Coin Press - A new vision for Japan

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A new vision for Japan




Sanae Takaichi’s election as prime minister in October 2025 has ushered in a historic and transformative period for Japan. She is the country’s first woman to hold the post and, with a small Conservative bloc in parliament, she must rely on cooperation from opposition parties to deliver her ambitious agenda. A protégé of the late Shinzo Abe and a keen admirer of Margaret Thatcher, she promised during her leadership campaign to reassert Japan’s economic might, strengthen national security and regain the trust of conservative voters lost to right‑wing rivals.

Reviving the economy through fiscal firepower
Takaichi’s economic agenda centres on aggressive public spending coupled with targeted tax cuts. Within days of taking office she began drafting a fiscal package worth more than ¥13.9 trillion, surpassing the stimulus enacted in the previous year. The package aims to cushion households from inflation, expand investment in growth industries and support national security. Among the key measures under discussion are the abolition of a provisional gasoline tax that has been in place since 1974, lifting the income tax exemption threshold from ¥1.03 million to ¥1.6 million and combining income tax deductions with cash benefits to provide relief without increasing headline tax rates.

A Growth Strategy Council has been established to steer these efforts. The panel will map out a medium‑term plan by next summer, identifying sectors such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, shipbuilding, defence and telecommunications as priorities. Takaichi has already signalled her intention to invest roughly ¥1.7 trillion in Rapidus, Japan’s fledgling chipmaker, with the goal of tripling its overseas revenue by 2033. She has charged her ministers with developing domestic supply chains for semiconductors and AI and with supporting small and medium‑sized businesses through tax reforms and productivity‑boosting incentives. Her emphasis on “responsible and proactive fiscal policy” seeks to ensure that economic growth outpaces debt accumulation, even if the programme is financed through deficit bonds.

In addition to the stimulus package, Takaichi has pledged to transform Japan into a global asset‑management hub and to create a national disaster‑prevention agency. She advocates establishing a “secondary capital” outside Tokyo to decentralise government functions, and she has called for social security reforms to balance benefits and costs in an ageing society. Recognising that recovery from the Fukushima nuclear disaster remains incomplete, she instructed the new economy minister to prioritise reconstruction alongside growth initiatives. Energy policy features prominently in her plan: she wants Japan to leverage renewable energy and nuclear power to secure a decarbonised yet stable electricity supply.

Accelerating military modernisation
National security is another pillar of Takaichi’s platform. Breaking with decades of precedent, she intends to raise defence spending to 2 per cent of gross domestic product by the end of March 2026 — two years ahead of the timetable set by her predecessor. This acceleration will require an extra trillion yen through a supplementary budget and marks Japan’s largest defence build‑up since the Second World War. Her government has already begun revising the National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy and Defence Buildup Programme to reflect the changing security environment, citing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, regional conflicts in the Middle East and heightened pressure from China and North Korea.

The new administration’s alliance with the Japan Innovation Party, which shares a hawkish stance on China, removes the moderating influence of the pacifist‑leaning Komeito and liberates her to pursue constitutional change. Takaichi is a long‑time advocate of revising Article 9 of the Constitution to acknowledge the Self‑Defence Forces and relax restrictions on arms exports. Her coalition partners have floated proposals for a nuclear‑sharing arrangement with the United States, a radical departure from Japan’s longstanding non‑nuclear principles. She hopes to deepen ties with Washington and has signalled she will quickly meet President Donald Trump to discuss ways to strengthen the bilateral alliance. In the face of calls from some U.S. officials to raise defence outlays to 3 or even 5 per cent of GDP, she is likely to present a package of purchases ranging from American vehicles and soybeans to natural gas and attract U.S. investment in Japanese industries. At the same time, she has pledged to maintain a constructive relationship with China and to work with South Korea, Australia and India to support a free and open Indo‑Pacific.

A tougher line on immigration and foreign ownership
Alongside her economic and security initiatives, Takaichi has placed immigration at the heart of her domestic agenda. Despite acknowledging the need for foreign labour to offset Japan’s demographic decline, she has vowed to “set limits” on the number of foreign workers admitted through programmes designed to address labour shortages. In an early ministerial meeting on foreign nationals she argued that public anxiety stems from rule‑breaking by a minority of foreigners and announced plans to deny visa renewals to those who fall behind on pension or health‑insurance contributions. She has also instructed ministers to examine tighter regulations on land purchases by foreign nationals, particularly Chinese investors, and to develop a population strategy by fiscal 2026 with numerical targets for foreign residents.

Takaichi’s cabinet includes a minister specifically responsible for economic security and harmonious coexistence with foreign nationals. This official, Kimi Onoda, has been tasked with coordinating immigration policy, enforcing compliance and examining regulations on property ownership. The prime minister insists that her approach is aimed at ensuring fairness rather than promoting xenophobia. Critics, however, argue that the rhetoric and policies reflect a broader nationalist turn within the ruling party. During the leadership race she built support by invoking isolated anecdotes to justify restrictions on foreigners, echoing the populist “Japanese First” platform championed by right‑wing groups. Opponents warn that such measures could undermine industries that rely on overseas labour and exacerbate social divisions.

Managing minority rule and foreign relations
The political context surrounding Takaichi’s premiership complicates the implementation of her agenda. Her coalition is two votes short of a majority in the lower house, compelling her to seek backing from centrist and opposition parties to pass budgets and constitutional amendments. While she enjoys strong approval ratings in the early days of her government, observers question whether she can sustain momentum when her spending plans face scrutiny over Japan’s already‑high public debt.

Diplomatically, Takaichi must balance her hawkish instincts with regional realities. She reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to supporting Ukraine, pledged to secure the return of citizens abducted by North Korea, and called China an important neighbour despite labelling its actions a security challenge. In a symbolic nod to regional sensitivities, she refrained from visiting the Yasukuni war shrine during the autumn festival, a move interpreted as an attempt to ease tensions with Beijing and Seoul. Nevertheless, her regular visits in the past and her hard‑line views on wartime history continue to evoke suspicion abroad.

Sanae Takaichi’s rise to Japan’s highest office brings a blend of economic populism, military assertiveness and cultural conservatism. Her vision seeks to rekindle growth through massive public investment while rewriting the rules that have governed Japan’s post‑war pacifism and demographic openness. Whether she succeeds in changing Japan forever will depend on her ability to steer her minority government through political turbulence, manage relations with powerful allies and competitors, and reconcile a rapidly ageing society with the demands of globalisation.



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Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

Beijing's new Taiwan playbook

Beijing's military machinery and political ambitions have moved it closer to a point where it could attempt to seize Taiwan by force.  Decades of double‑digit defence spending have yielded advanced amphibious assault vessels, fleets of hypersonic and ballistic missiles and an air force that can saturate airspace around the island.  Naval analysts note that the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s new Type 054B guided‑missile frigates incorporate artificial‑intelligence‑enabled sensors to improve anti‑submarine warfare and fleet air defence and can undertake long‑range escort missions.  Dozens of civilian‑flagged research vessels, operating under the cover of scientific exploration, have spent years mapping the seabed across the western Pacific and as far afield as Guam and Hawaii to improve Chinese submarine navigation and to erode the United States’ traditional advantage in undersea warfare.  Expanded missile launch infrastructure in Xinjiang, featuring scores of launch pads, is intended to increase the survivability of China’s land‑based nuclear forces.Yet despite these capabilities, Beijing has shown little appetite for a near‑term invasion.  A recent threat assessment by the United States’ intelligence community concluded that Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion by 2027 and lack a fixed timetable for unification.  Taiwan’s defence ministry concurs that China’s build‑up is relentless but emphasises that deterrence, rather than assumptions about invasion windows, will shape Beijing’s calculations.  Analysts argue that a war would trigger unprecedented economic costs.  Taiwan’s semiconductor industry underpins global technology supply chains and about a fifth of world trade transits the Taiwan Strait.  Any conflict that closed this artery would reverberate through financial markets, manufacturing and energy supplies.  Even without U.S. intervention, Chinese leadership would risk social stability at home if a miscalculated assault stalled or provoked severe sanctions.Against this backdrop, Beijing has refined what some analysts describe as a grey‑zone strategy — a web of coercive measures designed to wear down Taiwan’s morale and manoeuvre it towards “reunification” without firing a shot.  People’s Liberation Army aircraft entered Taiwan’s air defence identification zone more than three hundred times a month after William Lai’s 2024 election, only for the number of incursions to fall sharply in 2026 as planners redistributed sorties to training and maintenance.  China’s coast guard now conducts routine multi‑ship patrols in the restricted waters around Kinmen and Pratas, two Taiwanese‑administered archipelagos close to the mainland, to normalise jurisdictional claims and erode Taiwan’s threat awareness.  As part of the large‑scale “Strait Thunder 2025A” and “Justice Mission 2025” exercises, the People’s Liberation Army practised cutting power and blockading Taiwan’s liquefied natural gas terminals — a rehearsal for imposing energy strangulation during a future crisis.Energy insecurity is a key prong of Beijing’s hybrid approach.  Taiwan imports around 97 percent of its energy, with liquefied natural gas accounting for roughly half of electricity generation.  When war in Iran temporarily choked off shipments through the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year, Chinese‑language social media channels flooded TikTok and Xiaohongshu with ominous videos claiming Taiwan’s gas reserves would expire within a fortnight and extolling “peaceful unification” as the only remedy.  Officials from the Taiwan Affairs Office even offered to supply electricity and gas from the mainland as soon as Taiwan surrendered its sovereignty.  Taiwan’s government countered by publicising the diversification of its imports, increasing strategic reserves and conducting joint navy‑coast‑guard drills to escort fuel tankers through potential blockades.  Such moves aim to reassure citizens and blunt the psychological impact of Beijing’s energy narratives.Political infiltration forms another component of the grey‑zone campaign.  Beijing has long supported parties in Taiwan that advocate a looser relationship with the mainland, but recent cases show a willingness to back actors whose public stance on unification is ambiguous.  Taiwanese courts convicted a former spokesperson for the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) after she accepted funds from Chinese handlers and provided contact lists of government agencies.  Investigators say the case is not isolated: election interference and covert recruitment have targeted both the centrist TPP and elements of the governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).  At the international level, Chinese diplomats persuade or pressure host governments to label Taiwan as a province of China; Taiwan stayed away from this year’s World Trade Organization ministerial in Yaoundé after delegates were issued documents bearing that designation.This cognitive warfare extends to culture and education.  President William Lai has warned that video‑sharing platforms may be used to cultivate the notion that Taiwanese and mainland Chinese people are “one family” and to foster resignation towards annexation.  His administration has banned certain Chinese apps from public‑sector devices and proposed curriculum changes to strengthen civic identity and debunk disinformation.  Opinion polls still show a solid majority of Taiwanese identifying as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, suggesting that Beijing’s narrative campaigns have yet to shift the island’s self‑perception.While China deploys these non‑military tools, Taiwan is struggling to adapt its defence posture.  The DPP has proposed a special budget worth around US$40 billion to procure hundreds of thousands of unmanned systems, develop an integrated air and missile defence network and fund the domestic arms industry.  Opposition parties controlling the legislature have delayed the budget, preferring a smaller package focused on conventional platforms such as artillery and anti‑tank missiles.  Delays threaten to slow deliveries of High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, self‑propelled howitzers and anti‑tank weapons from the United States.  At the same time, Taipei is investing in its first domestically built submarine and plans to upgrade two Dutch‑built boats from the 1980s.  Such measures are meant to raise the cost of aggression and complicate any blockade.Elsewhere in the region, countries are recalibrating their own strategies in anticipation of cross‑strait tensions.  Japan has acquired Tomahawk cruise missiles from the United States and is modifying its destroyers to carry them, signalling a shift towards a counter‑strike doctrine that can threaten missile launch platforms on the Chinese coast.  The Philippines and Japan have agreed to step up military intelligence sharing and have begun negotiating a boundary in their overlapping exclusive economic zones east of Taiwan.  Manila is seeking Japanese anti‑submarine destroyers and anti‑ship missiles to bolster its navy.  Such cooperation, alongside the United States’ continued security commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act, suggests that any attempt by Beijing to seal off the island would face a more coordinated regional response.Seen together, these developments reveal why Beijing may perceive hybrid coercion as “something better” than a risky assault.  China’s ability to project force across the Taiwan Strait has improved markedly, but its leaders recognise that a failed invasion would jeopardise economic growth and political legitimacy.  By combining military modernisation with psychological operations, energy leverage, political interference and calibrated maritime pressure, Beijing hopes to corrode Taiwan’s will and convince its citizens that unification is inevitable.  Whether this strategy succeeds will depend on Taiwan’s resilience, the cohesion of its democratic institutions and the willingness of regional partners to deter aggression.  For now, the contest remains a test not of who can fire the first shot, but of whose vision for the island’s future will ultimately prevail.