Coin Press - Israel’s Haredi Challenge

NYSE - LSE
RBGPF 0% 69.99 $
AZN 0.64% 162.89 $
RYCEF -0.05% 19.29 $
CMSC 0.68% 20.48 $
BCE -1.78% 22.5 $
VOD -1.26% 17.46 $
RIO -1.53% 95.79 $
BTI -0.77% 56.09 $
GSK 0.56% 50.29 $
RELX 0.15% 34.27 $
CMSD 0.88% 20.29 $
BCC -0.82% 75.31 $
BP -3.48% 45.38 $
JRI -1.04% 11.5 $
NGG 1.45% 76.03 $

Israel’s Haredi Challenge




The ultra‑Orthodox, or Haredi, community in Israel has become the focus of intense national debate. When the state was founded in 1948, a small number of exceptional Torah scholars were allowed to devote themselves to study instead of serving in the military. Nearly eight decades later, the people who follow this stringent interpretation of Judaism make up almost one in seven Israelis. Their numbers are growing rapidly, their political parties wield outsized influence in coalition politics, and their educational and economic choices increasingly shape the country’s future. As Israel grapples with war in Gaza, coalition infighting and a fragile economy, many secular and modern‑orthodox Israelis view the Haredi sector as the most formidable challenge to national cohesion and prosperity.

A population boom and its consequences
Demography is the most visible driver of change. Haredi families typically marry young and have large households: fertility rates average more than six children per woman, compared with about three across Israeli society. As a result, the community’s population has doubled in just fifteen years and now exceeds 1.3 million people. Demographers project that, by the start of the next decade, they will make up around one sixth of Israel’s citizens, and that their share of the 25‑29 age cohort will rise from 13 per cent in 2025 to 28 per cent by 2060. Around sixty per cent of Haredim are under the age of twenty. This youthful, rapidly expanding population concentrates in high‑density neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and Bnei Brak, placing intense pressure on housing, schools and local services.

Education and the labour market
Most ultra‑Orthodox boys’ schools devote the bulk of the day to religious studies and neglect secular subjects such as mathematics, English and science. The government provides funding to schools that pledge to teach a “core curriculum”, but enforcement is weak and many Haredi schools either ignore or water down these subjects. Policy analysts argue that this educational deficit locks many Haredi men out of higher education and skilled employment.

In the labour market, a gender divide has emerged. Haredi women, who often shoulder the financial burden while their husbands study, have made significant strides; about four fifths participate in the workforce. In contrast, employment among ultra‑Orthodox men has stalled at just over half, compared with around 85 per cent among other Israeli men. Many rely on stipends for yeshiva students and generous child allowances, reinforcing the incentive to remain outside the labour force. An OECD survey issued in April 2025 notes that budgetary support for yeshivas was increased significantly in recent years, deepening men’s disincentives to seek work. The same report stresses that reallocating funding toward schools that teach the full curriculum and conditioning childcare support on both parents’ employment could help narrow labour‑market gaps.

The result of low male employment is acute economic disparity. Ultra‑Orthodox households tend to earn roughly two thirds of the income of non‑Haredi households and depend more heavily on public benefits. With the community’s share of the population rising steadily, these gaps threaten to undermine Israel’s fiscal base and widen social divisions.

The conscription crisis
Israel’s defence doctrine rests on the principle of universal national service. Yet tens of thousands of Haredi men receive de facto exemptions because they are enrolled in religious seminaries. In June 2024, the country’s Supreme Court declared that, in the absence of a specific law distinguishing yeshiva students from other citizens, the defence service statute applies to them like anyone else. The justices decried the previous system as selective enforcement and a violation of equality, especially during wartime.

The ruling has proved difficult to implement. Despite an urgent demand for additional combat troops in 2025, only a tiny fraction of eligible ultra‑Orthodox men have presented themselves at induction centres. Estimates suggest that fewer than five per cent responded to call‑up notices and barely one per cent were actually inducted. Many secular and modern‑orthodox Israelis, who have spent long stints on the front lines since October 2023, are angered by what they see as an unfair distribution of sacrifice. Ultra‑Orthodox leaders argue that Torah study is a form of national service and insist that conscription would erode their religious way of life. They cite fears of exposure to secular influences, mixed‑gender environments and the weakening of rabbinic authority.

Protests and political turmoil
The dispute over military service has triggered some of the largest demonstrations in Israeli history. On 30 October 2025, hundreds of thousands of Haredi men converged on Jerusalem in a “million‑man march” to demand that yeshiva students remain exempt. The protest shut down highways and public transport, drew thousands of police officers and resulted in the death of a teenager who fell from a building. Banners proclaimed, “The people are with the Torah,” and speakers accused the government of betraying Judaism. The rally followed arrests of students who ignored draft notices.

These events have destabilised the governing coalition. Ultra‑Orthodox parties hold roughly 18 of the Knesset’s 120 seats, making them indispensable partners for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In July 2025 the United Torah Judaism party walked out of the government over the failure to pass a draft‑exemption law, and the Shas party resigned from its cabinet posts while continuing to vote with the coalition. Both insisted that they would not return until the status of yeshiva students was secured.

In early November 2025 Netanyahu sought to break the impasse by advancing a conscription bill drawn up by Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee chair Boaz Bismuth. The proposal aims to enlist fifty per cent of each annual ultra‑Orthodox draft cohort within five years. Critics, including opposition leader Yair Lapid, denounce it as a draft‑evasion bill riddled with loopholes. It lowers the threshold for yeshiva students to qualify for exemptions and softens penalties; draft evaders would be allowed to travel abroad after age 26, and licence suspensions would be scrapped. Supporters argue that codifying a realistic target will stabilise the coalition and bring ultra‑Orthodox parties back into government. As of mid‑November, the bill’s fate remains uncertain, and any perceived capitulation could provoke further protests or even bring down the government.

Gender segregation and the public sphere
Beyond conscription and economics, the ultra‑Orthodox exert growing influence on daily life. Although Israel’s Supreme Court outlawed gender‑segregated public buses in 2011, incidents persist. In 2023 a bus driver ordered teenage girls to cover their bodies and sit at the back, asserting that the route was a religious line; the case ended in a legal settlement in 2025. Advocacy groups recorded dozens of complaints of gender exclusion on public transport that year.

At the legislative level, coalition lawmakers have promoted initiatives that critics say blur the separation between religion and state. In October 2025 ministers proposed a bill requiring every public institution to affix a mezuzah and granting broad protections for religious rituals. Under the measure, interfering with Orthodox practices would become a criminal offence, and gender‑segregated prayer could be permitted if it reflected the worshippers’ tradition. Supporters framed the bill as protecting Jewish heritage; opponents warned that it would turn public spaces into ultra‑Orthodox domains and infringe upon democratic norms. Although some of the most controversial provisions were later removed, the episode underscored fears among secular Israelis that their society is being remoulded according to Haredi standards.

Change from within
The Haredi world is not uniform, and signs of change are visible. A survey published in October 2025 by researchers from the Hebrew University found that while the community retains conservative values, economic necessity has driven increasing acceptance of employment and professional education, particularly for women. Respondents described a “bounded pragmatism”: they adapt behaviour without renouncing ideology. Core religious studies and male higher education remain sensitive boundaries, but many respondents expressed openness to new national Haredi political frameworks. Opposition to mandatory military service was widespread and couched in moral terms.

Another social shift involves those leaving the ultra‑Orthodox fold. A study by the organisation Out for Change in 2025 found that growing numbers of former Haredim remain religiously observant in varying degrees and maintain ties to their families. Contrary to stereotypes, departure from the community does not always entail a complete break with faith; for many it is a move towards a hybrid identity that balances tradition and modernity.

Paths to integration
Addressing the ultra‑Orthodox challenge requires a multi‑layered approach. First, education policy must ensure that schools receiving state funds teach the full core curriculum; enforcement of funding conditions should be robust. Universities and vocational colleges can develop programmes tailored to ultra‑Orthodox students, offering separate campuses or hours to accommodate cultural norms. Financial incentives, such as earned‑income tax credits, should encourage men to seek employment rather than rely on stipends.

Second, conscription policy needs to balance equality with respect for religious sensibilities. Creative solutions could include expanded civil‑service tracks, specialised military units that protect religious observance, or alternative service in healthcare and education. The goal should be to share the defence burden more equitably while acknowledging the community’s fears.

Third, coalition politics should not treat public funds as bargaining chips. Transparent budgets, clear criteria for subsidies and accountability for yeshivas would reassure taxpayers that funds are being used responsibly. Dialogue between government ministers, army officials and rabbinic leaders is essential to design policies that are both just and workable.

Finally, a pluralistic public sphere must be safeguarded. Laws should protect freedom of religion without imposing religious norms on unwilling citizens. Resolving disputes over gender segregation, Sabbath observance and kosher certification will require compromise and a renewed commitment to democratic principles.

Conclusion
Israel’s ultra‑Orthodox community poses a unique challenge because its demographic momentum intersects with issues of economy, defence, politics and culture. The community’s deep commitment to tradition, combined with its growing size and political leverage, tests the country’s ability to remain both Jewish and democratic. Navigating this challenge will demand a delicate balance of enforcement and accommodation: enforcing equal obligations and educational standards while accommodating religious identity and autonomy. If Israel can foster integration without coercion and encourage responsibility without alienation, the Haredi challenge could become an opportunity to strengthen social cohesion and economic vitality.



Featured


Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Да здравствует Украина

Es lebe die Ukraine - Да здравствует Украина - Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Nech žije Ukrajina - Länge leve Ukraina - תחי אוקראינה - Lang leve Oekraïne - Да живее Украйна - Elagu Ukraina - Kauan eläköön Ukraina - Vive l'Ukraine - Ζήτω η Ουκρανία - 乌克兰万岁 - Viva Ucrania - Ať žije Ukrajina - Çok yaşa Ukrayna - Viva a Ucrânia - Trăiască Ucraina - ウクライナ万歳 - Tegyvuoja Ukraina - Lai dzīvo Ukraina - Viva l'Ucraina - Hidup Ukraina - تحيا أوكرانيا - Vivat Ucraina - ขอให้ยูเครนจงเจริญ - Ucraina muôn năm - ژوندی دی وی اوکراین - Yashasin Ukraina - Озак яшә Украина - Živjela Ukrajina - 우크라이나 만세 - Mabuhay ang Ukraine - Lenge leve Ukraina - Nyob ntev Ukraine - Да живее Украина - გაუმარჯოს უკრაინას - Hidup Ukraine - Vivu Ukrainio - Længe leve Ukraine - Živjela Ukrajina - Жыве Украіна - Yaşasın Ukrayna - Lengi lifi Úkraína - Lank lewe die Oekraïne

Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

Europe’s arms money maze

Europe’s rearmament has acquired an uncomfortable companion: uncertainty about what the money actually buys. In Germany, an argument over defence-related borrowing has raised questions about whether exceptional debt is producing genuinely additional expenditure. In Estonia, unreliable inventory records and disputed ammunition contracts have brought ministerial accountability into the foreground. These are different problems, but they meet at the same point: a larger budget is not a reliable measure of a stronger defence.The contention that nobody knows what is happening to Europe’s weapons money goes too far. Budgets are published, procurement bodies operate and auditors are identifying failures. Nor do these cases establish that funds have disappeared into Russian hands or that the Kremlin engineered the difficulties. The more defensible conclusion is also more useful: Europe cannot judge rearmament by the volume of money announced. It must establish what has been purchased, accepted and made ready for use.That distinction matters strategically. An adversary need not steal the money to benefit from delays, unusable equipment or a loss of confidence in the governments spending it.What the €800 billion actually meansThe scale of the spending is substantial. Combined defence expenditure across the European Union reached €418 billion in 2025, with €454 billion estimated for 2026. Those annual totals should not be confused with the much larger, multi-year headline attached to the EU’s rearmament financing plan. The widely cited €800 billion is potential financing capacity, not a single fund already transferred to arms manufacturers. Its main components are approximately €650 billion in possible additional national expenditure enabled by fiscal flexibility over four years, and €150 billion in loans through the Security Action for Europe instrument, known as SAFE. The loans must be repaid; the additional national spending depends on governments choosing to use the available room.These distinctions are indispensable to any honest assessment. Permission to borrow is not an order placed with a factory. An order is not a completed delivery. Equipment delivered to a warehouse is not necessarily equipment that troops can operate, maintain and replenish. Treating all these stages as interchangeable allows governments to claim progress before the military benefit exists.It also creates a temptation to add together figures that describe different periods or overlapping flows of money. A credible account of rearmament should distinguish financing arrangements from annual expenditure, and both from verified outputs. Otherwise, the public is left comparing impressive totals whose practical meaning is unclear.Germany’s argument over additional spendingOn 10 September, the Ifo Institute challenged the use of Germany’s defence-related borrowing exemption. It calculated an €11 billion gap between additional borrowing and the year-on-year increase in the relevant expenditure. Ifo’s argument was that 38.5 per cent of the additional debt had not produced additional defence and security spending, instead freeing room for other purposes in the ordinary budget. The Finance Ministry rejected the comparison as legally and methodologically flawed. The exemption concerns qualifying expenditure above one per cent of gross domestic product, rather than an increase over the previous year. Ifo, for its part, said its analysis concerned additional spending, not constitutionality.This is not evidence that €11 billion was stolen. It is a dispute over the relationship between an exceptional borrowing mechanism and the political expectation attached to it. The difference is important: an arrangement can comply with its legal design while delivering less additional expenditure than citizens understand the announcement to promise.The practical question is whether new borrowing expands defence capacity or changes the way existing commitments are financed. Those outcomes can coexist within the same budget. Refinancing an established obligation may be lawful and fiscally useful, but it should not be presented as though an equivalent amount of new military capability has been purchased. Germany’s dispute therefore points to a straightforward transparency test. Governments should identify the expenditure that would have occurred anyway, the genuinely additional commitments and the delivery milestones attached to them. Without that comparison, the argument risks becoming a contest between accounting definitions while the central question—what the armed forces actually gain—remains unanswered.Estonia’s warning from the accountsIn Estonia, the problems are more immediate. Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur announced on 2 September that he would step down, accepting political responsibility for failures exposed in defence administration and procurement. His announcement did not amount to an admission of personal corruption.The National Audit Office issued a qualified opinion concerning defence inventories valued at approximately €1.2 billion because their quantities, composition and valuation could not be established reliably. It also questioned an unexplained retrospective adjustment of €99.7 million to the previous year’s inventory figures. That does not mean €1.2 billion of weapons has vanished. An unreliable balance is not the same thing as a proven loss. It means the records are insufficiently dependable to establish what the balance represents—a serious weakness in any organisation, and particularly consequential in one responsible for military readiness.Inadequate records can obstruct decisions long before a final financial loss is demonstrated. Commanders and purchasing authorities need to distinguish usable stock from equipment awaiting inspection, repair or replacement. If those categories are unclear, another procurement decision may rest on a mistaken understanding of what is already available.Auditing is therefore more than an exercise in retrospective blame. A trustworthy inventory helps determine what must be bought next, how urgently it is needed and whether previous purchases fulfilled their purpose. Poor accounting can undermine operational planning even where no theft is established.Paid for is not the same as usableEstonia’s ammunition procurement for Ukraine illustrates a second difficulty. The audit identified disputed advance payments and warned of a potential exposure to the state budget of around €70 million. That figure describes a risk, not a final, adjudicated loss.The controversy includes contracts involving the Italian company Datasel. Pevkur described ammunition delivered under the disputed arrangements as incomplete and of insufficient quality, rather than simply non-existent. Datasel disputes the criticism and has said that goods delivered and invoiced were worth approximately €58 million against about €59 million in advances. The company’s account is a contested position, not a judicial finding.The disagreement exposes a distinction that matters beyond this particular supplier. A payment record, an invoice, the physical presence of goods and acceptance of those goods for their intended use answer different questions. A supplier may point to shipments while a purchasing authority disputes whether the contractual requirement has been met. The existence of equipment does not, by itself, resolve an argument over quality or completeness.For Ukraine, the decisive consideration is usable military support. For the public authorities financing it, the additional questions are whether payment conditions were appropriate, inspections were timely and contractual protections can recover money when performance is disputed. Those questions should be settled through evidence and the relevant proceedings, not through premature declarations of guilt.The procurement lesson is nonetheless clear. Emergency purchasing needs traceable contracts, independently verified acceptance and a dependable record linking each payment to performance. Urgency may justify faster decisions. It cannot make the distinction between an invoice and a functioning delivery disappear.An oversight system split across institutionsEurope’s defence financing does not sit within a single system of scrutiny. National budgets, EU programmes, loans and off-budget arrangements have different institutional responsibilities. The European Court of Auditors’ September review described complex governance and uneven oversight arrangements, rather than a continent-wide absence of auditing.SAFE falls within the European Court of Auditors’ remit. The European Peace Facility, outside the ordinary EU budget, has its own College of Auditors. National defence expenditure is scrutinised through national institutions. The distinction is between different mandates, not between money that is automatically checked and money that is automatically unaccountable. The difficulty arises at the joins. A public explanation may follow the announcement of a financing package, while a procurement body follows the contract and an operational authority follows the equipment. Unless those accounts can be reconciled, citizens and legislators may struggle to establish the complete journey from political promise to accepted delivery.Secrecy complicates that task, but it need not prevent it. Publishing ammunition locations or technical vulnerabilities would be irresponsible. Giving properly authorised auditors access to contracts, inspections and payment records is a different matter. The need to protect operational information should not become a general excuse for withholding financial evidence.Nor should procurement integrity be treated as a rival to speed. Clearly assigned responsibility, verifiable milestones and early checks can prevent disputes from developing into expensive attempts to recover money after the event. The relevant choice is between controls that work during procurement and explanations demanded after something has gone wrong.Where Putin could benefitThese failures do not establish that Vladimir Putin has obtained everything he wanted. A Europe that turns rising expenditure into effective forces would represent a very different outcome. There is also no demonstrated Russian role in the particular German budget dispute or the Estonian accounting and contractual problems described here.The potential advantage for Moscow is indirect. Delayed or disputed deliveries can leave the intended recipient weaker than the expenditure suggests. Confusing financial claims can make it harder to defend further commitments. A succession of procurement controversies could erode confidence not only in individual contracts, but in the wider case for supporting Ukraine and strengthening European defence.That is a strategic risk, not proof of an accomplished Russian victory. The public identification of problems is itself evidence that scrutiny exists. A minister accepting political responsibility, auditors challenging unreliable balances and a government being pressed to explain its borrowing are mechanisms through which democratic systems can correct failure. Their value depends on what happens afterwards.The answer is neither to abandon rearmament nor to shield it from criticism. Governments should report progress in terms that connect money to results: contracts awarded, payments made, equipment accepted and capabilities available, with sensitive details reserved for secure oversight. Disputed transactions should remain visible until resolved rather than disappearing beneath the next spending announcement.Europe does not need to prove its determination by producing another larger number. It needs to demonstrate that the money already committed is becoming usable strength. Until it does, the distance between those two things remains an opportunity for the adversary it is trying to deter.