Coin Press - UK politics: Outlook for 2026

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UK politics: Outlook for 2026




Barely six months after the landslide general election of late 2024, the new Labour government entered 2025 with high expectations and a hefty parliamentary majority. That optimism quickly gave way to impatience as voters confronted a cost‑of‑living crisis, strained public services and a sense that promises of “change” had yet to translate into tangible improvements. Opinion polls showed unprecedented volatility, with Reform UK and the Greens capitalising on frustration to peel supporters away from both major parties. By late summer the combined backing for “insurgent” parties outstripped that of Labour and the Conservatives, signalling a shift toward multi‑party politics and a deadlock between loosely defined left‑ and right‑leaning blocs.

Domestic politics were rarely short of drama. In January, Economic Secretary to the Treasury Tulip Siddiq resigned following controversy over her financial ties to relatives abroad, and Home Secretary Yvette Cooper announced a nationwide review into grooming gangs. February saw Health Minister Andrew Gwynne dismissed for sending abusive messages, and the government cut international aid to boost defence spending to 2.5 % of GDP by 2027, prompting the resignation of International Development Minister Anneliese Dodds. In March, Reform UK MP Rupert Lowe was suspended after publicly attacking Nigel Farage’s leadership, exposing fissures within the rising populist movement.

April brought a reminder of the state’s willingness to intervene in industry. Parliament was recalled over Easter to fast‑track the Steel Industry (Special Measures) Act, enabling ministers to take control of the Scunthorpe steelworks. The emergency law prevented the closure of Britain’s last blast furnaces, safeguarded thousands of jobs and gave the government powers to direct the board and workforce while a rescue plan was put in place. The episode underscored a new willingness to wield state power to protect “nationally critical” capabilities.

Local elections in May deepened the sense of volatility. Reform UK captured 677 of roughly 1,600 contested council seats, while the Liberal Democrats gained 160 seats and seized control of several county councils. Labour’s majority proved brittle as dozens of backbench MPs publicly opposed proposed cuts to disability benefits. In June the government was forced into a climb‑down over winter fuel payments and faced the emergence of two break‑away movements from Reform UK: Advance UK, led by Ben Habib, and Restore Britain, led by Rupert Lowe.

July delivered a landmark for foreign and domestic policy alike. Prime Minister Keir Starmer hosted German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in London to sign the so‑called Kensington Treaty—an ambitious friendship pact that included plans for a direct high‑speed rail link between London and Berlin and deeper cooperation on energy, security and climate action. The agreement set up a joint taskforce to overcome regulatory barriers and signalled an aspiration to strengthen European connectivity and decarbonise long‑distance travel. The month also saw Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch reshuffle her shadow cabinet, and former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn teamed up with backbencher Zarah Sultana to launch a new left‑wing party, provisionally titled Your Party.

Political scandals returned in late summer. Housing and homelessness minister Rushanara Ali resigned in August after criticism over a rent hike at a property she owned. In September, Deputy Prime Minister and Labour deputy leader Angela Rayner stepped down after admitting she had underpaid stamp duty on her Hove flat. Her departure forced a sweeping reshuffle: David Lammy became Deputy Prime Minister, Yvette Cooper moved to the Foreign Office and Shabana Mahmood took over as Home Secretary. United States President Donald Trump’s second state visit that month added to the diplomatic circus. 

October’s Caerphilly by‑election delivered a shock when Plaid Cymru overturned a Labour seat for the first time since the Senedd was established in 1999. At Labour’s conference in Liverpool, grassroots dissatisfaction manifested when Lucy Powell defeated Education Secretary Bridget Phillipson to become deputy party leader, signalling demands for a more left‑wing agenda. 

The year’s final months offered no respite. Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood announced that elected police and crime commissioners would be abolished from 2028, while First Minister John Swinney said the Scottish government would issue its first bonds in 2026‑27. In late November, Chancellor Rachel Reeves presented the Autumn Budget, which scrapped the two‑child benefit limit and raised the National Living Wage, but funded some measures through “stealth taxes” such as freezing income tax thresholds. Embarrassment followed when the Office for Budget Responsibility mistakenly published its economic and fiscal outlook online 40 minutes before Reeves delivered her statement, causing market turbulence. The leak triggered an investigation and the resignation of OBR chair Richard Hughes in December. By year’s end, Labour’s poll ratings had plummeted. Reform UK led national surveys, while the Greens approached parity with the Conservatives. Speculation mounted about potential leadership challenges and the likelihood that the May 2026 local and devolved elections could determine the fate of Starmer’s premiership.

Foreign policy and the enduring war in Ukraine
Despite domestic turmoil, the UK sought to reclaim a leadership role abroad. The most significant act was the signing of a century‑long partnership with Ukraine. During his first trip to Kyiv as prime minister in January, Starmer promised that Britain would support Ukraine “beyond this terrible war” and into a future where it was free and thriving. The One Hundred Year Partnership commits the UK to providing at least £3 billion in military assistance annually until 2030/31—and for as long as needed thereafter. It also pledges cooperation on defence production, training, air and missile defence, intelligence sharing and joint innovation. The pact is broad, covering economic recovery, scientific collaboration and cultural ties, and was accompanied by commitments to supply mobile air‑defence systems and 150 artillery barrels. 

The agreement was signed against a backdrop of shifting geopolitics. With the United States under the new Trump administration reluctant to approve additional Ukraine funding and publicly advocating for a negotiated settlement, European nations assumed greater responsibility for security on the continent. The UK and Germany took over leadership of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, which coordinates military assistance, while London and Paris pushed for a “coalition of the willing” to guarantee any future peace deal. European governments simultaneously expanded sanctions against Russia, agreed to increase defence spending and launched new funding mechanisms to procure equipment directly from industry. Bilateral donations of weapons gave way to initiatives aimed at joint production and financing Ukraine’s defence industry, with the UK and other allies emphasising rapid innovation and resilience.

This alignment with Kyiv reflected the government’s belief that Russia’s invasion threatened European security and the international rules‑based order. Starmer’s visit to Kyiv underscored the immediacy of the threat: during a press conference with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the Mariinskyi Palace, a Russian drone buzzed overhead, prompting anti‑aircraft fire. The incident reinforced London’s argument that Ukraine’s defence is inseparable from Europe’s security and that the UK must play a long‑term role in ensuring Ukrainian sovereignty.

Looking ahead to 2026: challenges and choices
The coming year promises to be pivotal. On the domestic front, the May 2026 local and devolved elections will be a referendum on Labour’s first 18 months in office. Polling experts expect Labour to suffer heavy losses across English councils, the Welsh Senedd and the Scottish Parliament. With Reform UK leading national polls and the Greens surging under new leader Zak Polanski, Labour faces pressure from both left and right. The Conservatives, led by Kemi Badenoch, hope to rebuild after their 2024 drubbing, while new parties such as Advance UK, Restore Britain and Your Party could fragment the vote further. A poor showing in May could trigger a leadership challenge against Starmer and Chancellor Rachel Reeves or prompt calls for an early general election. 

Economic headwinds remain severe. Fiscal space is limited, and the government is locked into pledges to keep borrowing within strict limits while funding rising welfare costs, investing in healthcare and increasing defence spending. The NHS will continue to test the government’s ability to deliver: ministers have promised a ten‑year plan centred on prevention, technological innovation and neighbourhood‑based care, yet reforms take time to translate into improved outcomes, and staffing shortages persist. Housing, transport and net‑zero commitments also demand urgent attention, especially as opposition parties champion radically different energy policies.

Internationally, Ukraine will remain at the centre of British foreign policy. The 100‑year partnership binds the UK to provide at least £3 billion annually in military aid and to deepen industrial cooperation with Ukraine. With Washington signalling reduced support and Russia showing no sign of halting its aggression, European nations must fill the vacuum. Britain’s leadership of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group and its role in brokering peace‑keeping guarantees will require sustained diplomatic and financial investment. Maintaining domestic consensus for such assistance in the face of economic hardship will be challenging, yet failure to support Ukraine could embolden an increasingly authoritarian Russia and undermine Europe’s security architecture.

2025 revealed both the fragility and resilience of Britain’s political system. Voters demonstrated that they are willing to abandon traditional allegiances, while ministers discovered that big majorities offer little protection when expectations run high and delivery is difficult. The year ahead will test whether the government can stabilise public services, manage economic constraints, and articulate a compelling vision that counters the insurgent appeal of Reform UK and the Greens. Above all, it will test Britain’s capacity to balance domestic discontent with its moral and strategic commitment to supporting Ukraine’s struggle against Russian aggression. 



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Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Да здравствует Украина

Es lebe die Ukraine - Да здравствует Украина - Long live Ukraine - Хай живе Україна - Nech žije Ukrajina - Länge leve Ukraina - תחי אוקראינה - Lang leve Oekraïne - Да живее Украйна - Elagu Ukraina - Kauan eläköön Ukraina - Vive l'Ukraine - Ζήτω η Ουκρανία - 乌克兰万岁 - Viva Ucrania - Ať žije Ukrajina - Çok yaşa Ukrayna - Viva a Ucrânia - Trăiască Ucraina - ウクライナ万歳 - Tegyvuoja Ukraina - Lai dzīvo Ukraina - Viva l'Ucraina - Hidup Ukraina - تحيا أوكرانيا - Vivat Ucraina - ขอให้ยูเครนจงเจริญ - Ucraina muôn năm - ژوندی دی وی اوکراین - Yashasin Ukraina - Озак яшә Украина - Živjela Ukrajina - 우크라이나 만세 - Mabuhay ang Ukraine - Lenge leve Ukraina - Nyob ntev Ukraine - Да живее Украина - გაუმარჯოს უკრაინას - Hidup Ukraine - Vivu Ukrainio - Længe leve Ukraine - Živjela Ukrajina - Жыве Украіна - Yaşasın Ukrayna - Lengi lifi Úkraína - Lank lewe die Oekraïne

Stargate project, Trump and the AI war...

In a dramatic return to the global political stage, former President Donald J. Trump, as the current 47th President of the United States of America, has unveiled his latest initiative, the so-called ‘Stargate Project,’ in a bid to cement the United States’ dominance in artificial intelligence and outpace China’s meteoric rise in the field. The newly announced programme, cloaked in patriotic rhetoric and ambitious targets, is already stirring intense debate over the future of technological competition between the world’s two largest economies.According to preliminary statements from Trump’s team, the Stargate Project will consolidate the efforts of leading American tech conglomerates, defence contractors, and research universities under a centralised framework. The former president, who has long championed American exceptionalism, claims this approach will provide the United States with a decisive advantage, enabling rapid breakthroughs in cutting-edge AI applications ranging from military strategy to commercial innovation.“America must remain the global leader in technology—no ifs, no buts,” Trump declared at a recent press conference. “China has been trying to surpass us in AI, but with this new project, we will make sure the future remains ours.”Details regarding funding and governance remain scarce, but early indications suggest the initiative will rely heavily on public-private partnerships, tax incentives for research and development, and collaboration with high-profile venture capital firms. Skeptics, however, warn that the endeavour could fan the flames of an increasingly militarised AI race, raising ethical concerns about surveillance, automation of warfare, and data privacy. Critics also question whether the initiative can deliver on its lofty promises, especially in the face of existing economic and geopolitical pressures.Yet for its supporters, the Stargate Project serves as a rallying cry for renewed American leadership and an antidote to worries over China’s technological ascendancy. Proponents argue that accelerating AI research is paramount if the United States wishes to preserve not just military supremacy, but also the economic and cultural influence that has typified its global role for decades.Whether this bold project will succeed—or if it will devolve into a symbolic gesture—remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Stargate Project has already reignited debate about how best to safeguard America’s strategic future and maintain the balance of power in the fast-evolving arena of artificial intelligence.

The dollar's strange turn

The dollar is strengthening in currency markets while its share of global foreign exchange reserves is declining. Central banks are accumulating gold, yet digital finance is creating additional channels for holding and transferring dollars. These developments reveal a monetary system changing in several directions at once, with consequences that extend well beyond the daily exchange rate.   By 13 November, the dollar was trading near its highest level against a basket of major currencies in 19 months. The euro stood at roughly $1.10, while the Japanese yen hovered close to 160 per dollar. Two-year US Treasury yields had risen by about 34 basis points over the week to around 4.87%, reflecting a substantial reassessment of the outlook for American interest rates. Those figures sit uneasily alongside another development. In the second quarter of 2026, the dollar’s share of global foreign exchange reserves fell to 56.70%. Its position in official reserve portfolios was becoming less concentrated even as its exchange rate subsequently strengthened.   The apparent contradiction becomes easier to understand once the dollar’s different functions are separated. Its price against other currencies, its place in central bank portfolios and its use in international payments respond to different incentives and operate over different timescales.   A rally driven by uncomfortable economicsThe latest advance has been supported by persistent inflation and expectations of tighter monetary policy. Stronger-than-expected inflation figures and firm comments from Federal Reserve officials pushed investors to reconsider how far US interest rates might rise.   Higher expected interest rates can support a currency by increasing the prospective return on assets denominated in it. That mechanism helps explain why troubling inflation news can coincide with a stronger dollar. Investors may respond to the anticipated policy response before the underlying economic problem has been resolved. The implications for households are quite different. A dollar that buys more euros or yen can still buy fewer goods and services at home. External currency strength and domestic purchasing power measure separate things.   For businesses, the effects are similarly uneven. A stronger dollar can reduce some import costs over time, while making American exports more expensive for foreign customers. Companies earning substantial revenues overseas can also face a reduction in the dollar value of those earnings. The exchange rate redistributes pressure across the economy; its rise alone says little about whether that pressure is becoming easier to bear.   The refuge is being judged more carefullyThe dollar’s behaviour during the tariff turmoil of April 2025 exposed a vulnerability that remains relevant. American equities fell, Treasury prices came under pressure and the currency weakened. In a conventional flight to safety, investors would normally expect stronger demand for dollars and US government debt.   The unusual combination mattered because the disturbance originated partly in American policy. Investors had to assess the reliability of the assets they would ordinarily use for protection. A rise in Treasury yields can therefore carry different messages. It may reflect stronger growth or expectations of higher policy rates. It can also reflect greater compensation demanded for inflation, uncertainty or the risks associated with holding longer-term debt. The direction of yields alone cannot distinguish between these explanations.   The lesson from that episode is that the dollar’s defensive qualities depend partly on the nature of the shock. Deep markets and abundant liquidity remain considerable advantages, but their value is reinforced by confidence in policy and institutions. That confidence has to survive periods when Washington itself becomes a source of uncertainty.   A smaller share of a larger reserve poolThe reserve figures require equally careful interpretation. Global foreign exchange reserves increased from $13.10 trillion in the first quarter of 2026 to $13.22 trillion in the second. Dollar-denominated holdings were broadly unchanged, while holdings in euros and several other currencies increased. The dollar’s share consequently declined from 57.18% to 56.70% without a corresponding large-scale reduction in the amount of dollars held. The euro’s share rose from 20.04% to 20.60%, while the Chinese renminbi reached 2.11%.   This distinction changes the meaning of the numbers. Reserve managers can diversify by directing additional funds towards other currencies while retaining their existing dollar portfolios. A declining percentage does not establish that central banks are collectively liquidating American assets.The latest quarterly changes also cannot be explained primarily by exchange-rate movements, whose valuation effects were limited during the period. Portfolio decisions and other asset-price changes played a greater role.   The resulting picture is one of gradual redistribution. The dollar remains far ahead of its nearest competitors, even as reserve managers reduce the concentration of their holdings.   Gold offers a different form of protectionGold provides another indication of changing reserve preferences. Estimated net purchases by central banks and other official institutions reached approximately 321 tonnes in the third quarter of 2026, bringing purchases during the first nine months to about 675 tonnes. These totals include estimates of activity that has not been publicly disclosed. Reported net purchases for the third quarter were around 120 tonnes, substantially below the estimated overall figure. That gap limits how confidently individual countries’ intentions can be inferred from the headline total.   Gold has an attraction that a government bond cannot replicate: the metal itself is no other institution’s liability. It can therefore serve a distinct purpose in portfolios designed to withstand political or financial disruption. It also pays no interest and can fluctuate sharply in price. Its accumulation indicates demand for diversification and resilience, but does not establish that it can assume the dollar’s functions in lending, invoicing and everyday settlement.   The dollar remains embedded in the machineryThe structure of international finance continues to favour the US currency. In April 2025, the dollar appeared on one side of 89.2% of foreign exchange transactions, compared with 88.4% in 2022. Average daily turnover across the global foreign exchange market reached approximately $9.6 trillion.   These figures measure trading activity, a different function from the accumulation of official reserves. Each currency transaction involves two currencies, so the dollar’s participation rate should not be interpreted as a share of worldwide savings or wealth. Its extensive use nevertheless demonstrates how deeply it is embedded in financial operations. Businesses borrow in dollars, investors hedge dollar exposures and financial institutions obtain dollar funding. Existing contracts and established markets create continuing demand even when some participants would prefer greater diversification.   Replacing that infrastructure requires liquid investment markets, dependable legal arrangements and the ability to move substantial sums without excessive cost. A competing payment platform or a bilateral agreement to use another currency can change particular transactions. Reproducing the full range of dollar financing remains a much larger undertaking.   Digital finance is carrying dollars into new placesOne of the most consequential changes is taking place through stablecoins: privately issued digital tokens designed to maintain a specified value, commonly one US dollar. These instruments can make dollar-denominated value accessible through digital wallets and trading platforms, including in places where conventional access to foreign-currency banking is limited. Their use creates another route through which households and businesses can save, transfer or transact in dollars.   The connection with American government debt is already substantial. Tether reported approximately $184 billion in USDT issuance and $132.4 billion in direct and indirect exposure to US Treasury bills at the end of September 2026. Its total reserve assets were approximately $191.5 billion. Those figures illustrate a financial link that can be overlooked in discussions of cryptocurrency. Demand for a privately issued digital dollar can support demand for the short-term securities used to back it. This creates an important possibility: governments may seek greater monetary independence while private users continue choosing dollar-denominated products. Official diversification and wider digital dollar access can develop simultaneously.   The arrangement also introduces additional dependencies. Users rely on an issuer’s reserves, redemption arrangements and operational systems. Digital access changes how dollar exposure is obtained; it does not eliminate the need to examine the institutions supporting it.   America’s borrowing needs remain a central weaknessThe expansion of dollar access takes place against a demanding fiscal background. The United States recorded a federal budget deficit of approximately $2.0 trillion in the fiscal year ending September 2026, equivalent to 6.2% of gross domestic product. Federal debt held by the public reached approximately 100% of GDP. Persistent borrowing requires sustained demand for government securities. The Treasury market’s size is an advantage for international investors because it offers an extensive supply of tradable assets. Maintaining confidence becomes more consequential as the volume of debt increases.   Higher interest rates complicate that relationship. They can support the dollar in currency markets while increasing financing costs as the government issues new debt and refinances maturing obligations. The immediate benefit to the exchange rate can therefore coexist with a worsening fiscal burden. Stablecoin reserves add a meaningful source of demand for short-term debt, but their importance should be kept in proportion. They cannot by themselves resolve the gap between federal revenue and expenditure or remove uncertainty about future borrowing costs.   The consequences reach beyond AmericaFor countries and companies with dollar liabilities but revenues in weaker local currencies, dollar appreciation can make debt service more expensive. Dollar-priced imports can also become harder to afford, complicating the work of central banks already facing domestic economic pressures.   These costs help explain the incentive to diversify. Yet the practical need to settle contracts, obtain financing and manage existing obligations can sustain dollar demand even among borrowers seeking to reduce their dependence. The evidence points towards a more differentiated monetary order. Reserve managers are spreading risk, digital platforms are broadening access to dollar instruments, and investors are examining American policy more closely.   What looks strange is the coexistence of these forces. A stronger exchange rate can accompany a smaller reserve share. Greater concern about US borrowing can coexist with continued demand for Treasury securities. Technologies intended to change finance can carry the dollar further into it. The decisive issue is how these relationships develop over time. America retains the benefits of a currency that much of the world continues to use. Preserving those benefits will depend on the credibility of the fiscal, monetary and institutional foundations beneath it.