widely cited €800 billion is potential financing capacity, not a single fund already transferred to arms manufacturers. Its main components are approximately €650 billion in possible additional national expenditure enabled by fiscal flexibility over four years, and €150 billion in loans through the Security Action for Europe instrument, known as SAFE. The loans must be repaid; the additional national spending depends on governments choosing to use the available room.These distinctions are indispensable to any honest assessment. Permission to borrow is not an order placed with a factory. An order is not a completed delivery. Equipment delivered to a warehouse is not necessarily equipment that troops can operate, maintain and replenish. Treating all these stages as interchangeable allows governments to claim progress before the military benefit exists.It also creates a temptation to add together figures that describe different periods or overlapping flows of money. A credible account of rearmament should distinguish financing arrangements from annual expenditure, and both from verified outputs. Otherwise, the public is left comparing impressive totals whose practical meaning is unclear.Germany’s argument over additional spendingOn 10 September, the Ifo Institute challenged the use of Germany’s defence-related borrowing exemption. It calculated an €11 billion gap between additional borrowing and the year-on-year increase in the relevant expenditure. Ifo’s argument was that 38.5 per cent of the additional debt had not produced additional defence and security spending, instead freeing room for other purposes in the ordinary budget. The Finance Ministry rejected the comparison as legally and methodologically flawed. The exemption concerns qualifying expenditure above one per cent of gross domestic product, rather than an increase over the previous year. Ifo, for its part, said its analysis concerned additional spending, not constitutionality.This is not evidence that €11 billion was stolen. It is a dispute over the relationship between an exceptional borrowing mechanism and the political expectation attached to it. The difference is important: an arrangement can comply with its legal design while delivering less additional expenditure than citizens understand the announcement to promise.The practical question is whether new borrowing expands defence capacity or changes the way existing commitments are financed. Those outcomes can coexist within the same budget. Refinancing an established obligation may be lawful and fiscally useful, but it should not be presented as though an equivalent amount of new military capability has been purchased. Germany’s dispute therefore points to a straightforward transparency test. Governments should identify the expenditure that would have occurred anyway, the genuinely additional commitments and the delivery milestones attached to them. Without that comparison, the argument risks becoming a contest between accounting definitions while the central question—what the armed forces actually gain—remains unanswered.Estonia’s warning from the accountsIn Estonia, the problems are more immediate. Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur announced on 2 September that he would step down, accepting political responsibility for failures exposed in defence administration and procurement. His announcement did not amount to an admission of personal corruption.The National Audit Office issued a qualified opinion concerning defence inventories valued at approximately €1.2 billion because their quantities, composition and valuation could not be established reliably. It also questioned an unexplained retrospective adjustment of €99.7 million to the previous year’s inventory figures. That does not mean €1.2 billion of weapons has vanished. An unreliable balance is not the same thing as a proven loss. It means the records are insufficiently dependable to establish what the balance represents—a serious weakness in any organisation, and particularly consequential in one responsible for military readiness.Inadequate records can obstruct decisions long before a final financial loss is demonstrated. Commanders and purchasing authorities need to distinguish usable stock from equipment awaiting inspection, repair or replacement. If those categories are unclear, another procurement decision may rest on a mistaken understanding of what is already available.Auditing is therefore more than an exercise in retrospective blame. A trustworthy inventory helps determine what must be bought next, how urgently it is needed and whether previous purchases fulfilled their purpose. Poor accounting can undermine operational planning even where no theft is established.Paid for is not the same as usableEstonia’s ammunition procurement for Ukraine illustrates a second difficulty. The audit identified disputed advance payments and warned of a potential exposure to the state budget of around €70 million. That figure describes a risk, not a final, adjudicated loss.The controversy includes contracts involving the Italian company Datasel. Pevkur described ammunition delivered under the disputed arrangements as incomplete and of insufficient quality, rather than simply non-existent. Datasel disputes the criticism and has said that goods delivered and invoiced were worth approximately €58 million against about €59 million in advances. The company’s account is a contested position, not a judicial finding.The disagreement exposes a distinction that matters beyond this particular supplier. A payment record, an invoice, the physical presence of goods and acceptance of those goods for their intended use answer different questions. A supplier may point to shipments while a purchasing authority disputes whether the contractual requirement has been met. The existence of equipment does not, by itself, resolve an argument over quality or completeness.For Ukraine, the decisive consideration is usable military support. For the public authorities financing it, the additional questions are whether payment conditions were appropriate, inspections were timely and contractual protections can recover money when performance is disputed. Those questions should be settled through evidence and the relevant proceedings, not through premature declarations of guilt.The procurement lesson is nonetheless clear. Emergency purchasing needs traceable contracts, independently verified acceptance and a dependable record linking each payment to performance. Urgency may justify faster decisions. It cannot make the distinction between an invoice and a functioning delivery disappear.An oversight system split across institutionsEurope’s defence financing does not sit within a single system of scrutiny. National budgets, EU programmes, loans and off-budget arrangements have different institutional responsibilities. The European Court of Auditors’ September review described complex governance and uneven oversight arrangements, rather than a continent-wide absence of auditing.SAFE falls within the European Court of Auditors’ remit. The European Peace Facility, outside the ordinary EU budget, has its own College of Auditors. National defence expenditure is scrutinised through national institutions. The distinction is between different mandates, not between money that is automatically checked and money that is automatically unaccountable. The difficulty arises at the joins. A public explanation may follow the announcement of a financing package, while a procurement body follows the contract and an operational authority follows the equipment. Unless those accounts can be reconciled, citizens and legislators may struggle to establish the complete journey from political promise to accepted delivery.Secrecy complicates that task, but it need not prevent it. Publishing ammunition locations or technical vulnerabilities would be irresponsible. Giving properly authorised auditors access to contracts, inspections and payment records is a different matter. The need to protect operational information should not become a general excuse for withholding financial evidence.Nor should procurement integrity be treated as a rival to speed. Clearly assigned responsibility, verifiable milestones and early checks can prevent disputes from developing into expensive attempts to recover money after the event. The relevant choice is between controls that work during procurement and explanations demanded after something has gone wrong.Where Putin could benefitThese failures do not establish that Vladimir Putin has obtained everything he wanted. A Europe that turns rising expenditure into effective forces would represent a very different outcome. There is also no demonstrated Russian role in the particular German budget dispute or the Estonian accounting and contractual problems described here.The potential advantage for Moscow is indirect. Delayed or disputed deliveries can leave the intended recipient weaker than the expenditure suggests. Confusing financial claims can make it harder to defend further commitments. A succession of procurement controversies could erode confidence not only in individual contracts, but in the wider case for supporting Ukraine and strengthening European defence.That is a strategic risk, not proof of an accomplished Russian victory. The public identification of problems is itself evidence that scrutiny exists. A minister accepting political responsibility, auditors challenging unreliable balances and a government being pressed to explain its borrowing are mechanisms through which democratic systems can correct failure. Their value depends on what happens afterwards.The answer is neither to abandon rearmament nor to shield it from criticism. Governments should report progress in terms that connect money to results: contracts awarded, payments made, equipment accepted and capabilities available, with sensitive details reserved for secure oversight. Disputed transactions should remain visible until resolved rather than disappearing beneath the next spending announcement.Europe does not need to prove its determination by producing another larger number. It needs to demonstrate that the money already committed is becoming usable strength. Until it does, the distance between those two things remains an opportunity for the adversary it is trying to deter.